Nkgau v Road Accident Fund (23282/2016) [2022] ZAGPJHC 614 (17 August 2022)


12



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(SOUTH GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION)

  1. REPORTABLE: NO

  2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO

  3. REVISED. YES


17 August 2022 ________________

DATE SIGNATURE




CASE NO: 23282/16


In the matter between:


NKGAU L Plaintiff



and



ROAD ACCIDENT FUND Defendant


________________________________________________________________ JUDGEMENT

20d186b024084f5989a9f9e3294c194820d186b024084f5989a9f9e3294c1948-1

___________________________________________________________________


MATSEMELA AJ


INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an action for delictual damages in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act

arising out of personal injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision

that occurred on the 12 August 2012.

[2] On the 27th of October 2021, the Judge Matojane granted an order whereby the

Defendant’s defence in the principal action was dismissed and the matter will

proceed by way of default judgment.

[3] By agreement between the parties liability was conceded in favour of the Plaintiff

in September 2014. The quantification of Plaintiff`s damages remains in dispute.


ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

[4] This court has to determine the following:

4.1. Past loss of earnings

4.2. Future loss of earnings and earning capacity.


PAST AND FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES AND GENERAL DAMAGES

[5] Counsel for the plaintiff addressed the Court that plaintiff abandons his claim for

past hospital and medical expenses.

[6] The Plaintiff served and filed a RAF 4 Serious Injury Assessment Report Form by

Dr. Kruger who qualifies the Plaintiff’s injuries as serious in terms of the Narrative

Test 5.3 (Severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioural disturbance or

disorder). The issue of general damages and Section 17(4)(a) undertaking is

postponed sine die pending the outcome of the full court decision which has been

constituted by acting JP Ledwaba regarding these issues.


EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATIONAL HISTORY

[7] The Plaintiff completed a grade 12 level of education at Springs Technical

College in 2010. He completed his theoretical N3 in aircraft maintenance in June 2011 and his practical training in December 2011. He commenced his with his apprenticeship at Execujet in January 2012 in order to become an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (“AME”).

[8] The accident intervened on 20 August 2012 and after 3 months off duty he was

able to return and was officially appointed as an apprentice AME from December

2012. He passed his trade test on 09 December 2014 and qualified as

an aircraft mechanic at the same time. He worked as an apprentice AME from 10

December 2012 up to July 2015. He was then promoted to learner AME until May

2018 and was appointed as a qualified AME in June 2018 to current.


JOB DESCRIPTION

[9] His employment generally consists of visual inspections and then hands on

removal and replacements of the following components:

9.1. Airframe,

9.2. Engines, and

9.3. Wheels

9.4. His job demands is stipulated as a Medium work category occupation.


LOSS OF EARNINGS

[10] To claim loss of earnings or earning capacity the Plaintiff must prove the physical

disabilities resulting in the loss of earnings or earning capacity and also actual

patrimonial loss.1

[11] Loss of earnings or earning capacity is assessed under the Lex Aquilia on the

basis that the Defendant must make good on the difference between the value of

the Plaintiff’s estate after the commission of the delict and the value it would have

had if the delict had not been committed.2

[12] There must be proof that the disability gives rise to a patrimonial loss, this, in

turn, will depend on the occupation or nature of the work which the Plaintiff did

before the accident, or would probably have done if he had not been disabled.3

[13] In De Klerk v Absa Bank Ltd And Others 4the court held that causation should be

distinguished from quantification. Quantification is depended not on proof on a

balance of probabilities but on the Court’s estimation of the likelihood of a future

state of affairs. In the case of uncertainty, the Court should make the estimate in

favour of the Plaintiff, provided that the best evidence was led.

CONTIGENCIES

[14] Once the value of the income which the Plaintiff will lose in future has been

ascertained, contingencies has to be taken into account. In Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO5 it was held that any enquiry into damages for loss of earning capacity is of its nature speculative, as it involves a prediction as to the future. All that the Court can do is to make an estimate, which is often a very rough estimate, of the present value of the loss.

[15] It is trite that where the method of actuarial computation is adopted in assessing

damages for loss of earning capacity, it does not mean that the trial Judge is tied

down by actuarial calculations. The court has "a large discretion to award what

the court considers right".

[16] One of the elements in exercising that discretion is the making of a discount for

"contingencies" or the "vicissitudes of life". These include such matters as the

possibility that the plaintiff may in the result have less than a "normal" expectation of life; and that he may experience periods of unemployment by reason of incapacity due to illness or accident, or to labour unrest or general economic conditions.

[18] The technique of assessing damages involves consideration of relevant events

which may occur or relevant conditions which may arise in the future. Even when

it cannot be said to have been proved, on a balance of probability justice may

require that what is called a contingency or allowance be made for a possibility of

that kind. See Burger v Union National South British Insurance CO.6

[19] It is trite that the Plaintiff’s capacity to earn an income has to be impaired. It is

only once impairment has, as a fact, been established, that the question of

quantification arises, and that the question of appropriate contingency provisions

fits into the quantification exercise not the first, enquiry. The approach

would firstly be whether there is a conceptual difference between the question

whether a plaintiff has suffered an impairment of earning capacity. This has to be

determined on a balance of probability in that plaintiff has the onus to discharge.

The answer to this question is at least theoretically answered affirmatively if the

plaintiff will have established a 51% chance of impairment being present.

[20] Secondly is whether the plaintiff will in fact suffer a loss of income in the future.

The answer to this question is an assessment in respect of which there is no onus in the traditional sense. This assessment involves the exercise of quantifying as best one and the chance of the loss actually occurring. The answer to this question is provided by the best match between the likelihood of a loss been suffered and the fraction expressed as a percentage.7

[21] The rate of the discount cannot be assessed on any logical basis. The

assessment must be largely arbitrary and must depend upon the trial judge’s

impression of the case. See “MVA Handbook”8

[22] In Road Accident Fund v Guedes9 the court referred with approval to “The

Quantum Yearbook”, 2004 by R Koch at 106 under the heading 'General

contingencies', where it states that when: “assessing damages for loss of

earnings or support, it is usual for a deduction to be made for general

contingencies for which no explicit allowance has been made in the actuarial

calculation. The deduction is the prerogative of the Court. . . . There are no fixed

rules as regards general contingencies. “

[23] Then follows what is termed a 'sliding scale' and the following is stated: 'Sliding

Scale: % for year to retirement age, ie 25% for a child, 20% for a youth and 10%

in middle age. See Goodall v President Insurance Co Ltd10

[24] The Quantum Yearbook,11 under the heading “General Contingencies” where it is

stated: “There are no fixed rules as regards general contingencies.

guidelines can be helpful:sliding scale of ½ % per year to retirement age...”.

[25] A short period of exposure to the risk of adversity justifies a lower deduction

than would be appropriate to a longer period.


MEDICO LEGAL EXPERTS

V MOOLMAN /OCCUPATIONAL THERAPIST

[26] V Moolman noted in his report that based on the Plaintiff`s lifting abilities he

tested suited for work in the Light Work Category. This is not a match for his pre-

accident postion as apprentice aircraft mechanic. His capacity for light work is

only a partial match for his current position. It appears as if the Plaintiff finds

himself in a position where his employer is lenient towards his limitations by not

assigning work to him which would require heavy lifting.

[27] He does however find himself in situations where he would not have a

technician available to assist him where he would then have to exceed his

safe lifting capacity especially when he has to do on-site repairs which, for

preservation purposes is not recommended. His work capacity has been compromised as a result of the accident related injuries.

From a psychological perspective it appears that he continues to have

difficulties with bad moods and impatient behavior which has a negative

impact on relationships at work. It appears that these are worse when he has

to work under pressure.

[28] The Plaintiff stated that that he finds working in the aviation industry too

stressful and he does not envision himself doing this work in the longer term

due to the difficulties he experiences at times when he is under pressure.

His emotional difficulties have made a negative impact on his level of competence at work. His ability to progress to working on bigger aircraft and thus handling and manipulating components has also been compromised, thus promotion in his career has been curtailed.


L. LINDE AND K JOOSTE/ INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS

[29] L Linde and K Jooste noted in their report that Pre-morbidly the Plaintiff

would have continued with his career at Execujet and would have developed in a

similar way as it has to date. However, he would have been psychologically and

physically healthy and therefore qualified for promotion to the position of Senior

AME.

[30] As a Senior AME he would have earned within the Patterson C5 level. He would

probably have continued in this position until his retirement age of 65. Post-

morbidly, when interviewed in 2015 about his future aspirations the Plaintiff stated

that he aspires to be promoted to the role of Senior AME.

15.6. In his 2020 interview he stated that his physical difficulties at work are

managed by an assistant who can do most of the heavy lifting. He did however

note that the stress and responsibilities at work have increased which in turn

is exacerbating his headaches and overall emotional and psychological

difficulties and composure.

[31] They explained that he does have a passion for his work and he does enjoy his

work, however he does not believe his physical capabilities and psychological

state , post-morbidly, is adequate to keep him going in the industry. He cannot

see himself coping long-term physically and mentally.

[32] They received collateral information indicates that the Plaintiff still has potential to

Be promoted to Senior AME but that such promotion has been delayed by at least

two years. Mokoena confirmed that the Plaintiff has physical limitations but that they do accommodate him. Mokoena however added that these limitations might cause problems for him as a Senior AME because as a Senior you have to do everything on your own. So some of the things that are expected from a senior to be able to do, the plaintiff cannot do due to the accident.

[33] Mokoena and Snyman confirmed that the work that the Plaintiff does is highly

stressful as they work with people`s lives essentially, and with a promotion

there will be more overtime hours.

[34] The Plaintiff will probably not be able to cope with the demands of the more

senior position, as he is already experiencing difficulties in his position as AME

even although he is enjoying a degree of sympathy. He will suffer at least a two

year delay before his appointment as a Senior AME.

[35] When taking the collateral information and expert opinions in consideration he will

battle even more to cope with the demands of this more senior position. It is

foreseen that he will at best return to his position of AME after a period of 12-24

months, including a period of management of poor performance and then being

declared incompetent to act as Senior AME.

[36] There is a real risk that the Plaintiff will resign at this stage as he may be

disheartened and unmotivated to continue in his previous position as AME. A

higher contingency deduction should be applied for the risk that he will resign

at a young age. Alternatively, should he persist in his position as AME it is not foreseen that he will be working until the usual retirement age and probably the Plaintiff will not work beyond the retirement age of 55.


ACTUARIAL CALCULATIONS

[37] GA Whittaker prepared calculations in determining the Plaintiff’s past and future

loss of earnings and earning capacity. Post-accident 2 year delay in promotion to

Senior AME i.e. 01 January 2023. Returns to working as AME from 01 July 2024

increasing in line with inflation until retirement age 65.


Past Loss

Value of income uninjured R 1 021 529

Less contingency 5 % R 51 076

R 970 453

Value of income injured R 594 629

Less contingency 5% R 29 731

R 564 898

Net past loss R 405 555

Future Loss

Value of income uninjured R 16 747 946

Less contingency 17.5% R 2 930 891

R 13 817 055

Value of income injured R 10 234 270

Less contingency 37,5% R 3 873 851

R 6 396 419

Net future loss R 7 420 637

Total net loss R 7 826 192

Loss after application of the limit

Net past loss R 282 338

Net future loss R 6 176 755

R 6 459 093

Applying the same scenario with a retirement age of 55 the net loss after application of the limit is R 6 798 271.

[38] I have considered all the arguments, expert reports and actuarial calculations and

decided to follow the actuarial calculation by GA Whittaker. I came to the

conclusion that 15% pre-morbid and 35% postage morbid contingencies should

apply. The contingency differential spread is thus 20%. Having said that I

therefore make the following order:


ORDER


The Defendant is liable 100% for the Plaintiffs’ proven damages.

The Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff an amount of R 6 459 093 for past and future

loss of earnings.




______________________

MOLEFE MATSEMELA


ACTING JUDGE OF THE SOUTH GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION





Date of hearing: 25 MAY 2022

Date of judgment: 17 AUGUST 2022



For the Plaintiff ADV. A Louw


Instructed by Erasmus De Klerk Inc




1See . RUDMAN V ROAD ACCIDENT FUND 2003 SA 234 (SCA).

2 See SANTAM VERSEKERINGSMAATSKAPPY BEPERK V BEYLEVELD 1973(2) SA146(A) 150 B-D

3See UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LIMITED V COETZEE 1970(1) SA295 (A) AT 300A.

42003(4) SA 315 (SCA)

51984 (1) SA 98 (A) FROM para 99-100

6 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 75.

7 See De Klerk v ABSA Bank Ltd and Others 2003(4) SA 315 (SCA) went on length to explain the difference

between causation and quantification of damages .

8BY D P HONEY AND H J NEWDIGATE PAGE 176).

92006 (5) SA 583 (SCA) at Paragraph [9] at 587 to 588

10 1978 (1) SA 389 (W)

112014 by Robert Kock (Actuary) at 114

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