i. The Respondent’s Submissions

30. The Respondent submits that the Applicants’ reliance on the 2002 Expulsion Regulations and statements made by higher-ranking officials, particularly those preceding the District Commissioner’s statement, reveal that the District Commissioner’s statement is not the real impetus for their Reference.

31. The Respondent contends that the Applicants’ cause of action is rooted in these earlier events, thus rendering their Reference time- barred. The Respondent posits that the District Commissioner's statement merely draws its legal basis from the 2002 regulations and pronouncements by officials like former President, John Pombe Magufuli and the former Minister of Home Affairs. The Respondent also contends that without these pre-existing legal frameworks and pronouncements, the District Commissioner lacked the authority to issue the statement in question, further reinforcing the Respondent’s argument that the true source of the Applicants’ grievance lies in those preceding actions.

32. The Respondent further submits that the Applicants’ claim includes a request for declarations regarding the legality of the Regulations, specifically Regulations 4(b) & (c) and 7(b). That, by their own pleadings, the Applicants acknowledge that these Regulations were promulgated in 2002. As such, the Respondent asserts that the Applicants’ claims, in as far as challenging the legality of the Regulations themselves, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court due to the expiration of the limitation period.

33. Supporting the claim that the Reference is time-barred, the Respondent cited the case of Legal Brains Trust Limited vs Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, EACJ Appeal No. 4 of 2012, where the Court held that it could not adjudicate a matter that was purely academic or lacked live controversy between the involved parties. Building on this precedent, the Respondent argued that the Applicants have failed to establish a live controversy before the Court, implying that their claims are based on past events rather than a current and actionable dispute.

ii. The Applicants’ Submissions

34. The Applicants strenuously submitted that the Reference was filed within the time frame prescribed by Article 30(2) of the Treaty; that is, within two months because the Reference is centred solely on the District Commissioner's statement made on 29^th February 2020.

35. The Applicants argued that their Reference, filed on 28^th April 2020, falls squarely within the two months’ time limit prescribed by Article 30(2) of the Treaty.

36. The Applicants acknowledged their inclusion of the 2002 Expulsion Regulations, former President Magufuli’s pronouncements, and the former Minister of Home Affairs’ statements in their Reference. However, they maintained that these references served purely contextual purposes and are not the foundation of their cause of action. The Applicants emphasized that their Reference is focused solely on the District Commissioner’s statement, which they allege infringes upon the Treaty.

37. Thus, the Applicants contend that the Court’s jurisdiction should be confined to this statement and not extend to previous government statements or regulations cited to provide context. The Applicants further emphasized that their case hinges on the District Commissioner's statement made within the two-months’ time limit, which is the sole basis of their Reference and, as such, the Reference is not time-barred.

iii. The Court's Determination of Issue 1

38. Jurisdiction is the cornerstone of any judicial process. Without it, the Court lacks the authority to exercise its powers under the Treaty. This principle was affirmed in the case of Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania vs African Network of Animal Welfare, EACJ Appeal No. 3 of 2011, where the Court observed:

“Jurisdiction is a most, if not the most, fundamental issue that a Court faces in any trial. It is the very foundation upon which the judicial edifice is constructed; from which springs the flow of the judicial process. Without jurisdiction, a Court cannot take even the proverbial first Chinese step in its judicial journey to hear and dispose of the case.”

39. The above decision emphasizes the essence of jurisdiction as a prerequisite for judicial action. It underscores that without establishing jurisdiction, the court cannot embark on its judicial process.

40. In the case of Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania vs Anthony Calist Komu, EACJ Appeal No. 2 of 2015, the Court clarified the three dimensions of jurisdiction: ratione personae, ratione materiae, and ratione temporis. These categories were explained as follows:

“Lack of ratione personae would arise where one of the parties lacks the legal capacity or standing to appear before the Court. On the other hand, ratione materiae relates to the subject matter of the dispute, and whether it falls within the Court's competence under the Treaty or applicable conventions. Ratione temporis refers to whether the case was initiated within the time frame prescribed for instituting proceedings in the Court.”

41. Likewise, in the case of Alcon International Limited vs Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda and 2 Others, EACJ Appeal No. 3 of 2013, the Appellate Division of this Court cited with approval the

Kenyan Court of Appeal decision in Owners of the Motor Vessels ‘Lillian S’ vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) KLR where Nyarangi, J.A. noted that:

“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a Court has not power to make one step. Where a court has no Jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of the proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds that it is without jurisdiction ”.

42. Further, in the case of Eric Kabalisa Makala vs the Attorney General of Rwanda, EACJ Reference No.1 of 2017, this Court held:

“Thus, to succeed on a claim of lack of jurisdiction in this Court, a party must demonstrate the absence of any of the three (3) types of jurisdictions: ratione personael locus standi, ratione materiae and ratione temporis. Simply stated, these 3 jurisdictional elements respectively translate into jurisdiction on account of the person concerned, matter involved and the time element.”

43. In the current Reference, no objections have been raised regarding the Court's jurisdiction in terms of ratione personae or ratione materiae. The Applicants have locus standi as residents of a Partner State within the East African Community, and the subject matter involves alleged breaches of the Treaty, over which this Court has clear jurisdiction. The only issue in contention regarding jurisdiction relates to ratione temporis—specifically, whether the Reference was filed within the prescribed time limit.

44. In this Reference, the Applicants assert that the Reference was filed on 28^th April 2020, arguing that the cause of action arose on 29^th February 2020 when the statement in question was issued. This Court must evaluate whether the Applicant has complied with the stringent temporal requirements outlined in Article 30(2) of the Treaty, as the resolution of this issue is critical to determining the validity of the Reference.

45. For purposes of clarity, we find it apt to reproduce most of the grounds that make up the subject matter of the Applicants’ Statement of Reference as they form the gist of the controversy between the parties in as far as the jurisdiction of this Court is concerned.

46. From paragraph 9-13 of the Statement of Reference, the Applicants submit as follows:

1. . In mainland Tanzania, the practice of expulsion of pregnant girls from schools backed up by the regulations made under the Education Act, CAP 353 R.E 2002;

The regulations are broad and vague. The said regulations are called the Education (Expulsion and Exclusion of Pupils from Schools) Regulations, G.N. No. 295 of 2002 under Regulations 4(b), (c) and 7 (b) (hereinafter the Regulations). Annexed and marked "GBS Annexure 3" is a copy of the said Regulations;

10. The Regulations, in their current form, have often been used as legal basis for expulsion and exclusion of pregnant school girls from schools;

11. In pursuit of implementing the Regulations, senior government education officials have often publicly contended that pregnant girls should be expelled from school as they do not belong in school as they may exert negative influence on other girls;

12. In 2017, His Excellency, the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dr John Pombe Magufuli publicly declared that pregnant students should be expelled from public schools...; and

13. To further the President's directive, on 29.02.2020, the District Commissioner, was invited in his capacity as a government official to speak at a function within Dodoma Municipality. He made a statement directing all heads of schools and education officers to compulsorily test school girls for pregnancy every 3 months ...”

47. The Court acknowledges the Applicants’ attempt to isolate the District Commissioner's statement as the sole cause of action. The Applicants contend that their arguments revolve around this statement and its potential future consequences if implemented.

48. The Respondent submits that the Applicants’ reliance on the 2002 Regulations and past pronouncements by senior government officials necessarily extends the date of the cause of action beyond the strict temporal limitations prescribed under Article 30(2) of the Treaty

49. We note that Article 30(2) unequivocally provides that proceedings shall be instituted within two months of the enactment, publication, directive, decision, or action complained of, or from the date it came to the knowledge of the complainant. This means that the Applicants must demonstrate that the Reference was filed within two months of either the occurrence of the impugned action or the date on which the Applicant became aware of it. The onus lies with the Applicant to establish adherence to this time frame.

50. This Court has consistently underscored the strict application of this provision, affirming that it does not allow for extensions, condonations, or waivers of the prescribed limitation period, even in cases involving continuing violations. In Steven Dennis vs Attorney General of Burundi & Others, EACJ Reference No. 3 of 2015, this Court reiterated that the rationale of Article 30(2) is to ensure prompt institution of cases to avoid stale claims and safeguard the principle of legal certainty. The Court further emphasized that any claim filed beyond the prescribed two-month limitation must be dismissed outright.

51. From the wording of the earlier cited grounds of the subject matter as presented by the Applicants, we deduce that the primary basis for expulsion lies in the 2002 Regulations, which explicitly permit the expulsion of students for moral offenses, including pregnancy. These regulations provide a legal framework that predates and encompasses any statements made by local officials, including the District Commissioner. Thus, the authority to expel students is rooted in established law rather than a singular directive from a government official.

52. It is also clear that the public statements made by the late President John Magufuli in 2017 further solidified the practice of expelling pregnant girls from schools. His declaration, that pregnant students should not return to school, served to institutionalize and legitimize the existing regulations, thereby creating a national policy that schools were expected to follow. This presidential endorsement indicates that the expulsion practice is part of a broader governmental policy rather than a reaction to the District Commissioner's statement alone.

53. The District Commissioner’s statement may be viewed as an attempt to enforce existing policies rather than create new grounds for action. The statement directed school heads to conduct pregnancy tests, but it did not establish new legal authority or justify expulsions independently of the regulations and presidential directives.

54. In this regard, attributing the cause of action solely to this statement undermines the broader legal context within which these actions occur.

55. In Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya vs Independent Medical Legal Unit, EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2011, the Appellate Division of this Court held that the two-month period begins from the date the contested action or decision is made. It stated:

“It follows, therefore, in our view, that this Court is limited by Article 30(2) to hear References only filed within two months from the date of action or decision complained of, or the date the Claimant became aware of it. In our view, there is no enabling provision in the Treaty to disregard the time limit set by Article 30(2). Moreover, that Article does not recognize any continuing breach or violation of the Treaty outside the two months after a relevant action comes to the knowledge of the Claimant; nor is there any power to extend that time limit”

56. This was further clarified in Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda & Another vs Omar Awadh & 6 Others, EACJ Appeal No. 2 of 2012, where the Court observed: “The starting date of an act complained of under Article 30(2) is not the day the act ends, but the day it is first effected.” The Court in the latter case, emphasized the principle of legal certainty, stating:

“The principle of legal certainty requires strict application of the time-limit in Article 30(2) of the Treaty. Furthermore, nowhere does the Treaty provide any power to the Court to extend, condone, waive, or modify the prescribed time limit for any reason (including for 'continuing violations')." (Emphasis added).

57. The Respondent contends that District Commissioner’s statement cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader legal and administrative framework particularly, the 2002 Regulations and the pronouncements of senior government officials such as the late President and the then Minister of Home Affairs.

58. This Court has held that where multiple actions or pronouncements are interconnected, the cause of action extends beyond any single statement or act. In Bonaventure Gasutwa & 2 Others vs Attorney General of Burundi, Appeal No. 13 of 2014, this Court found that the temporal limitation under Article 30(2) must be applied to the earliest action or decision in a chain of events. The Court rejected attempts to isolate subsequent statements or actions as the cause of action, holding that such an approach would undermine the strict application of the two-months limitation period. The Court further emphasized that litigants cannot revive stale claims by relying on later manifestations of long-standing policies or regulations.

59. The Applicants themselves have, on multiple occasions, referred to the 2002 Regulations and past pronouncements to provide context and background for the District Commissioner’s statement. This reliance establishes an intrinsic connection between the District Commissioner’s statement and the 2002 Regulations, which have been in force for an extended period. As such, the Applicants’ assertion that the cause of action arose solely from the February 2020 statement is untenable.

60. The Applicants’ argument that the 29^th February 2020 statement constitutes a fresh cause of action is further undermined by their reliance on past pronouncements by senior government officials, including statements made by the then President and the Minister in 2017. The principle of continuing violations, as articulated in Steven Dennis vs Attorney General of Burundi & Others (supra), does not apply to revive claims arising from earlier acts or policies. This Court has consistently held that the temporal limitation under Article 30(2) is absolute and cannot be extended on the basis of continuing violations.

61. The Court’s position in Attorney General of Kenya vs Independent Medical Legal Unit (supra) is particularly instructive. The Court rejected the argument that ongoing effects or consequences of earlier actions could extend the limitation period, affirming that the two- months period must be strictly adhered to from the date of the initial act or decision.

62. The Respondent contended that the Applicants’ reliance on the Regulations of 2002, as well as statements made by high-ranking Tanzanian officials in 2017, demonstrated that the District Commissioner's statement was not a novel or independent action. Instead, the Respondent urged, the statement falls within a pre­existing legal and policy framework established by the earlier pronouncements. The Respondent further argued that the Applicants’ own submissions acknowledge this connection by citing the 2002 Regulations and the 2017 statements to provide context for the District Commissioner's statement.

63. The Court finds the Respondent’s arguments compelling. The Applicants, while asserting that their claims centred solely on the District Commissioner's statement of 29^th February 2020, repeatedly refer to the 2002 Regulations and the 2017 pronouncements as the legal and policy backdrop against which the District Commissioner’s statement should be understood. This reliance suggests that the Applicants themselves view the District Commissioner’s statement as an extension of a pre-existing policy position rather than a distinct and independent action.

64. The Applicants’ argument that the 2002 Regulations and 2017 pronouncements are merely “contextual” and not the basis of their cause of action is unconvincing. The Applicants have not provided a clear and persuasive distinction between "context" and "cause of action" in this case. The Court finds that the 2002 Regulations, being the primary legal framework governing student expulsions, including those related to pregnancy, provide more than mere context. They are, in fact, the foundation upon which any subsequent pronouncements or directives regarding the handling of student pregnancies must be based.

65. Furthermore, the statements attributed to the late President Magufuli and the then Minister of Home Affairs, being expressions of high-level policy pronouncements, cannot be dismissed as mere "context." These statements, regardless of their formal legal status, carry significant weight in shaping the government's approach to the issue of student pregnancies. It is reasonable to infer that the District Commissioner's statement, even if viewed as a directive, would have been guided by and derived its legitimacy from these earlier Regulations and pronouncements.

66. The Court notes that the two-month time limit under Article 30(2) is calculated from the date of the action or decision complained of, or the date the complainant becomes aware of it. In this case, the Respondent argued, and the Court agrees, that the relevant “action” is the establishment of the policy itself, as reflected in the 2002 Regulations and reinforced by the 2017 statements. The District Commissioner's statement, even if interpreted as a directive, is merely a manifestation of this pre-existing policy and does not reset the clock for the limitation period.

67. As earlier stated, jurisdiction lays the groundwork for all subsequent legal actions and decisions; without it, a court lacks the authority to act.

68. Resultantly, we are unable to interrogate the subject matter of the Reference for lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis.

69. Regarding costs, Rule 127(1) of the Rules provides that: “Costs in any proceedings shall follow the event unless the Court shall for good reasons otherwise order.”

70. However, given the public interest nature of this case, and having determined the Reference at a preliminary stage due to lack of jurisdiction, we find it equitable to order that each party bears its own costs.