The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The appellant is a commercial bank and the respondent a holder of several accounts in the bank. The Imo State Task Force for the Recovery of Public Property and Funds (the task force) alleged that the respondent used contracts to defraud the Imo State government and paid the proceeds into the said accounts with the appellant.
The respondent admitted that the moneys in the two accounts operated with appellant were payments he received from the contracts which he failed to perform. The task force ordered the transfer and freezing of funds in these accounts pursuant to the Recovery of Public Funds and Property (Special Provisions) Edict, 1985, section 18(1). After hesitation and unfruitful communication with the respondent, the appellant consequently complied with the order of transfer and freezing of the funds in the account.
The courts below held that the action as constituted was a banker/customer relationship. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter.
However, this court held that the matter went beyond an ordinary banker/customer relationship. The freezing of the account of the respondent and subsequent transfer of the funds therein to government's’ bank account were acts done under Edict No. 7 of 1985. Thus, the cause of action was consequently not subject to litigation.
The respondent sued the appellant for default of payment in respect of loans granted to the appellant by the respondent in the course of the appellant’s employment.
The appellant claimed that liability in respect of the car loan should not have been determined solely by reference to the formal contract. Instead, the court should have had regard to extrinsic evidence.
The appellant further claimed that the summary judgment granted against him by the court below was erroneously made as there was a plausible dispute between the parties for which leave should have been granted to the appellant to defend the action. The respondent contended that the factual situation representing the appellant's defence did not constitute a good defence on the merit to the claim of the respondent. This court agreed with the respondent.
The appellant submitted that his continued retention in the employment of the respondent was a condition precedent to his repayment of the loans and his employment having been terminated, the enforcement of the personal loans had been frustrated. This court held that this stance was not sustainable because the contracts of employment and personal loans between the parties were two distinct contracts and their duration not co-existent. Thus, the appeal was dismissed.
The matter involved an appeal over a decision made about a contractual dispute between the appellant and the respondent.
The first issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider a contractual matter between an individual banker and his bank. The court engaged with the interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision (s 251(1)(d)) as given by the Supreme Court and established that it granted concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state High Courts in customer-bank matters. The court reasoned that the provision is an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction enjoyed by federal courts. It concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction, though concurrent, to decide the matter at issue.
The second issue was whether there had been sufficient proof at the trial court to support judgment in favour of the respondent. Acknowledging that this issue required the court to embark on a re-evaluation of the evidence, the court emphasised that interference could only be done if it is shown that the trial court’s judgment was perversely flawed. After reviewing the trial court processes, the court concluded that there was a failure to properly evaluate the totality of all evidence, particularly determining what was admissible or inadmissible, before making its decisions. Since there was proof of an absence of a nexus link between the conclusions of the court and the proven facts, the appellate court could thus interfere and re-evaluate the evidence. The trial court’s judgment was therefore found to be fraught with error and was set aside.
This is an appeal of the decision of the trial court that found the assignment of the respondent’s debt to the Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) as being illegal, unlawful and negligent in law.
The court determined the first issue: whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the AMCON Act in relation to assignment of the debt and finding that the assignment was illegal, unlawful and negligent in law. The court held that the provisions relied on in the AMCON Act were clear and its only duty was interpreting the provisions according to their literal meaning not varying them. It was held that the trial court erred in its determination thereof. With respect to the other issues, the court held that the resolution of the first issue disposed the appeal making the other issues irrelevant. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside with costs in favour of the appellant.
The issue was whether the Corporate Affairs Commission (appellant) has powers to inspect affairs of banks (respondents) without a court order.
The case emanated from decision of the trial judge declining to grant an order directing the respondents to comply with the appellant inspectors.
The appellant argued that the Companies and Allied Matters Act (the act) empowers it to carry out an inspection without the need of a court order. It pointed out that the trial judge erred by holding that the appellant require a court order to investigate the respondents.
The respondents opposed the appeal by pointing out that the appellant can only carry out an inspection on the respondents through a court order and that the appellant had no power to appoint inspectors. They further argued that allowing an inspection by the appellant amount to breach of bank/client confidentiality.
The court ruled that the act allows the appellant to appoint investigators at the instances of company members or through a court order. It held that s 314(1) of the act empowers the appellant to investigate affairs of the banks without the need of a court order. The court ruled that the trial judge erred and the appeal was upheld.
The issue was whether the unilateral withdrawal of a bank guarantee by the appellant amounted to breach of contract.
The appeal emanated from judgement of trial court which found that the withdrawal of a bank guarantee by the appellant
was in breach of contract. The appellant had advanced a bank guarantee to the respondent to guarantee its trading capacity with MTN, a communications company for which it was a distributor. The parties agreed that the contract can only be terminated by giving 60 days’ notice period. The appellant unilaterally terminated the contract.
The respondent successfully challenged the termination in a lower court and was awarded damages amounting to ten million Naira with pre-trial interest. The appellant appealed the decision on the basis that it withdrew the bank guarantee after the respondent breached the agreement. It argued that the respondent’s claim was premised on negligence which had not been proven.
The respondent maintained that the appellant breached the contract by withdrawing the bank guarantee resulting in MTN cancelling its distribution agreement with the respondent. It further argued the delivery of termination was never proved.
The court held there was no evidence to show that the termination notice was delivered to the respondent. It found that the withdrawal of the bank grantee amounted to a breach of contract. The court ruled that it has no power to interfere with damages awarded by the lower court unless special circumstances exist. It found that the ten million award was too excessive warranting it to intervene.
The appeal was dismissed. General damages were reduced from ten million Naira to five million Naira.
The dispute emanated from reversal of a bank deposit by the appellant bank from the respondent’s bank account. The respondent deposited US $51,700 in to his bank account which was reversed by appellant bank on the basis that the money deposited was counterfeit currency. The respondent successfully challenged the reversal and was awarded damages amounting to 1 million Naira.
The appellant appealed against the ruling on the basis that the trial judge erred. The bank maintained that the currency deposed with bank was counterfeit. It based its argument on the failure by the respondent to disclose the source of the money and the verification of the money at its head office which proved that the money was counterfeit.
The respondent opposed the appeal on the grounds that there were not present at the verification of the currency and that it was the appellant who bears the onus of proving that the currency was not authentic. He argued that the bank staff verified the authenticity of the currency when he made the deposit.
In deciding the case the court held that the was no evidence to show that deposit acceptance was subjected to authentication. It ruled that deposit of the US $51,700 created a rebuttable presumption that authentic dollars were deposited. It pointed to the teller stamp and initials as consituting prima facie proof of payment and after producing that the respondent need not to go further. The appeal was thus dismissed.
The appellants appealed a judgment granting the respondent payment of a sum of money in terms of an indemnity agreement between the parties.
There were four issues for determination in the main appeal: whether the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the matter; whether the personal indemnity form did not constitute a contract between second appellant and first respondent to make second appellant personally liable to indemnify first respondent; whether the deposit of the second appellant’s title deeds with the first respondent was in furtherance of the personal indemnity form; and whether the judgment was against the weight of evidence.
As regards the first ground of appeal, the court found that the lower court was vested with the jurisdiction to hear the matter, as stated in the Insurance Act, 2003. The second ground was resolved in favour of the first respondent as the indemnity form was held to be a contract with the main aim of making the second appellant personally liable to indemnify the first respondent. Issue 3 was found in favour of the first respondent as the words of the document were found to have created an equitable mortgage over the second appellant’s property, using it as collateral to secure the counter indemnity granted by the first respondent on behalf of the second appellant. The fourth issue was resolved in favour of the first respondent, and the appeal was held to be lacking in substance and merit. The appeal was dismissed.
The Financial Intelligence Centre applied to the High Court to freeze the assets of the applicants who were being investigated for trafficking narcotic drugs. The applicant contended that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed an application to dismiss the freezing of assets, because the law provided that this must be done for one year only; however in this case a year had since lapsed. It was also contended that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction to impose directions on how the case should be tried, and more broadly that the freezing of the account was in breach of the rules of natural justice.
The court held that the High Court acted contrary to the law when it did not exercise its jurisdiction to defreeze the assets, as the courts have supervisory jurisdiction. A year had lapsed and hence it was an error of law to not grant the order to defreeze the assets. The court which has supervisory jurisdiction has the power to defreeze assets if the one-year period has lapsed.
The issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to order the freezing of the bank accounts of the applicant.
The dispute emanated from an order to freeze the applicant’s three bank accounts after allegations of money laundering by the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). The applicant was accused of illegally receiving approximately US$ 43 000 and remittance of US$ 39 000 from a Canadian company. The applicant tried without success to apply to defreeze the bank accounts.
The applicant further applied arguing that the Anti-Money Laundering Act (the act) only allowed the bank accounts to be frozen for one year. It pointed out that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the application because the statutory period of 12 months had lapsed. They also challenged the decision to freeze all the accounts including money that was not part of the laundering investigation on the basis that it was an infringement of the right to natural justice.
The FIC argued that that investigation of allegation of fraud, which is criminal in nature, is not affected by time constraints.
The court held that one year was enough for FIC to investigate any alleged wrong-doing. It ruled that High Court lacked the jurisdiction to order the continuous freezing of the accounts of the applicant beyond the one year. It further ruled that moneys which stood in the accounts of the applicants before any alleged illegal transfers into the accounts should not form part of the freezing order.
The applicant was seeking a clarification of a court judgement.
The case emanated from a dismissal of an appeal by the first respondent to challenge a decision of the High Court in favour of Fidelity Bank. The plaintiff sought clarification of the judgement. It sought clarification on the nature of interest to paid and why the applicant and the respondent were jointly liable for payment of outstanding loan.
The court held that there was a contract between the applicant and the respondent and it provided that the applicant should obtain a loan from Fidelity Bank (the bank). The bank required an undertaking from both the applicant and the respondent that they are going to be jointly responsible for the repayment of the loan. The court found that the respondent reneged on all payments under the contract in the joint names and thus contributed to the non-payment of the loan, hence its liability.
On interest, the court ruled that the undertaking between the parties bears three different interest rates. It pointed out that the parties in this transaction are governed by their undertakings hence interest is calculable on the terms agreed.
The respondent refused to accept the principle of simple interest. The appellant declined to pay compound interest. The dispute was taken to court for resolution. The liability whether to pay compound or simple interest can only commence from the date when the dispute whether to pay that interest is resolved.
The court held that when determining which interest to use a clear distinction needs to be made between the reasons for awarding a simple interest and those that justify an award of compound interest in legal proceedings. A simple interest arises invariably when a party which is liable or owes money fails to pay what is due before or on the date agreed, stipulated, implied. The court exercises its discretion as to the rate and date when interest shall be paid.
However, the award of compound interest depends on other different criteria beside the discretion of court. Compound interest is not founded simply on the mere fact of indebtedness nor on the date the principal debt becomes due nor on the duration it has taken to pay since accruing. It is based on one or more of a multiplicity of reasons such as the law applicable to the transaction, the nature of the business transacted or agreed between the parties, the construction of the agreement or contract made between the parties, the trade custom of the business out of which the indebtedness arose, intentions of the parties or the consequences of the commercial transaction that was concluded between them.
The court concluded that the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent did not point to the award of a characteristically compound interest. There was no evidence presented or authorities cited to suggest that in this case compound interest was intended, implied or anticipated by the parties or implied by law. The authorities cited in this appeal did not assist court to decide that there was a compound interest implied or contemplated in this case. In the result, the appeal succeed.
This is a second appeal by the appellant, both
his original suit in the High Court and his
subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal
having been dismissed. The background is
that the appellant thought to borrow money
from the respondent and gave security as his
land, the issued cheque bounced and the
respondent used the security to secure a
mortgage from the first respondent which he
failed to pay and the first respondent sold the
land. The appellant was evicted and the
business closed and the appellant alleged
fraud but was unsuccessful both at high court
and court of appeal hence this appeal on the
grounds of the sale of land using the power of
attorney, the validity of the mortgage on the
appellants land, holding on fraud, improper
consideration of the evidence on record and
complete disregard of the facts.
A dispute between the company and the bank arose in respect of a specimen signature card allegedly issued for Susan Margaret Howard Bristow (Susan) as a director of the company. The dispute arose because the signature of Dr. Alex Babitunga authenticating Susan's specimen signature card was apparently forged. Additional words written on the card, altering the previous arrangements with the bank requiring two signatures for authorisation of withdrawals, appeared without any initials, signatures, authentication or stamping by the person or persons who cancelled them. The bank permitted certain withdrawals from the company bank account in accordance with the instructions on the card; as opposed to the earlier instructions.
The respondent alleged that the appellant had acted in breach of its duty to the respondent as its customer and had been negligent in permitting the respondent’s accounts to be cleared of all the money in them without the respondent’s authority.
The issues were whether the lower court erred in law and in fact in not holding that the respondent was estopped from saying that Susan Bristow was not an authorized signatory to the respondent's account.
The court explained that the principles of estoppel provides that when one person has, by his or her declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, neither he or she nor his or her representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself or herself and that person or his or her representative, to deny the truth of that thing. One of the conditions for the doctrine to apply is, therefore that the act or omission by the person against whom estoppel is to be set up, as a defense, must have been intentionally caused, in the instant case the fraud which the two courts below found had caused the appellant to act to its detriment believing it to be true was unknown to the respondent until the police report. The court held that the defense of estoppel was not available to the bank against the company because the respondent was unaware of Susan's fraudulent signatures on the cheques until the police investigation and report.
The court held that all documents concerning the respondent's accounts were in the possession and custody of appellant bank. Only the appellant knew and was responsible for entries on the bank accounts, it bore responsibility as the banker to what entries were made on those accounts without respondent's authority. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs.
A claim by the appellant was repudiated by the respondent on the grounds that the deceased had misrepresented and failed to disclose to the respondent certain details of her pre-existing medical condition which materially affected the assessment of the risk under the policy by the respondent. The issue before the court was whether the deceased made a misrepresentation during the telephone conversation as well as materiality of any alleged misrepresentation or non-disclosure, does not arise in the absence of proof of the deceased’s pre-existing medical condition.
The court held that the respondent bore the onus to prove that the deceased had misrepresented herself to the respondent. The respondent also had to prove that the deceased had failed to disclose that she had received medical advice or treatment previously. There was however there was no clear understanding between the parties as to the evidential status of the contents of the hospital records. The court ruled that the respondent failed to discharge that onus to prove that the deceased did misrepresent herself as there was inadequacy and lack of clarity in the hospital records.
The court expressed that that the court a quo erred in concluding that it was not in dispute that the illnesses were noted correctly in the hospital records. The court also noted that the court a quo paid scant regard to the admissibility of the evidence as a result the parties had to file supplementary heads of argument.
Accordingly the court upheld the appeal.
This issue was whether the Minister of Finance (applicant) has powers to intervene where the respondent's (Oak Bay Investments) bank accounts were being closed. In deciding the case, the court employed the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 (the act) which empowers the court to enquire into and determine any rights and obligation a person can claim.
The court held that the enquiry envisaged by s21(c) of the act encompasses a two-legged enquiry. The court must be satisfied that the applicant is a person interested in an existing, future or contingent right and whether the case is a proper one in which to exercise its jurisdiction.
The court ruled that there is no statute that empowers a minister to intervene in a private bank client dispute. Banks can terminate a relationship with a client at their own discretion. It observed that there was no uncertainty in regard to the relief sought by the applicant as there was a court precedent relating to relief being sought. The court held that the Minister of Finance through his counsel knew very well that he has no power to intervene. The court ruled that it is not obliged to grant the order sought by the minister because there was no uncertainty in regard to the legal question. It ruled further that to allow the relief sought would breach the principal of separation of powers as it will amount to judiciary to stray into domain of the executive.
The applicants sought an interim interdict against the respondent bank, with which they had a bank-client relationship, to restrain it from terminating the operations of the applicants’ banking facilities.
The court considered whether courts could direct the respondent to continue its operations in the country against its will. The court held that the respondent’s decision to exit the country’s banking sector is one that the courts cannot interfere with.
The court relied on the respondent’s constitutional right to trade, which also entails the election of not utilising such right. The court remarked that the respondent’s decision to cease operations in the country rested on commercial considerations which were highlighted in para 15 of the judgement.
The respondents right to or not trade supersedes any right the applicant may have, thus the application was dismissed with costs.
In this case the plaintiff had lost valuable equipment through acts of incendiarism and sought indemnity since this had happened over 100 days into the life of the insurance policy. This case illustrates how parties are bound to their own undertakings in a contract for insurance premiums.
The court considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity under the Contractor Plant and Machinery Policy. The court considered the parole evidence rule and held that the defendant had to meet its obligations under the insurance policy. The policy insurance was clear on what it covered and thus the defendant could not invoke the parole evidence to show what the insurance policy intentions were or not. The court held that it could only enforce the insurance policy as it was.
The court also considered whether the plaintiff’s claim was fraudulent. It held that the plaintiff’s claim under the insurance policy was legitimate, as it had been proven that it possessed a valid insurance policy issued by the defendant. Thus in the absence of proof of fraud by the defendant, obligations under the insurance policy had to be met.
The court concluded that there was no fraud and thus the plaintiff was to be indemnified. The court upheld the claim and awarded damages in favour of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contested the validity of the sale and transfer of its property by the first defendant, alleging the transaction was tainted by illegality and fraud. The mortgaged property was auctioned in a public sale pursuant to the terms of the credit facility agreement concluded between the parties.
The contract permitted that the first defendant could execute the property without application to a court if the plaintiff defaulted on payment. In accordance with this provision, the first defendant advertised and sold the plot in a public auction to the second defendant who made the purchase in good faith.
The plaintiffs challenged the first defendant’s actions on several grounds with no success before the High Court. It was argued that, because the sum advanced by the first defendant fell marginally short of the anticipated amount, it did not have to perform its obligation under the contract to pay the stipulated installments, despite having received and utilised the sum advanced by the first respondent.
The court dismissed this argument along with further technical attacks to the alleged unlawfulness of the advertisement of the auction, the sale agreement’s adherence to statutory formalities, and the first defendant’s failure to ‘release’ the plaintiff from the mortgage following the sale of the property to the second defendant.
The judge found in favour of the defendants, ruling that the advertisement, sale and transfer of the property had occurred lawfully and did not offend any aspects of the parties’ agreement.
The court considered whether the petitioner was unable to pay his debts, a bankruptcy order could be granted and whether the petitioner had any properties to be administered by a trustee in bankruptcy.
The court held that a petitioner must prove that he is unable to pay his debts exceeding Uganda Shillings fifty million in terms of Insolvency Act s 3. Further, once a debtor files a petition the court has the jurisdiction to determine the matter as it deems fit and order is granted where the petitioner has filed a statement of affairs with the official receiver in terms of s 4 of the act.
The court found that the petitioner had shown that he was unable to pay his debts by attaching his statements of account. The petitioner also did not file his statement with the official receiver.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.
The court considered whether a Financial Services Provider (FSP) as regulated according to the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAAIS) was negligent by advising the plaintiff which led to a loss of two million Rands. Further, if the second defendant was liable to indemnify the first defendant for professional negligence considering the exclusion clause in the insurance contract.
The court held that s 16 of FAAIS requires that an FSP act honestly, fairly with due skill, care and diligence. Further that the FAAIS Code of Conduct requires professionalism, in the interest of the public. In the case of an insurance contract, the court held that an exclusion clause might make proper commercial sense, be consistent with and not repugnant to the purpose of the contract.
The court concluded that the defendant did not act in accordance with expectations of an FSP, the defendant was negligent and dishonest. Further, the purpose of the insurance contract was to indemnify the insured for professional negligence; the exclusion interpreted restrictively cannot be applicable in the case.
The defendant was ordered to pay damages of two million Rands plus interest and second defendant to indemnify the first defendant.
The defendant had rejected a claim of a certain amount as allowable tax deductions by the plaintiff. This case reconciles the different calculations for bad debts used according to the Financial Institution Act and the 2005 regulations on the other hand the Income Tax Act (ITA) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The court considered whether the assessment followed by the defendant was unlawful.
The court held that it was not required to determine which methodology was more consistent with the ITA section 24. The rationale for accounting methods should not depart from what is provided under the ITA, which is the parent act. Therefore, the definition of a bad debt should be based on the ITA under. The court considered the practice note which had the interpretation of the Commissioner General and held that section 160 of the ITA must be followed because the practice note is only binding on the Commissioner General and her personnel. The court held that section 24 deals with deductions of bad debts and the conditions to be fulfilled for deduction must apply. Thus, the court held that a bad debt under section is allowable as a deduction under section 24.
The court held that the plaintiff was obliged to make provision for bad debts which meet the criteria under section 24 of the ITA and the practice note issued by the Commissioner, file accounts with the Bank of Uganda and be up to standard under the IFRS.
The court also considered whether the plaintiff had to comply with the Bank of Uganda Circular that regulated deductibility of bad debts for income tax. The court held that the circular was not binding because it does not deal with whether a bad debt is an allowable deduction or not.
The court was satisfied that the above sum was a bad debt that is supposed to be an allowable deduction under section 22 and 24 of the ITA.
The applicant brought an application for interim order against the respondents disposing of the
suit property fraudulently mortgaged by her husband without spousal consent the same being
matrimonial property. The applicant’s suit was dismissed by the trial court hence the appeal from
which the application arose.
The matter involved a dispute over the defendants’ refusal to release a certificate of title pursuant to an agreement to do so.
The first issue was whether the defendant was justified in not releasing the certificate of title belonging to the plaintiffs. The court observed that the defendant’s conduct in refusing to release the title created an impression of premeditated non-performance with the defendant only using the purported mala fides (bad faith) conduct as a farcical reason. The court thus concluded the defendants' conduct was unjustifiable.
The second issue was whether the conduct led to loss for the plaintiffs. Concerning whether there was loss of profits due to the plaintiffs being detracted from clearing their indebtedness the court found there was insufficient evidence to support it.Similarly, on the corresponding allegation that the conduct resulted in the incurring of interests due to another creditor, the court held that payment of interests had not been proved by the plaintiff. It thus denied the claim for both loss of profits and interest payments.
However, the court did accept that the actions of the defendant prevented them from discharging their indebtedness and thus resulted in the incurral of interest. It thus absolved the payment of the interests that arose within the affected period and consequently snuffed the corresponding counter-claimed interests for the period.
Regarding damages, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs had acted on the impression that the title would be released to enter into some arrangements which were frustrated by the defendants' unjustified conduct. It therefore granted general damages. Similarly, because of the defendants' oppressive and high-handed conduct, the court granted punitive damages.
The matter involved a claim by the applicant against the defendant’s conduct of unlawfully blocking and deducting monies from his salary account.
First, was whether the court, as a commercial division, had jurisdiction over the matter. The court reasoned that as it dealt with crediting and debiting of the applicant’s account, the matter therefore lay in the ambit of a banker customer relationship. The court was therefore had jurisdiction as it was a commercial matter.
Next, was whether the applicant’s account had been unlawfully deducted and consequently who was liable, considering that the defendant had assumed the obligations of Crane Bank, the applicant’s original employer. The court found there was evidence that the applicant’s account had been credited with less money than he was earning for some time.
On the issue of liability, the court reasoned that despite the contractual exemption of liability upon assumption of Crane’s obligations by the defendant, the Employment Act required the employment obligations to transfer to the defendant as a matter of law. The effect was that the defendant was liable for the unlawful deductions.
Finally, the court dealt with the question of damages. The court used its discretion to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been but for the wrong, as required by law. The court, using its discretion, also awarded interest to the applicant on the basis that applicant had been deprived from own monies. It however denied the claim for exemplary damages as it could not establish malice, outrage or impunity in the conduct of the defendant.
The matter involved a dispute over an order of suit property sale as a remedy for breach of a loan agreement granted by the trial court against the appellant.
The first question was whether the responded had paid the whole stipulated loan amount to the appellant. Assessing the evidence in the record from the trial court, the court reasoned that the trial court’s assessment had failed to evaluate crucial evidence that showed doubt in the respondent’s claim that the whole stipulated amount had been paid. The court thus concluded that the evidence indicated that the responded had failed to fully honor its performance obligation. As a result, the responded could not pursue the remedy of obliging the appellant to transfer the property for failure to repay the loan.
The second issue concerned the right to mesne profits (i.e. profits received by tenant in wrongful possession and which are recoverable by the landlord) by the appellant and the amounts due. The court did not dwell much on the question of entitlement, instead accepting the trial court’s finding of indisputable occupation and rental collection by responded as a basis together with the fact that responded could not justify the occupation.
The court thus concluded that mesne profits were owed but order that they be set-off to the amount of the loan that the appellant still owed. The decision of the trial court was therefore set-aside and appeal allowed.
The appellant claimed from the respondents jointly and severally for general damages for physical injuries he sustained after being involved in the accident caused by the motor vehicle owned by the first respondent and insured by the second respondent.
The issue was whether the magistrate erred in law and fact by considering false evidence tendered by the witness of the respondents.
The court held that the appellant did not state if it was all evidence tendered in court which was false or which part of it is false and was considered by the trial court’s magistrate and used in making the decision of the trial court.
The court noted that it had the duty as an appellate court to review the record of evidence of the trial court in order to determine whether the conclusion reached upon the evidence received by the trial court should stand. Though the court was in agreement with the appellant that motor vehicle insurance companies were statutorily duty bound to pay compensation to the victims of the accident caused by the motor vehicles of their clients but the compensation to be paid must be proved to the standard required by the law.
The court found that there was also no evidence tendered to the trial court to establish the appellant sustained permanent incapacity but he sustained temporary disability as indicated in the said exhibit.
The court considered an application for temporary injunction restraining the respondents from selling two seized motor vehicles. Furthermore, the court considered whether the right of seizure and sale can be exercised without the intervention of the court.
This case concerned an agreement for the sale and purchase of 10 motor vehicles. The applicant alleged that the agreement was oral, whereas the respondents alleged it was written. The applicant subsequently defaulted on the payment and the first respondent seized the vehicles and threatened to sell the vehicles on public auction.
The court found that the agreement concluded between the parties was in fact a written agreement.
The court considered the provisions of S 124 – S 128 of the Law of Contract Act. The basis of these provisions found that the pawnee may retain goods pledged for payment of any debt and may bring a suit against the pawnor upon the debt and retain the goods pledged as collateral security or he may sell the thing pledged.
The court found that the applicant (pawnor) defaulted in payment and the first respondent (pawnee) had the option of bringing a suit against the pawnor and retaining the goods as security or sell the thing pledged by giving the pawnor reasonable notice. If the proceeds are less than the amount due, the pawnor is liable to pay the balance. If the proceeds are more, the pawnee shall pay the surplus to the pawnor.
A pawnee, in possession of the title and the property pledged is entitled to sell the property without intervention of the court. However, in absence of possession, he cannot take the law into his own hands without the court’s intervention.
The court found that there was no clause in the agreement empowering the first respondent to take possession and sell the vehicles, and thus he cannot exercise his right without the court’s assistance.