The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The case was an application seeking to revive a consent judgment set aside by the registrar of the court.
The dispute emanated from an application by the respondent seeking an order to nullify registration of property in the name of the defendants (who are now applicants). The order was granted under an ex parte application because the respondents failed to respond to the suit. The respondents tried without success to appeal the judgment.
The respondents then filed a notice of appeal to the Appeal Court seeking to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing the application. They also requested an interim order for stay of execution. The applicant (who is now the respondent) objected to the appeal arguing that it was late which was confirmed by the registrar. The respondents referred the matter to a single judge and pending the determination by the judge, the parties entered into a consent judgment which was endorsed by the registrar. The registrar later set aside the consent judgment which the applicants are now seeking to revive.
In deciding the case, the court held that there was no appeal before the single judge because the applicants filed the appeal late. The court ruled that the registrar has no jurisdiction to hear and dispose an appeal. It found that the registrar erred when he entered a consent judgment on a matter which was on appeal before a court. It further ruled that the consent judgment was null and void thus it cannot be revived.
In this case, the court made a determination on an application to set aside a consent judgment that made provision for share transfer, land transfer and a special resolution.
The court determined whether the fourth defendant had the authority to enter into the consent judgment. The court applied the indoor management rule to make a finding that the fourth defendant had such authority and that parties outside did not have to enquire about the fourth respondent’s authority.
The applicants raised an objection that the consent judgment contained unpleaded issues in the prior suit by including legal entities or companies which were not parties to the suit. This objection failed since the parties had elected to be bound by what they agreed.
On the issue of whether the fourth respondent had colluded with the other respondents to defraud the applicant, the court held that it lacked merit since the fourth respondent was duly authorised by the applicants to represent them. The applicants claimed that there was no special meeting to sanction the change of name and offering the first applicant interest in land but on the evidence tendered, the court was satisfied that the meeting took place.
The court dismissed the application to set aside the consent judgment thereby denying the consequential order sought to set aside transactions validated by the consent judgment. Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
In this case the defendant raised a preliminary objection disputing the jurisdiction of the court to handle a dispute in a loan agreement.
The court determined the jurisdiction of the high court to handle the matter despite a clause in the agreement that ousted (excluded) its jurisdiction. The court applied article 139(4) of the Constitution and the rule that a simple clause in a contract does not oust the unlimited original jurisdiction of the High Court as conferred by the Constitution. The court observed that the defendant raised this objection to avoid liability since the defendant did not prove his case. The court was satisfied that it would be very expensive to conduct the trial in Belgium as provided in the contract. Consequently, the objection was not sustained and the court ordered that the matter should proceed to trial.
The court concerned whether the goods seized by the defendants were all released pursuant to a consent to judgment being signed, and payment being fulfilled.
The plaintiff instituted action against the defendants for a declaration that they had breach a consent order. The defendants, without the plaintiff being present, entered a warehouse and seized a substantial number of goods.
A consent to judgment was entered into, wherein it was alleged that the defendant had breached the consent by not releasing all the goods. The plaintiff sought recovery of the goods and said that the seizure was unlawful.
The court found that the test to be applied is as follows: 1) whether all goods were released? 2) If not, what is the value of the goods not released and the potential remedies available?
The court found that the burden of proof lies on the party who asserts that the truth of the issue is in dispute. When that party adduces evidence, which is sufficient to raise a presumption that what he alleges is true, the burden of proof shifts to the other party to counter allege and produce evidence to rebut the presumption.
The court found that a substantial portion of the goods were not released as a result of the defendant being overburdened in their workforce, which deprived the plaintiff from use of the proceeds of the goods. Therefore, the plaintiff should be compensated for the economic inconvenience and awarded general damages.
The plaintiff tried to claim exemplary damages for breach of consent to judgment, however this was denied as it was not proven that the conduct of the defendants amounted to oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional behaviour.
This is an application to annul the consent order that was executed between the respondents and the cancellation of the third respondent’s title. The appeal was issued by the registrar against the decision of a judge who dismissed an application by the first respondent against the second and third respondents. The appeal is premised on grounds that the registrar had no jurisdiction not issue the orders and the consent is illegal.