The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The respondent bought a piece of property from a third party. After the respondent had taken possession of the property, he became aware of the fact that his predecessor-in-title had mortgaged the property to the appellant. The respondent paid off the outstanding debt and thereafter demanded the release of the title deeds to him. Instead, the appellant demanded some authorisation from his predecessor-in-title before the documents could be released to him. The respondent instituted a claim on this basis. The trial court judgment was in the respondent’s favour.
After the respondent attached the property the appellant filed an application praying for an order staying execution of the judgment, particularly the sale of the property and ordered release thereof; before hearing of the application. The trial court dismissed this application.
The appellant eventually appealed to this court asking for the same. The appellant urged this court to allow the appeal, set aside the ruling of the court below and grant an order directing the High Court to retain the amount deposited as per judgment.
This court held that the order sought to be stayed was made by the trial court and there was no appeal against that order to the Court of Appeal. That being the case, it was held that it would be a wasteful academic exercise to delve into the merit of the issue. Consequently the appeal was dismissed.
The claimant/appellant purported to buy a property offered to it by the defendant/first respondent and consolidate the transaction with its purchase of another of the latter’s properties. This was proposed via counter-offer. The appellant proceeded to pay a down-payment for both properties after the agreed time-period, the bulk of which was unilaterally appropriated by the respondent towards payment for only one of them in reverting to the terms of the original agreement. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court seeking layered relief to uphold the consolidated sale. The trial court found that, on the facts, the consolidation agreement was valid but conditional on the specified time-frame. It was therefore aborted as time was of the essence and payment had not been made in the required period. Judgment was entered in favour of the first respondent.
Challenging the trial court’s decision, the appellant argued that a binding agreement had been created, and the respondent had waived the issue of timeous payment when it accepted the appellant’s performance beyond the stipulated time-period. The court dismissed this claim, finding in concurrence with the court below that the failure to meet the time requirement – a term that was accepted by the appellant – thwarted the consolidation. No waiver had occurred.
Specific performance was unavailable to the appellant as the respondent had not breached their existing agreement. Its claim attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction to make an order regarding the transfer and registration of the property – directed at the second respondent – also failed.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
The court considered whether the court below properly evaluated the evidence, and were they correct in expunging the evidence. Furthermore, it looked at whether the doctrine of waiver had been correctly applied.
This case looked at whether the revocation of the property as well as the sale of the property was null and void.
The court considered s 83(1)(b), 2(a) and (5) of the Evidence Act and found that a wrongly admitted piece of evidence is not a sacrosanct, it is still subject to scrutiny by the appellate court.
The court found that inadmissible evidence ought not to be admitted, even by mistake, and if it is, the appeal court ought to consider the case on the legally admissible evidence and preclude that which is inadmissible.
It is trite that the evaluation of evidence is essentially the function of the trial judge, where the trial judge has unquestionably evaluated the evidence before him and ascribed probative value to it, it is not the business of the appeal court to disturb such findings of fact, unless the findings are perverse.
In considering the doctrine of waiver, it was found that waiver means that the person in whose favour a benefit or right exists, is aware of those rights or benefits, but chooses to freely not take advantage of those rights or benefits. Thus, the doctrine of waiver could not be applied.
The issue was whether the unilateral withdrawal of a bank guarantee by the appellant amounted to breach of contract.
The appeal emanated from judgement of trial court which found that the withdrawal of a bank guarantee by the appellant
was in breach of contract. The appellant had advanced a bank guarantee to the respondent to guarantee its trading capacity with MTN, a communications company for which it was a distributor. The parties agreed that the contract can only be terminated by giving 60 days’ notice period. The appellant unilaterally terminated the contract.
The respondent successfully challenged the termination in a lower court and was awarded damages amounting to ten million Naira with pre-trial interest. The appellant appealed the decision on the basis that it withdrew the bank guarantee after the respondent breached the agreement. It argued that the respondent’s claim was premised on negligence which had not been proven.
The respondent maintained that the appellant breached the contract by withdrawing the bank guarantee resulting in MTN cancelling its distribution agreement with the respondent. It further argued the delivery of termination was never proved.
The court held there was no evidence to show that the termination notice was delivered to the respondent. It found that the withdrawal of the bank grantee amounted to a breach of contract. The court ruled that it has no power to interfere with damages awarded by the lower court unless special circumstances exist. It found that the ten million award was too excessive warranting it to intervene.
The appeal was dismissed. General damages were reduced from ten million Naira to five million Naira.
The appeal emanated from the advance of a loan by the first respondent to the appellant. The appellant deposited with appellant bank a certificate of occupation and a share certificate as security. The appellant then failed to repay the loan resulting in the sale of the appellant’s shares deposited as security. The appellant instituted legal proceedings against the respondent claiming that it was not indebted to the first respondent for any amount because the arrangement between the parties was a joint venture agreement and that the sale of the second appellants shares was done mala fide and without their consent.
The challenge was dismissed. The appellant appealed against the dismissal arguing that the trial court erred. It pointed out that the deed of mortgage was not properly executed and that the contract between the parties was invalid.
The respondent argued that the appellant was raising new issues not canvassed in the court below. It argued that there was a valid contract between the parties.
The court held that there was a loan agreement between the parties and the appellants did not complain of anomalies in the contract hence it waived any right it may have had. The court ruled that a party cannot raise new issues in an appeal and dismissed the appeal.
The appeal stemmed from the denial of the appellant's right to defend on merits due to the lower court’s grant of an Order 14 summary judgement in favor of the respondent, without properly engaging with the merits of the matter.
Substantively, the court held that in a summary judgement application the plaintiff must bring a prima facie case for the claim, which includes showing the basis of the claim, before the burden shifts to the defendant to defend. However, a complete defence is not required but rather the defendant only needs to show that he has a reasonable defence to the claim and his defence is not a sham or intended to delay payment.
Since the respondent’s claim had been based on an agreement and an alleged assignment, the court reasoned that on assessment of the evidence the argument of assignment lacked the element of intent and thus could not stand. Further, the argument that the respondent was a beneficiary of the agreement in question was unfounded. The trial court therefore erred in its decision to grant summary judgment as the very basis of the claim was reasonably challenged on the facts.
The court thus concluded that the appellant had been unjustifiably been shut out of trial. It thus allowed the appeal setting aside the summary judgement.
The parties entered into a business transaction for the supply and installation of a saw-mill. However, the transaction was not covered by a properly drawn up contract. Furthermore, it became apparent that the plaintiff provided the defendant with a plant which was defective and not fit for the purpose it was intended.
This case considered whether the Court of Appeal had misdirected itself to the defects contained in the machinery, whether there was a breach of a fundamental obligation and whether the goods sold were fit for the purpose which they were intended to be used.
The court considered the Sale of Goods Act, 137 of 1962 (the act) and found that the breach of a promise under the act depends on the category of promise; either a fundamental obligation, condition or a warranty. Breach of a fundamental obligation or a condition entitles the party not in default to repudiate the contract of sale and if it is the seller who is in breach, the buyer can reject the goods. The breach of a warranty cannot lead to a repudiation or rejection of the goods but will entitle the party not in breach to damages. However, a party entitled to repudiation and rejection may waive their right and opt for damages.
The court considered whether the goods were fit for the purpose that they were provided for. The plaintiff sold the machinery in the course of its business on condition that it will be fit for the purpose of saw milling. A machine is fit for purpose if it is able to perform the task for which it was acquired, safely and for a reasonable period, before defects appear. The court found that a saw mill should not break down after 11 days of operation and therefore did not meet the standard of the purpose for which it was intended. The court found that as a result of the defect, the defendant was entitled to general damages as a result of the failure of the saw mill being fit for purpose.
The plaintiff/appellant unsuccessfully sued the defendant/respondent for breach of contract following the latter’s refusal to accept delivery of the relevant goods. Curtailing the appellant’s sizeable claim for special damages, the High Court awarded only nominal damages – an order later confirmed by the Court of Appeal.
At the Supreme Court, the scope of section 48 of the Sale of Goods Act (the act) was elucidated: the computation of damages thereunder may be either general or special depending on the circumstances of each case. General damages refer to those which are foreseeable without proving that special circumstances were brought to the breaching party’s attention. Special damages are those which are foreseeable by the parties at the time of contracting because certain circumstances have been highlighted which render the damages within the realm of the signatories’ reasonable contemplation. These must be pleaded and proved at trial.
The plaintiff’s claim for special damages for the losses suffered by the breach was not proven before the High Court and were subsequently abandoned. The Supreme Court thus took the plaintiff to be entitled only to general damages under section 48 of the act. To this end, the plaintiff did not lead any evidence on the multipliers which would entitle the court to award enhanced damages. Section 48 caters to the contract price/market price differential and not to a computation of lost profits. The plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence to merit the proposed determination of damages and so the nominal award made by High Court in terms of s 48 was adequate.
The appeal was dismissed.
The respondent sold a car to a man who paid half price and took the vehicle
leaving the original registration book with the respondent. The new buyer on
the same day sold the car to the appellant. The respondent bought a suit
against the appellant and his predecessor in title for orders of specific
performance of the sale agreement, damages, interest and costs of the suit.
The trial court entered judgment for the respondent and the appellant’s
appeal to the court of appeal was dismissed hence this appeal.
The first issue was whether the appellate court erred in law and in fact to conclude that the respondent could not be sued. The court observed a difference in the extent of immunity accorded in the domestic act and that granted in the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank Charter of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African States (the charter) and Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank Act (the act), with the charter providing for absolute immunity whilst the act offered functional immunity. It reasoned that the intention of the act is to govern the relationship between Uganda and the respondent. Applying the ejusdem generis rule (that a general term describing a list of specific terms denotes other things that are like the specific elements) to interpret the objectives of the act, the court concluded that immunity was not intended to extend to third party relationships as these are not covered by the functionality principle underpinning the act. The court held the appellate court erred in its finding and instead concluded against immunity.
The second question was whether it was a procedural requirement to obtain a waiver before instituting suit against the respondent. Reiterating the functionality basis of the respondent’s immunity and the fact that it did not extent to suits from third parties for contractual breach, the court reasoned that the waiver requirement was inapplicable and unnecessary. It thus concluded that there was no need to obtain a waiver before commencing suit and allowed the appeal.
The matter involved a dispute as to whether there was a contract and in effect breach of contract.
The main issue before the court was whether there was a contract for sale of goods and in consequence whether there was breach. Citing trite law that there is no contract if there is no agreement on the essential terms of contract, the court established that the alleged contract did not mention the amounts allegedly guaranteed whilst the demand for payment itself was not linked to the telephone transactions. The court considered the definition of a proforma invoice and concluded the alleged contract was part of negotiations and was therefore an offer to treat. As there was no indication of agreement on the essential terms, there was therefore no contract and consequently no breach of contract.
In obiter, the court also dealt with the question whether special damages were rightfully awarded by the court a quo. Acknowledging special damages as damage in fact caused by wrong and the claim requirements for specificity of pleading and proof, the court concluded that the award of special damages was inconsistent as liability could not be imported on a non-existent contract.
The court thus concluded in favor of the appellant and allowed the appeal.
The plaintiff sued the defendant state organ for the balance of payment for construction services rendered in respect of a government-owned school premises. It contended that the defendant had failed to pay the agreed-upon amount timeously; his sum claim was therefore the unpaid balance plus compound interest. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had been paid in full – the principal amount plus simple interest for the period of delay. As the agreement was unwritten, the court had to establish its terms. The determination of the type of interest was integral as the parties had not considered this at the time of contracting.
That the defendant was in breach due to its prolonged delay in effecting payment was quickly established by the court. Considering the nature and purport of contractual damages, it established that compound interest was apposite. Examining the plaintiff’s exhibits of standard industry lending rates sourced from the Bank of Uganda, the court determined the correct rate of interest at 22% p.a. and ruled in favour of the plaintiff. It held further that the award of compound interest sufficiently compensated the plaintiff for its restitutionary and expectation interests, thereby obviating the need for general damages.
This case involved an allegation that the defendant had not paid fully for services stipulated within an advertising agreement with the plaintiff. This case illustrates the importance interpreting the terms within a contract in line with what the parties to that contract had agreed.
The court held that the court’s duty is to interpret clause 4 of the contract in order to determine what the parties had agreed to. The court had regard to statements of English authority on the interpretation of commercial contracts. In particular,
that ‘[t]here must be ascribed to the words a meaning that would make good commercial sense … and not some meaning imposed … that no businessman in his right senses would be willing to incur.’
The court was satisfied that the according to the terms of the contract, the plaintiff as the ‘landlord’ had provided the defendant as the ‘advertiser’ space for advertising, and undertaken the contested printing activities for its benefit. The court held that the only sensible interpretation of the contract was that the cost of this printing was to be borne by the defendant because the alternative view would lead to a conclusion that ‘flouts common business sense’.
The court ruled that the defendant was supposed to pay the 3.5 million Ugandan shillings for the printing.
The plaintiff’s witness testified that the parties entered into a contract of hire for some construction equipment. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would would hire the equipment for a period of two months for payment .
Before the expected due date for the agreed payment, the defendant sought for a grace period.The plaintiff granted the grace period. However after expiration of the grace period, the cheque from the defendant returned unpaid and marked with the words ‘refer to drawer’. Upon failure to locate the defendant the plaintiff filed suit.
The plaintiff was found to have executed its part of the contract. The defendant’s failure to make funds available on his account constituted a breach of the terms of the contract.
It is trite that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. The plaintiff was found to have proven this and thus special damages were awarded. Due to non-payment the plaintiff was denied its expected income and inconvenienced. Hence, general damages were granted. The plaintiff was for this reason further awarded interest on the special damages at the rate of 25% per annum from the date the default of payment arose.
This case involved a memorandum of understanding that was departed from orally by both parties. This case illustrates how an oral variation leaves the written contract enforceable.
The court considered three issues, whether there was a valid contract, whether the counter-defendant had breached the contract, and if the counterclaimant is entitled to the remedies available.
The court held that the burden of proving misrepresentation rests on the party alleging it. Secondly, a breach of a contract arises when a party to a contract fails to meet its contractual obligation. However, where a party waives its rights, it cannot claim damages for breach on the same contract. Lastly, the court held that a party must take all reasonable steps to mitigate loss following a breach.
The court was satisfied that there was no proof of misrepresentation on the part of the counterclaimant. The court found that though there was breach of the contract by the counter-defendant, the counter-claimant had waived its rights and could not claim damages for breach on the same contract. The court was satisfied that the counter-claimant did not mitigate its loss and was therefore not entitled to any special damages.
The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for breach of contract, special damages, general damages, interest and costs of the suit. The two issues were whether there was a legally binding contract for decorating services between the plaintiff and the defendant and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies claimed.
It was submitted that under s 55 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 (PPDA or the act) all public procurement has to be carried out in accordance with the rules set out in the act and regulations and guidelines made under the act. The court held that there was non-compliance with the PPDA regulations on procurement of services.
The court stated that the act was established to ensure the application of fair, competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and value for money procurement and disposal standards and practices. Although there was non-compliance with established procedures as set out above, the contracts committee subsequently agreed with the methodology chosen albeit after the event. They ratified the process.
The court went on to decide that on the first issue thereof of whether there was a legally binding contract for decorating services between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the permanent secretary upon clearance by the Contracts Committee was under obligation to retrospectively regularise the procurement of the services of the plaintiff representing a consortium of companies which carried out decorations. The failure to regularise the procurement of the services of the plaintiff worked injustice because the plaintiffs remained unpaid for services procured and which had been cleared by the Contracts Committee.
Each of the parties accused the other of breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged breach in terms of non-payment for services conducted. The defendant counter-claimed breach in terms of failure to comply with the set completion time and providing substandard quality work.
The defendant also contended that should it be found liable, it should be indemnified by a third party as it has been negligent in doing its work.This court held that the defendant is not entitled to indemnity or any contribution from the third party.
The court found that there was no breach of contract by the plaintiff in so far as completion time is concerned. The defendant waived the right to complain about completion time and was estopped from raising the issue. The defendant was found to not be entitled to monies claimed in the counterclaim, as there was no basis for it and this court had already held that the defendant waived its rights.
The plaintiff was found to be entitled to the monies reflected on two certificates. The plaintiff was not awarded the contractual interest claimed because the court held that the the defendant was justified in not paying contractual interest for an erroneously issued certificate.
Following its non-payment for construction services rendered, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract. A counter-claim was lodged alleging that the plaintiff breached the parties’ agreement through a significant delay in performance and sub-standard discharge of its obligations. Insofar as the third party had issued unqualified certificates of completion for the plaintiff’s/counter-defendant’s alleged malperformance, the defendant/counter-claimant contended that it was negligent and therefore liable for a degree of indemnification.
The defendant/counter-claimant was found to have impliedly waived its right to liquidated damages for late performance and consequently estopped from enforcing it. The court found further that the plaintiff’s/counter-defendant’s performance, while flawed in some respects, was not materially defective. The issuing of a certificate of completion marks the close of liquidated damages liability and commences the period of defects liability, where errors in performance are identified and submitted to the contract debtor for rectification. Failure to rectify does not give a right to sue for breach but rather gives the employer the right to refuse to release retention monies.
The third party was found to have conducted its work competently, barring one erroneously issued certificate, and was under no obligation to indemnify the defendant. The defendant was therefore indebted to the plaintiff for the outstanding amounts stipulated by the lawfully issued certificates. Because the defendant had accepted and made use of the plaintiff’s performance, despite the erroneously issued certificate of completion, the court found that it was liable to compensate the latter under the law of unjustified enrichment. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff with costs.
The plaintiff sought relief from the court for alleged breach of contract said to have been committed by the defendant. The alleged breach was on the basis that the defendant had renewed a contract the parties had entered into and breached the contract by awarding a tender to another bidder.
In considering whether there was a breach of contract, the court essentially had to decide whether the contract between the parties was renewed.
The court held that the contract was not renewed, thus no breach of contract had taken place.
The court examined the clauses of the contract that was entered into along with legislation that provides guidance regarding procurement in local government in reaching its decision. From the above instruments, the court stated that for renewal to take place, it would have to be in accordance with clause 17.1.1 of the contract and through legislation.
Seeing that that was not the case, the court stated that there was only an oral understanding between the parties to continue working together even after the contract between them had expired.
The suit by the plaintiff was dismissed with costs. Since there was no breach of contract, no remedies were available to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff company brought a suit against the defendant school and its deputy headmaster for breach of contract stating that the defendants failed to pay for services rendered by the plaintiff.
There were two issues before the court: whether there was a valid contract between the parties and whether the plaintiff carried out their services in accordance with local purchase orders 1941 and 1942.
The court held that there was a valid contract between the parties. It was also held that in rendering services, the plaintiff did not supply and install certain items in accordance with local purchase orders 1941 and 1942.
Regarding the validity of the contract, the court found that the second defendant had apparent authority to sign the local purchase orders meaning the contract was valid and that there was no express provision in the legislation stating that non-compliance vitiates legality of contract. In addition, the court found that the first defendant accepted the goods when they were delivered to it and had to pay accordingly.
The court’s judgement relied on a report by the Ugandan National Bureau of Standards which found that some of the items installed by the plaintiff were substandard.
The court awarded the plaintiff Shs 216,000 for delivery of goods and Shs 84,000 for general damages. In addition, the court awarded the plaintiff interest on the above amounts until payment was made in full.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract following its failure to pay in full – inclusive of VAT and penalties accruing from delayed payment – for construction services rendered. Two clear issues arose: whether the plaintiff was entitled to the sum claim and what remedies were available to the litigants. The contract provided for specific procedures in the event of disputes between its signatories. The plaintiff’s grievances with the project manager’s final certificate (which confirmed the amount owing by the defendant) ought to have been aired via these channels, so the defendant could be alerted thereto.
Because timeous and effective payment was based on certificates, the court found that the defendant could not be held liable for non-payment exceeding the certified amount. The court accordingly reduced the sum claim. Because the defendant had hampered the plaintiff’s commercial endeavours through its breach, it stood liable for general damages. The plaintiff provided no elucidation on the quantum thereof, and so its determination fell to the court’s discretion.
The plaintiff supplier sued the defendant – its Local Technical Representative (LTR) in accordance with the National Drug Authority Act for the distribution of pharmaceutical products – for breach of contract. The defendant failed to pay the plaintiff for the assorted products it supplied. The plaintiff consequently claimed for loss of income, damages, interest and costs of suit. The defendant lodged a counter-claim alleging that the plaintiff/first counter-defendant had breached the memorandum of understanding concluded between the parties and had, through various means, attempted to cripple the defendant’s/counter-claimant’s enterprise. It alleged further, as the basis of its challenge to the legality of the arrangement between the first and second counter-defendants, that the just-mentioned parties had colluded in this endeavour so as allow the latter to become the new LTR.
The defendants/counter-claimants successfully raised the procedural bar of res judicata – which prohibits judicially-decided matters from being heard afresh a second time – concerning the plaintiff’s claim, given that the matter of their indebtedness thereto had been resolved in the settlement of antecedent winding-up proceedings. To what extent ought the defendant’s/counter-claimant’s challenge have been raised as part of the previous lawsuit? Suggesting that res judicata was applicable to both parties’ claims, the court nevertheless considered the counter-claimant’s’ case in respect of the first and second counter-defendants and found no measure of illegality or bad faith on the evidence. The counter-claimant was additionally time-barred from seeking review of the National Drug Authority’s decision over the LTR change.
The plaintiff’s suit and defendants’ counter-claims were accordingly dismissed with costs.
In this case the applicant wanted a writ of mandamus to compel the first respondent to pay the outstanding amounts with interest as ordered from the High Court. This case emphasizes that there must be a clear right in order to use a mandamus.
The court held that in order to obtain a writ of mandamus the following must be established: (1) a clear legal right and a corresponding duty in the respondent; (2) that some specific act or thing which the law requires that particular officer to do has been omitted to be done by him; (3) lack of any alternative, and (4) whether the alternative remedy exists but is inconvenient, less beneficial or less effective or totally ineffective.
The rights of the party seeking the writ of mandamus must not be doubtable. The court was not satisfied that the issues regarding the interest to be awarded and the amount due where properly determined. The court found that the applicant’s rights were doubtable. The court dismissed the application and advised the parties to seek an appropriate intervention to give proper interpretation of the trial judge’s judgment.
The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, for the defendant to pay the balance of the money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in terms of their contract, and for interest on the amount.
The sourt held that on the evidence the defendant failed to deliver all the sugar within the seven weeks. The defendants did not adduce any evidence to the contrary, and the plaintiff was entitled to refund of the money paid for the sugar. The issue was whether general damages ought to be awarded in addition to interest on the outstanding amount.
Section 50 of the Sale of Goods Act provided that the remedy for wrongful non-delivery was damages. The measure was the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach of contract. General damages will usually be awarded to place the plaintiff in as close a position as possible they would have been had the injury not occurred. Where interest is awarded for deprivation of monies to be paid, then general damages will not be awarded in addition to interest. The award of interest would place the plaintiff in its original position.
The court held that the plaintiff did not adduce evidence of what loss was suffered to warrant an award of general damages. Interest was therefore awarded in lieu of general damages.
The plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant to recover a sum of money owed to the plaintiff for the construction of a television complex constructed by the plaintiff on the defendant’s premises. The defendant submitted a counterclaim.
The court was faced with a number of issues to resolve, namely: whether the deed of variation entered into by the parties was void for illegality; whether the plaintiff breached he contract; whether the plaintiff is entitled to any remedies and whether the defendant is entitled to their counter claim.
The court held that (i) the deed of variation was enforceable; (ii) the plaintiff was not in breach of contract; (iii) the counter claim by the defendant must fail and that the plaintiff was entitled to remedies for the sum withheld.
The court relied on existing legislation to distinguish between variation and amendment- the former dealt with changes in the contract relating to the price, completion date or statement of requirements of the contract and the latter related to changes in terms and conditions of the awarded contract. The court relied on witness testimonies from which it determined that the plaintiff was not in breach of contract.
The defendant’s counterclaim was dismissed, and the plaintiff awarded Shs 749,884,386 being the money owed to it by the defendant. Interest was set at 19% p.a. Costs were ordered in favour of plaintiff.
The plaintiff instituted a civil action against the defendant for breach of contract and sought the following remedies: an order for specific performance, special damages, general damages and interest.
The court had to consider whether the plaintiff had a cause of action, whether the defendant was in breach or failed to perform and whether the plaintiff was entitled to any relief.
The court held that a cause of action existed and that the defendant was indeed in breach as he failed to perform his part of the bargain, consequently the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
The court stated that where a plaintiff has a liquidated demand, there is no need to assess the demand where no defense is presented. The court relied on previous judgments that made a distinction between a liquidated demand and pecuniary damages. With further reliance on existing civil procedure legislation, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgement based on the liquidated demand.
The court awarded judgment in favour of the plaintiff for the amount on the liquidated demand. Due to no evidence being led, relief in the form of special and general damages was not awarded. The court granted the plaintiff 10% interest on the amount in the liquidated demand.
The plaintiffs sued the defendant for breach of contract. The first plaintiff claimed US $190,747 for services rendered to the defendant. The second plaintiff claimed US $3,085 being the outstanding balance for provision of services to the defendant before their contract was terminated. The plaintiffs each reached a settlement agreement in which the defendant was going to pay a portion of the claimed amount.
The plaintiffs later claimed they concluded the first payment under duress, and sought the full amounts originally claimed plus interest.
The defended raised a defence of res judicata on the grounds that the case was premised on a subject matter which has been previously decided. It produced letters of acknowledgment of full payment.
The court dismissed the res judicata defence on the basis that this was a different case because there were new parties and that the plaintiffs were now seeking interest. However, the court held that there was no evidence of duress and if the plaintiffs were assaulted they should have made a police report. The court ruled that it cannot ignore the letter of acknowledgement of full payment on the grounds that a contract entered by parties should be respected.
The case was dismissed with costs.
This is a case relating to to a contractual dispute where the plaintiff was suing the defendant for breach of contract.
The defendant had been contracted by the Uganda Revenue Authority to construct a border post. The defendant then sub-contracted the plaintiff to perform certain work under three contracts. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant unlawfully terminated one of the contracts after they demanded payment. The defendant contended that it was the plaintiff who unilaterally terminated the contract by halting work at the site resulting in the defendant taking over the work. The defendant further counter-claimed that the plaintiff used some of their equipment and as result the plaintiff owes them compensation.
The court held that there were disparities between the plaintiff’s witnesses and that the defendant did not unilaterally terminate the contract. It ruled that the defendant could not be held liable for any sum of money beyond payment for work the plaintiff had actually performed. The court also found that there was no evidence to show that the amount of work done was to a value in excess of what was paid.
The case was dismissed. The counter-claim was equally dismissed for lack of evidence
The dispute emanated from the arrest of the plaintiff’s workers on the instruction of defendant, the National Forestry Authority on allegation of illegally felling trees. This was despite the fact that the plaintiff was licensed to harvest the trees. The plaintiff was forced to pay 150 000 shillings for the tools and logs impounded by the police.
The plaintiff claimed compensation amounting to 3 million shillings for mistreatment, mental health and psychological torture at the hands of the defendant. She further claimed special damages for loss of income. The plaintiff submitted that the defendant breached the license awarded to the plaintiff to harvest abandoned logs
The defendant contended that that the plaintiff breached her license by illegally harvesting timber beyond what was permitted by the license. It argued that the plaintiff’s claim was outrageous in view of the fact that she abandoned the license and that the allegations of mistreatment was frivolous. On special damages, the defended argued that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show any loss.
In deciding the matter, the court held that the defendant was in breach of its obligations towards the plaintiff and awarded damages of 3 million shillings for breach of the contract, lost opportunities and inconveniences suffered. The claim for special damages was dismissed.