The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The court considered whether the court below was correct in finding that the re-allocation of land was valid in law. Furthermore, it considered whether the below court was correct in finding that ownership could not be established, irrespective of a subsisting agreement and whether the court was correct in admitting inadmissible evidence.
The appellants alleged that they were staff of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (‘NITEL’) purchased flats from NITEL and occupied them with supporting letters to confirm their purchase. They subsequently discovered that a portion of their land had been re-allocated and used as a car park without their consent.
The court found that a party for a declaration of title of land must show the court clearly the area of land to which the claim relates. The court found that the appellants did not prove their title by failing to prove acts of ownership or long possession.
On the issue of ownership, the court considered the five requirements for a contract to be valid, namely, 1) offer, 2) acceptance, 3) consideration, 4) intention to create a legal relationship and 5) capacity to contract. These must co-exist for a contract to be formed in law. It was found that a valid sale agreement had been established, therefore denoting ownership.
The court found that the admission of evidence which was made during the pendency of the suit was inadmissible and should not have been relied upon by the court below.
Second respondent was informed of a building for sale by the appellants with a 5% commission to whoever secured a buyer. Second respondent found a buyer but received no payment. He successfully claimed payment in the lower court, which the appellants appealed.
The issue was whether the second respondent was an agent of the appellants and entitled to the commission claimed.
Agency is created when the principal authorises the agent to act on their behalf, and the agent accepts to act on their authority. The appeal court agreed that the second respondent began acting as agent immediately after being given the sale price and rate of commission. The first appellant authorised several agents, including second respondent, to look for a buyer. The ultimate buyer was introduced to the first appellant by second respondent.
At issue was whether the second respondent could act as a commission agent or receive commission. He was not a qualified estate surveyor and valuer, or a member of the Nigerian Institute of Estate Surveyors, Agents and Valuers. Furthermore, a lawyer may not practice as a legal practitioner while engaging in the business of a commission agent. Though the second respondent contravened the latter rule, the court held that this contravention did not vitiate the agency agreement. A party who has benefitted from a contract cannot evade their obligations by relying on an allegation of illegality; illegality must be on the face of it. There was no illegality in the agency agreement.
The appeal was dismissed.
The court was confronted with a question of liability for undelivered goods by the driver of a haulage company contracted by the plaintiff. The meat of the enquiry focused on the issue of the effect of a failure to sign the delivery note on bailment. Having assessed the understanding and intentions of the parties the court reasoned delivery occurred at the moment of loading by the supplier, upon which liability passed to the carrier. The issue of the signing of the note or lack of by the driver thus bore no significance on the question of liability. Only sufficient reasons for failure to adduce the signature and evidence of collusive fraud by defendant would commute the carrier’s responsibility. Consequently, a claim of contributory negligence could not stand once loading had been made by the supplier as they did not have an express duty of care to ensure signing of the notes. Moreover, the mere loading was in itself delivery thus the plaintiff failed to demonstrate negligence.
Finally, the court dealt with the question of whether a contract actually existed between the parties as this had an effect on surcharges deducted by the defendant. The court found that given the nature of the contracts involved, the defendant had no contractual relationship with the plaintiff and therefore could not sue on the surcharge agreement as they were not party to the contract made for their benefit.
The court thus dismissed the appeal.
The appeal arose from the appellant’s contention that the judgment by the Court of Appeal was against the weight of evidence.
The court relied on the rule that the plaintiff in the contest bears the burden of production of evidence and persuasion to ground its assessment of the status of the International Rom (appellant). It reasoned that given the evidence, the true position was that the email which was received from the Chief Compliance Officer of Mauritius was intended to be an official record complying with the Act 772 and was thus relevant and admissible. However, considering the conflicting evidence, the court concluded against placing any probative value to the email and thus dismissed the contention that the company had ceased to exist.
The court also applied the rule in Turquand’s Case, formulated in the case of Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 EI & BI 327 which has been codified and amended in ss 139-143 of the Companies Act, Act 179 (1963) and common law principles to assess the party the defendants contracted with. It reasoned that since International Rom Mauritius and International Rom Ghana had been regarded as one entity by the first defendants, mistake could not be argued to escape the contract.
Finally, the court assessed the provisioned evidence particularly the cross examination to concluded that the claim of failure to allow for challenge of the evidence lacked merit. In addition, the court also held there was an undertaking to make the payment by the first defendant, a commitment which the first defendant did not honor. It was therefore urged by the court that the defendants pay the outstanding amounts plus interest to the appellant.
The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for breach of contract, special damages, general damages, interest and costs of the suit. The two issues were whether there was a legally binding contract for decorating services between the plaintiff and the defendant and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies claimed.
It was submitted that under s 55 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 (PPDA or the act) all public procurement has to be carried out in accordance with the rules set out in the act and regulations and guidelines made under the act. The court held that there was non-compliance with the PPDA regulations on procurement of services.
The court stated that the act was established to ensure the application of fair, competitive, transparent, non-discriminatory and value for money procurement and disposal standards and practices. Although there was non-compliance with established procedures as set out above, the contracts committee subsequently agreed with the methodology chosen albeit after the event. They ratified the process.
The court went on to decide that on the first issue thereof of whether there was a legally binding contract for decorating services between the plaintiff and the defendant, that the permanent secretary upon clearance by the Contracts Committee was under obligation to retrospectively regularise the procurement of the services of the plaintiff representing a consortium of companies which carried out decorations. The failure to regularise the procurement of the services of the plaintiff worked injustice because the plaintiffs remained unpaid for services procured and which had been cleared by the Contracts Committee.
The plaintiff sought relief from the court for alleged breach of contract said to have been committed by the defendant. The alleged breach was on the basis that the defendant had renewed a contract the parties had entered into and breached the contract by awarding a tender to another bidder.
In considering whether there was a breach of contract, the court essentially had to decide whether the contract between the parties was renewed.
The court held that the contract was not renewed, thus no breach of contract had taken place.
The court examined the clauses of the contract that was entered into along with legislation that provides guidance regarding procurement in local government in reaching its decision. From the above instruments, the court stated that for renewal to take place, it would have to be in accordance with clause 17.1.1 of the contract and through legislation.
Seeing that that was not the case, the court stated that there was only an oral understanding between the parties to continue working together even after the contract between them had expired.
The suit by the plaintiff was dismissed with costs. Since there was no breach of contract, no remedies were available to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff company brought a suit against the defendant school and its deputy headmaster for breach of contract stating that the defendants failed to pay for services rendered by the plaintiff.
There were two issues before the court: whether there was a valid contract between the parties and whether the plaintiff carried out their services in accordance with local purchase orders 1941 and 1942.
The court held that there was a valid contract between the parties. It was also held that in rendering services, the plaintiff did not supply and install certain items in accordance with local purchase orders 1941 and 1942.
Regarding the validity of the contract, the court found that the second defendant had apparent authority to sign the local purchase orders meaning the contract was valid and that there was no express provision in the legislation stating that non-compliance vitiates legality of contract. In addition, the court found that the first defendant accepted the goods when they were delivered to it and had to pay accordingly.
The court’s judgement relied on a report by the Ugandan National Bureau of Standards which found that some of the items installed by the plaintiff were substandard.
The court awarded the plaintiff Shs 216,000 for delivery of goods and Shs 84,000 for general damages. In addition, the court awarded the plaintiff interest on the above amounts until payment was made in full.
The first appellant and the respondent are siblings whom were initially registered as tenants in common, on a land plot. In 2002, the proprietorship of this land was transferred from the names of the siblings to the 2nd to 8th appellants (who were at the time minor children of the first appellant).
The respondent was aggrieved by the transfer and registration of the appellant's descendants to the suit property. She contended that the first appellant had acted fraudulently in this transfer. She went to the High Court seeking reinstatement of her name on the suit title. The High Court granted the orders sought.
The appellants appeal the decision of the High Court. On the grounds that (1) the court erred in evaluating the evidence of the first appellant as a whole, nor recording of his evidence and (2) the respondent freely relinquished her interests in the property.
The respondent filed a cross appeal declaring that she is entitled to award of mesne profits and or general damages as well.
This court found that the transfer form did not amount to forgery or fraud. The appeal therefore succeeded in part. However, it was found that the respondent had not fulfilled the condition of transferring and subdividing part of lands into the names of the respondent - as they agreed.
The respondent was found to have carried out her part of the bargain and the first respondent must do his own as well.
This case concerns the award of damages, or not, to compensate for the negative consequences of the respondent’s repudiation of a procurement contract. In the first instance, the trial court dismissed the suit with costs after finding that there was no contract between the parties. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court decision and awarded damages. The appellant, however, was dissatisfied with the quantum of damages awarded by the Court of Appeal and filed a further appeal to the Supreme Court, seeking damages for lost profits in addition to general damages. The respondent filed a cross-appeal proposing that the appellant’s appeal be dismissed, the decision of the Court of Appeal be reversed in part and the High court judgment and orders be restored. The respondent argued that no valid contract was entered into by the parties.
The court first considered whether there was a valid contract entered into between or executed between the parties under the 2003 PPDA Act and Regulations. PPDA section 76(3) requires that formal contracts be in writing. This requirement was not fulfilled. Consequently, no binding obligation arose out of the letter of bid acceptance. The court, therefore, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.