31
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
DATE 18 January 2023 SIGNATURE
CASE NUMBER: A308/2021
In the matter between:
DONALD RAMETSI APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
TLHAPI J
INTRODUCTION
[1] The appellant appeared before the Regional Magistrate Gauteng Central,
sitting in Pretoria, on a charge of murder. He was convicted of attempted murder and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years, five years of which was to run
concurrently with the term of imprisonment the appellant was serving at the time.
Leave to appeal his conviction was granted on Petition to the High Court.
[2] At commencement of the trial the appellant informed the court that he did not
wish to be legally represented, that there was no need for assessors to be appointed
even though he was appearing on a serious charge of murder. Furthermore, that he
understood that the minimum sentence for the offence he was charged with was 15
year’s imprisonment. It was only during the cross examination of the deceased’s
mother that he changed his mind and informed the court that he required legal
representation. The facts leading up to his change of mind shall be dealt with below.
[3] There were witnesses who were present at the scene who did not testify
because they had died and these were one Vijo, Thabo and Bar One, and they were
friends of the deceased and the appellant. The application for admission of hearsay
evidence in terms of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 was made after
Ms Maphike and Ms Baloyi had testified and after the appellant had secured legal
representation.
[4] Furthermore, Mr Viviers took over from Ms Els as legal representative for the
appellant. It was only realized during the trial, when a transcript of the record was
made available to him that the recording of the evidence of George Mathibele, the
police officer who took down the statements of the witnesses and of the appellant
was not transcribed. Their evidence was reconstructed from the notes of the presiding
Magistrate and read into the record.
BACKGROUND
[5] On 8 January 2008 the deceased sustained injuries, namely, one perforating
gunshot wound to the pelvis and two gunshot wounds to his right leg. He died on 10
January 2008. In light of the issues in this appeal it is necessary to briefly traverse
the events leading up to his death.
Ms Maphike
[6] Ms Dimakatso Maphike (“Maphike”) was the deceased’s girlfriend. She
testified that at around 20:00 on 8 January 2008 she accompanied the deceased in his vehicle to Block D3 Mamelodi and, their four-year old son was present. Near a tavern in the next street from the deceased’s home they were stopped by his friend Vijo. She heard Vijo say “stop I want to see you, don’t come near me, that young man is here he is looking for you”. At the time she did not know whom Vijo was referring to. Vijo was in his vehicle in the presence of his girlfriend and one Yvonne and her taxi driver boyfriend and all were known to her.
[7] The deceased alighted and walked towards Vijo’s vehicle which was behind
theirs. Shortly thereafter the appellant walked past their vehicle from the direction of
the tavern. The appellant was known to her as the deceased’s friend. Although there
were street lights their vehicle was parked in a dark area. She later heard gunshots,
and, on realising that the deceased was not returning to the vehicle she fled the
scene in his vehicle to his home which was in the next street. She had hoped to find
him there. On arrival she found one Daddy and the deceased’s nephew and she
learned that they had reported to the deceased’s mother that ‘the appellant had shot
the deceased’.
[8] When she returned to the scene she found that the deceased had been
transported to the Mamelodi Day Hospital. On her arrival there, she found Vijo and
the occupants of his vehicle whom she had seen earlier on. The deceased was later
transferred to the Pretoria Academic Hospital. At this hospital she got a chance to
speak to the deceased. She enquired ‘why he and the appellant were fighting’ and
the deceased told her that “the appellant fired shots at him and he did not know
why”. At the time the deceased was in pain and he could not speak properly; “hy kon
nie ordentlik praat nie”1
[9] On her arrival from the hospital her brother Letlhogonolo informed her that the
appellant had been to her home to ‘enquire if the deceased had returned, and the
appellant asked for her numbers’. She called the appellant. They talked about the
incident and the appellant told her that he was sorry, and that the deceased had
refused to pay back the R700.00 owed to him. She learned later that day that the
deceased had discharged himself from hospital.
[10] The appellant’s version put in his cross examination was that he denied that
he had admitted having shot the deceased; he denied that he was in possession of a
firearm; he denied that he had shot the deceased; he disputed that the deceased had
told her that he was the assailant and alleged that the accusation was made up. He
put it to Ms Maphike that her statement was written on 23 March 2010 two years after
the incident. Cross -examination was suspended pending the holding of a trial-within-
a-trial regarding her written statement to the police. Although she admitted that the
signature on the statement was hers, that she had read it after it was written down and
before testifying, she disputed certain aspects in the statement and stated that the
police officer had on his own added to her version, she informed the police officer that
she was not satisfied with the statement and he told her she would have an opportunity
to explain fully at court;
Ms Baloyi
[11] Ms Baloyi, mother of the deceased testified that after receiving a report on the
incident she immediately went to the tavern to make enquiries. There were many
people and she was informed by Maggie the tavern owner that the appellant had shot
the deceased. She was also informed that the deceased had been transported to the
Mamelodi Day Hospital. She met up with the deceased in Casualty. She asked him
what had happened and he explained that the appellant had shot him. At that time he
had no difficulty conversing with her “ hy kon ordentlik met my praat”.2
[12] She did not have further conversations with the deceased after he was
transferred to the Pretoria Academic Hospital because there, she was not allowed to
see him at that time of the night as it was not visiting hour. When she went to visit the
deceased the following day she was informed that the deceased had discharged
himself from hospital. She did not find the deceased on her return to her home. He
later called to inform her that he was at Nelmapius. Arrangements were made for the
deceased to rather go to her sister’s place at Mamelodi ‘D’ section. The deceased was
seen by Dr Palafala who informed her that the bullet was lodged in the deceased’s
kidney and that it had to be removed, even though he had refused treatment and
discharged himself, they still had to take him back for the procedure to be performed.
The deceased was given an injection for pain. They did not take him back to hospital,
instead they returned to her sister’s place. After about seven to eight hours the
deceased complicated, they took him back to the doctor, he was examined by the
doctor in their vehicle and pronounced dead.
[13] She had also called the appellant wanting to know what problems he had with
the deceased and why he had not consulted with her. The appellant did not reply and
he dropped the phone. Later the appellant called her and told her that he was sorry
for what happened, that he did not know what he was doing: “dat hy nie geweet wat
hy maak nie”.3
[14] Cross examination by the appellant presented with problems when she was
questioned on the contradictions in the two statements made to the police. She
acknowledged that she made two statements to the police and that the first statement
was made when the incident was fresh in her memory on 12 March 2008 and the
second on 23 March 2010. In the first statement she failed to report that the deceased
had informed her that he was shot by the appellant. She became agitated and in some
of her emotional outbursts she accused the appellant of being a murderer who was
responsible for the death of other people. The altercation ended up with her refusing
to give answers to the appellant. The proceedings were adjourned to allow her to cool
down. Afterwards the purpose of the cross examination was explained to her. When
the cross examination resumed an altercation ensued between the presiding
magistrate, Mr Bosch and the appellant about whether the second statement had been
properly introduced. At this point the appellant told the court that he was greatly
disturbed by Ms Baloyi’s utterances in court, that he could not continue with the trial
and he requested a postponement which was refused. The appellant then requested
a postponement to seek representation from Legal Aid and the trial was postponed.
[15] Ms Baloyi was confronted in cross-examination with the two statements she
made to the police, where in the first statement she mentioned that she was informed
by Maggie the tavern owner that the appellant had shot the deceased. In the second
statement she alleged she asked the deceased who shot him and he said it was the
appellant who was well known to her. It was further put to Ms Baloyi that the appellant
denied having admitted in the telephonic conversation he had with her that he had
shot the deceased and that he was sorry. She testified that the issue of his denial was
not discussed but she inferred from the overall conversation that she had with the
appellant that he was sorry for what he did and not that he actually said he was sorry.
She testified that the appellant and the deceased were good friends and, that she had
relied many a times on the appellant to assist her during the deceased’s previous
incarceration. She testified that she called the appellant to inform him that the
deceased “Tiego” had died and his only response was “Eish”.
[16] Ms Els came on board as the accused’s legal representative six months
later. She informed the court that after consulting the appellant the trial-within- a- trial
regarding Ms Maphike’s statement was no longer necessary and she had no further
cross examination for this witness. However, the record reveals that a trial-within- a-
trial was held regarding only the certification of the statements. Mr Mathibele, a
lieutenant testified that he attended the crime scene. He took down statements
including that of Ms Maphike from a house in Mamelodi West. The statements were
read back but were not certified. When he later returned to the police station the
statements were certified by one Constabel Shishange.
[17] Ms Els resumed cross examination of Ms Baloyi on the contradictions in her
two statements. Ms Baloyi again got agitated. She denied the version put to her that
the appellant, after receiving a call from her, had denied that he shot the deceased.
Godfrey Mohlala and Letlhogonolo Maphike
[18] Godfrey was one of the occupant’s in Vijo’s vehicle, and he was in the
company of Vijo, his girlfriend Siphiwe and Vijo’s girlfriend Yvonne. He heard Vijo
inform the deceased that the appellant was looking for him. Immediately after
hearing these words a gunshot went off, he hid himself in the vehicle. He heard the
deceased say “I have your money why shoot me take the money” and he heard the
appellant say “I don’t want the money, I want you.” He hid behind the steering wheel,
Vijo sat behind him and the deceased was outside the vehicle behind the vehicle.
After the shooting he and Vijo got out of the vehicle and found the deceased on the
ground, Vijo picked him up and they rushed the deceased to hospital. He did not see
the appellant. On further questioning he revealed that the appellant was not known
to him even though he heard his voice.
[19] Letlhogonolo brother of Ms Maphike testified that he met appellant earlier in the
evening before the incident at his home when the appellant came looking for the
deceased and Ms Maphike and he took the latter’s telephone numbers.
Dr Palafala and Dr Blumenthal
[20] There was no objection from the defence to the handing in of Dr Palafala’s
statement which confirmed his treatment of the deceased. Dr Blumental performed the
autopsy. He testified that he found that the abdomen was full of puss, which was
caused by an infection that had spread from the site of the pelvic region to the
abdomen, throughout the body and to the lungs and that the deceased had suffered
multiple organ failure. Although he was not a clinician, he confirmed the possibility that
the infection had spread quickly. He was asked if the deceased’s refusal of treatment
and his own discharge from hospital could have been a contributing factor to his
death. His response was that the deceased needed surgical management and that the
wound could have been treated if properly managed by a surgeon and a clinical
physician.
The Appellant
[21] The appellant was a friend of the deceased. He admitted being in the vicinity of
the shooting on 8 January 2008. Prior to the shooting he drove past the vehicle of the
deceased and Vijo in the direction of the tavern. It was at night, the vicinity around the
tavern was well lit and there were a number of other vehicles parked on either side of
the street. He stopped his vehicle next to Thabo’s, who was resident at the tavern. The
deceased and Vijo stood in front of Thabo’s vehicle and Thabo was in his vehicle. He
stopped without alighting from his vehicle next to the deceased and Vijo because he
wanted to inform the deceased that one Bar One, also known as Rufus Mathebe, was
looking for him.
[22] Another vehicle arrived on the scene and parked behind the deceased’s
vehicle. There was not sufficient space for this vehicle to pass so he drove on in order
to give way, and he parked his vehicle and walked back towards where the deceased
and Vijo were standing. He only realized later that the vehicle which parked behind
Thabo’s belonged to Bar One. He saw the latter alight in possession of a firearm. The
appellant testified that two shots were fired, he retreated and ran back to his vehicle
and later several other shots were fired. According to the appellant, they were all
friends with the deceased, that is, including Thabo and Bar One. The appellant testified
that before the incident around 18.30 Bar One had called him to enquire why he had
made the deceased get used to him because the deceased had an affair with his
girlfriend Lerato.
[23] The appellant denied that he had made calls to Dimakatso and Ms Baloyi and
admitted to them that he had shot the deceased and he denied that he asked for
forgiveness. He contended that he may have been implicated because as the
deceased’s friend his family and girlfriend expected him to tell them who had fired the
shots. He also had knowledge that after the deceased left hospital him and Bar One
resolved their problems and they as friends did not foresee that his friend would die.
He denied that the deceased owed him money but testified that it was him who owed
the deceased. Initially he owed the deceased R1500.00, paid back R700.00 and owed
the deceased R800.00 which he promised to pay back at a later stage. The
relationship between him and the deceased deteriorated from November of the
previous year due to his substance abuse.
[24] In cross examination he testified that he had lost contact with the deceased in
November of the previous year because the deceased no longer lived in Mamelodi.
On the day of the shooting he had parked his vehicle near Maggies Tarven and walked
to Ms Maphike’s home in search of the deceased. He did not have the deceased’s
number and on not finding her, he asked for her number. On his return he walked
past Vijo’s vehicle and asked Vijo to tell the deceased that he urgently needed to
see him. Later in the evening as he was approaching Vijo’s vehicle, he saw one
William and Bar One in the street, he heard shots being fired, and saw Ms Maphike
drive away in the deceased’s vehicle. He was told that Bar One was responsible and
he knows that after the deceased had discharged himself from hospital the deceased
and Bar One met and made up. The police approached him and he gave them
information on Bar One. The appellant testified that he was implicated by Ms Maphike
and Ms Baloyi because he was a friend of the deceased and that he had not been
forthcoming with information on who murdered the deceased.
THE ISSUES
[25] Although there were numerous grounds of appeal these were summarised in
counsel for the appellant and respondent’s heads of argument as follows:
The Appellant:
(i) The court a quo admitted hearsay evidence without observing the
requirements provided for in section 3(1)(c ) of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (“the Act”);
(ii) The lack of assistance to the appellant who was an undefended
accused person resulted in an unfair trial;
(iii) The State failed to make findings on the presence of circumstantial
evidence from which it could be inferred that there was an intention to
kill especially where no direct evidence was presented.
The Respondent:
(iv) The court had to draw a distinction between the hearsay evidence of Ms
Maphike and Ms Baloyi in that it was the deceased who told them that
the appellant was the one who shot him and the admission which was
made directly to them by the appellant was an informal admission ‘ex
facie curia, and as such section 219(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977 was applicable. Furthermore, that there was an admission made
directly to Ms Maphike by the appellant.
(v) That as a result of the admissions made by the appellant to Ms Maphike
and Ms Baloyi, the report by the deceased to them was not subject to
the provisions of Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988
THE LAW
[26] It is trite that a court of appeal would only interfere with the findings of the trial
court where there is a material misdirection on the fact and credibility findings of the
witnesses.4 It is also trite law that the state bears the onus to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. The accused bears no onus and if his version is reasonably possibly
true he is entitled to receive the benefit of the doubt and be discharged.5
The Lack of Assistance to an undefended during trial:
[27] It is common cause that the appellant was not represented at commencement
of the trial and that such legal representation came about only later during the trial. It
is apparent from the record that legal representation was sought after the presiding
Magistrate declined a request for a postponement from the appellant after a heated
cross examination of Ms Baloyi..
[28] Of importance is that there was no direct evidence linking the appellant to the
murder of the deceased. The learned Magistrate disallowed a report made to Ms
Maphike and the deceased’s mother by one Daddy regarding the appellant and ruled
that if the State was not going to call Daddy as a witness the evidence was
inadmissible. The prosecutor indicated that he was not going to call Daddy as a
witness. The appellant was not engaged or advised on the provisions sections 3(1)(c)
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act. The same occurred when the evidence of
Ms Baloyi was led in that reference was made to this Act but nothing was explained to
the appellant. It is trite that presiding officers are obliged to assist an unrepresented
accused person in the conduct of the trial in order to ensure that the accused’s rights
are protected and not violated and that he receives a fair trial.
.
[29] As I see it, the questioning of Ms Maphike by the prosecutor, which followed
was about the conversation she had with the deceased at the Steve Biko Hospital and
it was indirectly based on the hearsay reports that were disallowed. The report by the
deceased was in my view not a spontaneous and unsolicited one. Ms Maphike did not
pose a question as to what happened; she assumed that the hearsay report from
Daddy was true and posed a question as a fact on what she had heard:
Ms Maphike
“By die hospital het u kontak gehad met die orrledene? Het u met hom gepraat
of hy met u gepraat of nie? – Ja ek het inderdaad met hom gepraat 6…….
Was hy by sy positiewe of nie? -Edele ek dink hy was in pyne gewees want hy
kon nie ordentilke praat nie.
Het u met hom gepraat? Kon hy verstaan? – Ja
Het u vir hom iets gevra – Ja
Wat vra u hom? – Ek het hom gevra waaroor baklei u en Tsietsi? Hoekom het
hy op u gevuur?
Ja, het hy geantwoord? - Ja hy het
Wat het hy gese? – Die oorledene het vir my gese ja hy het op my gevuur en
ek weet nie hoekom hy dit doen nie.7
Edelagbare ek gaan u versoek om dit toe te laat in belang van geregtiheid
Hof : Ek sal dit voorlopig toelaat, ek sal later daaroor uitspraak gee meneer. Ek
will eers sien wat u aanbied
Hof: Ek laat dit voorlopig toe. Dit kan later total wegval (my underlining)8
Ms Baloyi
Wat het u by die hospital aangetref toe u daar aankom mevrou - ……ek het
inderdaad vir Tiego givind ….en hy kon ordentlik met my praat Edele en toe vra
ek hom wat het gebeur :
Die staat sal dan versoek dat heirdie getuienus voorlopig togelaat word Agbare
Hof: Goed die hof sal dit voorlopig toelaat in terme van artikel 3(1)(c)……die
hof sal later beslis oor die finale toelaatbaarheid daarvan.” (my underlining)9
[30] It was contended for the appellant that hearsay evidence was allowed to be led
against an unrepresented appellant without any assistance and explanation ‘of what
hearsay evidence is, the procedure to be followed dealing with its admission and the
consequences of its admission and his right to object thereto.’ In S v Ndhlovu and
Others10 the court discouraged the application of the Act ‘against an unrepresented
accused to whom the significance of its provisions had not been explained’
[31] It was conceded for the respondent that the only evidence linking appellant to
the murder was that of Ms Maphike and Ms Baloyi. It was contended that the
appellant’s admissions to them do not constitute hearsay and that instead section
219A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was applicable.
[32] In my view, it was also the relevance and the import of allowing such hearsay
evidence to be led that should have been explained to the appellant, that is, that it was
tendered in the interests of justice as provided in the Act under consideration. As the
record reflects, submissions and argument on the section 3 (1)(c) of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act were only heard after the evidence of Ms Maphike and Ms
Baloyi was led and, also after the appellant had secured legal representation.
Furthermore, in my view, if the state intended to rely on the extra curial statement by
the appellant, such intention should have been mentioned by the state and also in that
regard, the court had an obligation in that instance to explain section 219(A) of the
Criminal Procedure Act as amended to the unrepresented appellant, the requirements
that such statements should have been freely and voluntarily made and especially the
discretion that the court would exercise for allowing admissibility of such statement.
The record does not reflect that the state intended to rely on these extra curial
statements as provided in section 219 (A) in that the state sought, throughout the trial
an admission on grounds that the hearsay statements made by the deceased to Ms
Maphike and Ms Baloyi were in the interests of justice and in terms of section 3(1)(c)
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act. The respondent cannot rely as basis for
admission of section 219(A) when this was not considered by the court a quo.
[33] When the appellant eventually obtained legal representation by Ms Els, the
issue of the witness statement of Ms Maphike was discussed. The court had already
heard the evidence relating to the said statement by the deceased. Giving Ms Els, who
was not present, an opportunity to after the fact make submissions on the provisionally
admitted evidence does not address the issue on whether it was fair for the trial to
have continued without any assistance or any explanation whatsoever to the appellant.
Furthermore, the indication by Ms Els that she had instructions not to pursue the trial-
within-trial pertained to the cross-examination by the appellant of Ms Maphike
regarding when her statement made to the police, the appellant having contended
that Ms Maphike and Ms Baloyi had colluded with each other. In my view, not pursuing
that line of questioning was of no consequence. What was communicated to the court
was that it was no longer necessary to pursue the trial-within-a-trial regarding the
statements of Ms Maphike.
Admission of Hearsay Evidence
[34] The admission of hearsay evidence is regulated by Section 3 (4)11 and thereafter where it relates to this matter the preconditions in section 3(1)(c)12 of Act 45 of 1988 apply. The respondent did not address the provisions of these sections in the heads of argument despite the fact that the court a quo relied on the provisions of the Act for conviction.
[35] It is contended for the appellant that in in terms of 3(1)(c)(i) the court firstly had
to determine the nature of the proceedings. These were criminal proceedings which
required even where hearsay evidence was admitted, that the state to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the issue of prejudice to the
accused at trial was to be considered especially where the evidence sought to be
tendered was the only evidence the court would rely upon in convicting the accused.13
It is common cause that none of the witnesses who were allegedly present at close
proximity to the incident tendered any evidence implicating the appellant. The State
did not call Daddy. Mohlala’s evidence was not helpful. He heard a conversation
between the deceased and someone and assumed that it was with the appellant. I use
the word assume because Mohlala testified that although he was behind the steering
wheel of Vijo’s vehicle he did not see the appellant and he did not know the appellant.
The only evidence that remained was that of Ms Maphike and Ms Baloyi.
[36] Section 3(1)(c)(ii) requires the court to evaluate with caution the evidence
tendered as hearsay especially where it is in the form of statements made to Ms
Maphike and Ms Baloyi by others and the alleged statements made by the deceased
to them. The reliability of the evidence so tendered needs to be assessed having
regard to the evidence as a whole. Section 3(1)(c)(iii) requires the court to carefully
consider the purpose for which the evidence is tendered. For example, in cross
examination Ms Baloyi explained that she inferred from the conversation she had with
the appellant that he was sorry for what he did, not that he told her he was sorry.
[37] It is contended for the appellant that the question to be asked is whether what
was testified to by these witnesses represents the deceased’s ‘actual words quoted
as spoken by the deceased or if it was a summary of his words, or if it was a conclusion
drawn by the witnesses.’ Both witnesses approached the deceased on the allegations
made to them prior to them seeing the deceased in hospital. For example, the alleged
report by the deceased to Ms Maphike is not a spontaneous narration of what
happened. The question posed by her to the deceased was prompted by a foregone
conclusion that the appellant was responsible. In my view I would have expected the
deceased who was friends with the appellant to have informed them that he was shot
by the appellant because he owed him R700.00. The deceased told Ms Maphike he
did not know why he was shot by the appellant and to Ms Baloyi he pointed to the
appellant as being responsible. This in my view questions the reliability of the
deceased’s statement to them.
[38] Also to be considered is the contradiction between Ms Maphike and Ms Baloyi
of the state in which the deceased was when they had a conversation with him. Ms
Maphike stated that the deceased was in pain and could not converse properly while
Ms Baloyi stated that he was in good condition. The impression given in the latter’s
testimony is that she had a conversation with the deceased, but she did not reveal
what the conversation was about. On the other hand, Mr Mohlala heard a conversation
allegedly between the deceased and the appellant about money but he did not see
the appellant and he did not know the appellant. This again puts into question the
reliability of the hearsay statement.
[39] The appellant on the other hand gave a different version. He testified that
he owed the deceased money, an amount of R1500.00, that he had repaid R700.00
and still owed an amount of R800.00. He gave a version that Bar One was responsible
for the shooting, that such information was given to the police, unfortunately Bar One
died before the trial. His evidence that the deceased and Bar One met after the
deceased had discharged himself from hospital was not investigated.
[40] The court in considering the probative value of the evidence as required in
section 3 (1)(c)(iv) has to bear in mind that the state still bears the onus to prove an
accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is contended that the enquiry into the
probative value must be two-fold (i) to assess the reliability and completeness of the
transmission (ii) the reliability and completeness of what the deceased said14.
Furthermore, that the ‘probative value of the evidence depends on the credibility of the
statement made by the deceased but also the credibility and reliability of the persons
to whom the declaration was made. The utterances by the deceased must be
spontaneous and unsolicited. The evidence must be corroborated by other
‘surrounding evidence’ which would give credence to the evidence of the witnesses
and to the statement of deceased that it was the appellant who killed him.15
[41] I have already alluded to the testimony of Ms Maphike in that I found that the
statement by the deceased was not a spontaneous report and it cannot be said that
the report was unsolicited, neither can it be said that the report was complete. The
deceased was not willing to disclose the reason for the shooting and since he was no
longer present, the appellant would not be in a position to cross examine the
deceased. The court a quo rejected the appellant’s version regarding the R700. In my
view even on the version of the state witnesses, that is, of Ms Maphike and Mr Mohlala
the evidence is not reliable in that it is not corroborated by any other evidence.
[42] Regarding the reliability of the hearsay evidence the other issue not
satisfactorily dealt with by the court a quo, was raised in cross examination by the
appellant pertaining to the statements made to the police by Ms Maphike. Although
Ms Els indicated that she had instructions to longer pursue the trial-within-a trial, Ms
Maphike testified that there were certain portions in the statement which she did not
agree with, which were incorrectly recorded or made up by the police officer when
taking down her statement. In my view, by abandoning this procedure the court a quo
and the appellant were not in a position to assess whether what Ms Maphike
complained about would have impacted on the hearsay evidence which the court had
admitted. Coming to Ms Baloyi her ‘emotional uncooperative outbursts’ tainted the
credibility and reliability of her evidence especially in my view,(i) when she refused to
answer questions regarding the two statements made to the police one in 2008 and
the other 2014 and (ii) why she had not mentioned in the first statement of 2008 what
the deceased had communicated to her, that the appellant was responsible for the
shooting (iii) her outbursts that the appellant was a murderer of many other people.
[43] Regarding section 3(1)(c)(v) the deceased’s death renders impossible why the
hearsay evidence could not be given by the person upon whose probative value such
evidence depends. The other witness Vijo, the only eye witness also passed away
before trial. It is contended that the deceased’s statement remains uncontentious,
except for the fact the appellant testified denying that he admitted to Ms Maphike and
Ms Baloyi that he was the one who shot the deceased.
[44] In admitting the hearsay evidence in terms of Section 3(1)(c)(vi) the court had
to assess the degree of prejudice to the appellant. It is contended that the opportunity
to cross examine the deceased on the identity of the person who shot him was
rendered impossible because of his death and the failure by the learned Magistrate to
assist the appellant when cross-examining Ms Baloyi on her inconsistent statements
widened the possibility of prejudice to the appellant. In my view this also goes to the
evidence of Ms Baloyi.
[45] Regarding section 3(1)(c)(vii) it is contended for the appellant that there are no
factors that would justify the admission of hearsay into evidence. I have already
alluded to the fact that the court a quo had failed to advise, to explain and to lend
assistance before the hearsay evidence was led. The appellant was prejudiced
because he was not legally represented and he would not have been in a position to
consider the application of the requirements in section 3 (1)(c) (i) –(vii). The evidence
was provisionally allowed with an indication on record that the learned Magistrate first
wanted to hear what evidence was being put up and the admission of the evidence
on grounds of the interests of justice would be dealt with at a later stage. This step in
my view was irregular. While having correctly considered the cases relevant to the
admission of hearsay evidence, the learned Magistrate when dealing with the reasons
for admitting the said evidence in the interests of justice, stated the following on case
lines:
“Die hof moet die beskuldigde se regte opweeg . Die hof moet beskuldigde
se regte opweeg ten opsigte van die begrip in belang van geregtigheid.
Beskuldigde staan voor hierdie hof waar hy aangekla staan van moord op die
oorledene day hy die oorledene geskiet het. Die enigste daadwerklike
getuienis wat hom verbind is die mededelings waaroor hierdie aansoek gaan.
Die hof kan nie sien hoe ons regstelsel die beskuldigde se regte kan oorheers
bo die belang van geregtiheid nie……Beskuldigde kan nie net vry stap vandag
omdaat oorledene dood is nie. Die hof is van oordeel dat die mededelings die
hoorse getuinis in belang van geregtigheid is en did word toegelaat. (my
underlining)
It is clear from the above statement, as is common cause, that the only evidence
against the appellant were the reports made to Ms Mashike and Ms Baloyi and the
alleged admissions by the appellant which he denied having made. I have already
found that the learned Magistrate did not deal with the admissions allegedly made in
terms of section 219(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended. He
concentrated mainly on the statements by the deceased to the witnesses in terms of
section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act dealt with above. According to
the learned Magistrate because the appellant faced a serious charge, a murder
charge, the rights of the accused cannot be allowed to dominate over the interests of
justice. This stance ignores the only criterion being the fact that (i) hearsay evidence
will only be admitted where the court has satisfied itself that all the requirements as
set out in section 3(1)(c) have been considered,(ii) that prima facie there was evidence
that implicated the appellant (iii) this coupled with his duty to assist the appellant by
explaining the law and consequences of admitting hearsay evidence (iv) ensuring that
the appellant who was unrepresented at the time evidence was led received a fair trial.
Conviction : Attempted Murder
[46] It is common cause that the deceased discharged himself from hospital without
being treated, that a day later he was seen by a doctor who stated that the injuries
were treatable but recommended urgently his return to hospital for removal of the
bullet from the abdomen. The deceased failed to heed such advice and succumbed
two days after he sustained his injuries. The court a quo found that there was a
novus actus interveniens (sepsis and multiple organ failure as cause of death) to the
murder charge and convicted on attempted murder.
[47] It is trite that Attempted Murder is a competent verdict in terms of section 256
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended. ‘The state has the onus to
prove the elements of attempted murder, (i) an attempt (ii) to kill another person
unlawfully (actus reus) (iii) with the intent to kill with an appreciation that the killing is
unlawful (mens rea), the state of mind required for attempted murder is the same as
for murder, the difference lies in the actus reus, in the case of murder the act allegedly
perpetrated by the accused must have actually resulted in death …….the same state
of mind suffices for attempted murder…the prosecutor must prove the elements of
attempted murder’16.
[48] It is contended for the respondent that the inference sought to be drawn ‘must
be considered having regard to the totality of the evidence. It was contended that the
intention to kill could be inferred from (i) the multiple shots that were fired and the fact that multiple shots were fired which struck the deceased in different parts, the wound to the abdomen being the most serious one (ii) that the appellant was looking for the
deceased about money owed to him by the deceased (iii) that the appellant was heard
speaking to the deceased about the money before shots were fired (Mohlala’s
evidence). Furthermore, that if this court were to find that attempted murder was not
proved, the court still had to explore whether on the evidence before the court other
competent verdicts were proved, like ‘assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm,
common assault, pointing of a firearm in contravention of any law.’
[49] The cardinal rules of logic regarding inferential reasoning were outlined by
Watermeyer JA in R v Blom17. The circumstances from which the inference is drawn
should be conclusive and must be proved by direct evidence, the inference sought to
be drawn must be consistent with all the facts. In Kruger supra the elements as stated
of a charge of attempted murder must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In my
view, although multiple shots were fired and the deceased sustained injuries, the
evidence presented to the court a quo was inconclusive, as to inferences to be drawn
as to participation of the appellant at the crime scene; and inferences regarding the
rest of the elements in particular the intention to kill, cannot be drawn from the
evidence as tendered. It would be an exercise in futility if this court were to explore
whether on the evidence before the court other competent verdicts were proved. In
my view the appeal should be upheld.
[50] In the result the following order is given:
(1) The appeal is upheld;
(2) The conviction and sentence of ten years imprisonment on 10 March 2014
of the appellant for Attempted Murder is set aside.
________
V.V. TLHAPI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
I agree and it is so ordered
____________________
N L TSHOMBE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
HEARD AND RESERVED ON : 6 October 2022
FOR THE APPELLANTS : Adv P Pistorius SC
INSTRUCTED BY : Legal Aid Board of South Africa
FOR THE RESPONDENT : Adv AP Wilsenach
INSTRUCTED BY : National Director of Public Prosecutions
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 18 January 2022
1 Transcript Page 19 Line 16
2 Transcript Page 37 Lines 12-13
3 Transcript Page 40 Lines 13-14
4 R v Dlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677(A) and S v Francis 1991(1) SACR 198(A) at 198j-199a “The power of a Court of appeal to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial Court are limited. In the absence of any misdirection the trial Court’s conclusion, including its acceptance of a witness’ evidence is presumed to be correct. In order to succeed on appeal, the appellant must therefore convince the court of appeal on adequate grounds that the trial court was wrong in accepting the witness’ evidence-a reasonable doubt will not suffice to justify interference with its findings. Bearing in mind the advantage which a trial court has of seeing, hearing and appraising a witness, it is only exceptional cases that the court of appeal will be entitled to interfere with a trial court’s evaluation of oral testimony”. S v Monyane and Others 2008 SACR 543 (SCA) [15]
And in S v Hadebe and Others 1997 (2)SACR 641 (SCA) at 645e-f the court held:
…..in the absence of demonstrable and material misdirection by the trial court . its findings of fact are presumed to be correct and will only be disregarded if the recorded evidence shows them to be clearly wrong.”
5 S v Van Der Meyden 1999(1) SACR 447; S v Shackell 2002(2) SACR 185 at para [30]
6 Transcript Page 19 Lines 9-12
7 Transcript Page 19 Lines 15-23
8 Transcript Pages 19 Lines 24-25; 20 Lines 1,2 &4
9 Transcript Page 37; Lines 10-18
10S v Ndhlovu and Others 2002 (6)SA 305 (SCA) (In setting aside the conviction in S V Ngwani 1990 (1)SACR 449 (N) Didcott J stated “ The accused who was unrepresented had to have the effect of the subsection fully explained to him, in contrast with the legal position were it not invoked. He then had to be heard on the issue whether it should be invoked. In particular, he had to be heard on the important one raised by para(iv), the issue whether he would be prejudiced were it to be invoked”
11 3 (4) “hearsay evidence means evidence whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence”
12 3(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless-
3(1)(c) The court having regard to
(i)The nature of the proceedings;
(ii) The nature of the evidence;
(iii) The purpose for which the evidence is tendered;
(iv) The probative value of the evidence;
(v) The reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends;
(vi) Any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might entail; and
(vii) Any other factor which should be taken into account, is of the opinion that such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.
13 S v Ndhlovu and Others supra at para [16]….This court alluded in S v Ramavhale 1996 (1)SACR 639 (a) 647-8 and 649d-eto an intuitive reluctance to permit untested evidence to be used against an accused in a criminal case, observing that an accused usually has enough to contend with without expecting him also to engage in mortal combat with absent witnesses.’ It concluded that ‘a judge should hesitate long in admitting or relying on hearsay evidence which plays a decisive or even significant part in convicting an accused, unless there are compelling justifications for doing so’.
14S v Ramavhale 1996 (1) SACR 639 (A) at 649 E-G
15 S v Sigcawu 2022 (1) SACR 77 (WCC) at para [36] and [37]
16 Kruger v S (A347/2013) [2014] ZAECHC 196 (17 December 2014) para [14]
17 1939 AD at 188 at 202 to 203