East African Community
East African Community Model Investment Treaty
- Published
- Not commenced
- [This is the version of this document at 1 February 2016.]
Commentary:The preamble introduces the objectives and intentions of the Treaty, and serves as guidance for its application and interpretation. The preamble highlights the importance of cooperation between the Parties and their desire to encourage investment, in view of its potential contribution to sustainable development, while preserving the states’ right to regulate, and strike a balance between rights and obligations of investors and states. |
Part 1 – Common provisions
Article 1 – Objective
Commentary: This article outlines the main objective of the Model Investment Treaty: to encourage and increase foreign investment between the state parties, but not any type of foreign investment only those investments that effectively support the sustainable development of both parties, particularly the host state party. |
Article 2 – Definitions
For the purpose of this Treaty, unless the context otherwise requires:Force Majeure means act of God beyond the Parties’ control;Home State means, in relation toa.a natural person, the State Party of nationality or predominant residence of the investor in accordance with the laws of that State Partyb.a legal or juridical person, the State Party of incorporation or registration of the investor in accordance with the laws of that State Partyand declared as the Home State at the time of registration where required under the law of the Host State.Host State means the State Party where the investment is located.ICSID means the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States as amended to date.Commentary:The definition of "investment" determines the scope of the treaty’s protection, defining which foreign assets and persons can benefit from the rights granted in the treaty, including the right to initiate arbitration against the host state. |
Article 3 – Scope and coverage
Commentary:This Article offers a generally acceptable way to outline the scope and coverage of the treaty |
Part 2 – Substantive provisions
Article 4 – National treatment
Commentary:National Treatment requires non-discrimination as between domestic and foreign investors.This article does not to extend National Treatment to investors and investments during the pre-establishment phase, by not including the words "establishment, acquisition, expansion", and by covering only "the management, operation and disposition" of investments. This would allow EAC Partner States to preserve their policy space and to open or close sectors to investment in accordance to their development strategies.Paragraph 4.3 (a), refers to separate schedules that allow for each party to submit lists of measures and sectors permanently excluded from the scope of the post establishment non-discrimination obligations under the treaty. This is in line with most advanced investment agreements, which allow for many exceptions to post establishment National Treatment coverage. In turn, paragraph 4.3(b) grandfathers all existing non-conforming measures, reducing the burden of listing all existing measures and the risk of forgetting to list some. |
Article 5 – Most favoured nation treatment
Commentary:Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN) requires the non-discrimination between foreign investors of different nationalities.The MFN clause (under paragraph 5.1) (1) does not include pre-establishment commitments (as expressions establishment, acquisition, expansion" are not included), (2) the term "in like circumstances" is clarified under paragraph 4.2, and (3) treatment promised under other treaties is appropriately excluded from MFN coverage under paragraph 4.7.In addition to the schedules, the article also provides for exclusions.Paragraph 5.2 excludes the application of MFN to the advantages given to investors under other international agreements. |
Article 6 – Treatment of investors and investments
Commentary:The language in this article adopts a more restricted formulation which is less likely to lead to expansive interpretations, unlike the traditional FET provisions common to many BITs. It changes the focus from investor rights to governance standards, narrows the scope and coverage of FET.An alternative approach has been included, based on the approach of the Indian Model BIT. |
Article 7 – Expropriation
Article 8 – Senior management and employees
Commentary: This article provides for the host state to require progressive increases in the number of senior management, executive or specialized knowledge positions for nationals of the host state to occupy, and to institute training and mentoring program. |
Article 9 – Transfers
Commentary:This article provides for a general right of an investor to repatriate its assets, subject to prudential measures, law enforcement, tax obligations, and a general emergency balance of payments situation. It includes clear and strong safeguards (under paragraph 9.4) to ensure the ability of the state to reply to emergency situations. |
Article 10 – Compliance with domestic law
Commentary:The objective of Articles 10 and 11 is to ensure that the conduct, management and operations of Investors and their Investments are consistent with the Law of the Host State, and enhance the contribution of Investments to inclusive growth and sustainable development of the Host State. |
Article 11 – Obligation against corruption
Article 12 – Provision of information
Article 13 – Investor liability
Commentary:This article does not create a determination of liability of the investor; it merely requires home states to restrict the use of procedural or jurisdictional constraints (such as the forum non conveniens rule) to hearings on the merits of cases concerning investor acts. The article ensures that an investor scan be held liable for impacts abroad of the decisions they take in their home state. |
Article 14 – Transparency of contracts and payments
Commentary:This article aims at enhancing transparency in contract negotiations and payments by investors to the government. |
Article 15 – Right of states to regulate
Commentary:This article reinforces that the treaty does not change the states’ right to regulate, already affirmed in one of the preambular paragraphs. Considering the broad provisions contained in investment treaties, the significant number of investment treaty arbitrations challenging states’ regulatory measures, and the risk that investment tribunals interpret the investment treaty as purely protecting the rights of investors, it is useful and important to reaffirm in the treaty text the states’ right to regulate in the public interest. |
Article 16 – Right to pursue development goals
Commentary:This article provides exclusions from the treaty for measures taken to promote development within host states. In particular, it ensures that performance requirements may be imposed by states on foreign investors to promote the social and economic benefits of their investment in the host state. Subparagraph 15.2(b) highlights that a state may impose requirements on investors (before or) at the time of the establishment or acquisition of the investment, so that the investor can make an informed decision on establishment or acquisition, and those requirements will be applied during its operation. |
Article 17 – Transparency of information by state parties
Commentary:This article promotes transparency of the information about the investment-making process. Publication of laws and regulations is a binding obligation, and policies and other administrative measures are under a best-endeavour obligation. However, these obligations are not subject to Investor to State Dispute Settlement. |
Article 18 – Exceptions
Commentary:This article provides exceptions seen in different regional and bilateral investment treaties. |
Article 19 – Denial of benefits
Commentary:This article provides for two types of situations where a state may deny an investor the benefits of the treaty, including access to dispute settlement: (1) in the lack of diplomatic relations between the host state and the home state, or when the home state is subject to economic sanctions by the host state, and (2) in the investor’s lack of substantial business activity in the home state (paragraph 2 might not be needed if the definition of "investor" under Article 2 of the Draft EAC Model adopts a "substantial" or "substantive" business test, to avoid treaty-shopping). |
Article 20 – Periodic review of this Treaty
Commentary:This article requires the Parties to review the Treaty every five years and adopt readjustments if needed. |
Part 3 – Dispute settlement
Article 21 – Counter-claims by State Parties
Commentary:This article makes clear that breaches of the Treaty by the investor can and should be taken into account in any dispute settlement proceedings, allows counterclaims by the states, and creates monetary liability in domestic courts for treaty breaches by an investor. These provisions seek to address the concerns with the enforceability of investor obligations under the treaty. |
Article 22 – State-State dispute settlement
Commentry:Most investment treaties include a State-State dispute settlement provision. This article divides out the two possible roles of a State-State dispute settlement system: a State claiming damages on behalf of an investor for an alleged breach of the treaty; and a “pure” dispute between the State Parties themselves over the interpretation or application of the treaty. Importantly, the former is made subject to the same exhaustion of local remedies requirements as the following article on investor-State arbitration.Paragraphs 22.1 and 22.2 set out a requirement to seek to resolve disputes by amicable means prior to resorting to a formal and binding dispute settlement process. This is very common. Paragraph 22.2 seeks to encourage a formal mediation process and makes it mandatory for both parties to enter into such a process if one party formally states it desires to do so. Mediation is a non-binding process; hence a solution to the potential dispute cannot be imposed during mediation without the consent of both State Parties.Paragraph 22.3 sets out the two options for State-State dispute settlement noted above: a State acting on behalf of an investor and a State initiating the process in order to resolve a dispute directly between itself and the other State Party. States have, under customary international law, a right to make claims for damages suffered by their citizens or businesses due to breaches of international law by a State. The provisions allowing for a State Party to make a claim on behalf of an investor here reflects a concrete application of this customary law right.Paragraph 22.4 requires the exhaustion of local remedies by an investor or investment before a State may initiate a claim on behalf of an investor. Theexhaustion of local remedies clause means that before any claim can be taken under the dispute settlement process set out in the treaty, the investor or investment must have sought to resolve the dispute in the local courts or other dispute settlementprocesses available in the Host State. It is important to note here that the language for such a clause must be set out as domestic proceedings relating to the measures underlying the claim under this Treaty. Some treaties have phrased the condition as requiring a claim concerning the breach of the treaty to be taken in the domestic courts, if it can be so taken. However, most States do not allow claims for a breach of the treaty per se to be taken, but rather a claim that the measure taken by the government is otherwise in breach of the domestic law or constitution. This difference is important. In addition, the exhaustion of local remedies clause allows a State seeking to take a claim on behalf of an investor or investment to argue that no local remedies are available under which to challenge the underlying measure. A State making such a claim must show evidence of this in order to be entitled to go directly to the international process.Paragraphs 22.5–22.8 are fairly standard paragraphs relating to the appointment and operation of a tribunal at the international level. They ensure that the tribunal can be appointed and become functional even if one State is recalcitrant and uncooperative.Paragraph 22.9 sets out options that States may consider for identifying the arbitration rules that will be applied by the tribunal to the dispute. This can be made specific, or left general. It should be noted that a tribunal can utilize the ICSID arbitration rules, which are fully accessible at any time to the public, without having to utilize the ICSID process if it does not wish to. Similarly, the UNCITRAL arbitration rules can be adopted, or any other rules, without any other impacts on the organization of the arbitration.Paragraphs 22.10–22.13 are drawn from the COMESA approach and more recent approaches to investor-State arbitration in the U.S. and Canadian treaties, as well as others. Paragraph 21.10 requires that all the key arbitral documents be made public. Posting them on a website is the easiest way to do this.Paragraph 22.11 allows for the participation of amicus curiae, either organizations or individuals, with an interest in the case.Paragraph 22.12 requires the tribunal hearings to be open to the public. Paragraph 22.13 sets out the exception to the previous few paragraphs, that the tribunal can take such steps as may be needed to protect confidential business information from being put into the public domain. For documents this can be done by redacting any such information from the public versions. For oral hearings it may mean holding portions of a session in camera. |
Article 23 – Investor-State dispute settlement
SPECIAL NOTE: the preferred option is not to include investor-State dispute settlement. Several States are opting out or looking at opting out of investor-State mechanisms, including Australia, South Africa and others.However, if EAC decide to negotiate and include this, the text below may provide guidance for this purpose |
Article 24 – Interpretive statement of the State Parties
Commentary:This provision may serve as a safety valve to prevent unintended interpretations having binding force on the states, while making it easier for states to interpret the treaty without a need to amend it. |
Article 25 – Governing law in dispute settlement
Commentary:This article is aimed at ensuring a broad approach to the interpretation and application of the treaty, preventing tribunals from focusing on investment protection provisions only, and precluding the addition of obligations from other parts of international law. |
Article 26 – Service of documents
Delivery of notices and other documents on a State Party shall be made to the place named for that State Party.Part 4 – Final provisions
Commentary:The final provisions establish key aspects such as entry into force, period in force and termination, possibility of amendment, schedules and notes that form part of the Treaty, and language of the authentic texts. |
Article 27 – Entry into force
Commentary:This is a key technical legal provision required to ensure clarity on when the obligations on the parties become legally binding. |
Article 28 – Period in force and termination
Commentary:The initial period for which the treaty would be in force is ten years. The treaty renews automatically at the end of ten years for a further ten years, indefinitely, unless either Party notifies the other of its wish to not have the treaty renew itself.In addition, the text provides a mechanism for either Party to terminate the treaty upon 12 months notice to the other Party. This provides an additional safety valve for the Parties in the event of significant difficulties being experienced, significant differences in interpretation or application of the treaty, or other policy reasons a State may have to terminate the treaty. This specific rule would replace general rules under the Vienna Convention.Finally, it is common for investment treaties to provide for a period of continued application of the treaty in favour of investors of the other State Party made prior to the termination of the treaty. In some instances, treaties have extended this period to between 20 and 30 years. In other instances, the period has been 10 years. The shorter period is proposed here, with an additional option to adopt only a 5-year time period. |