The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
This appeal raises the question of admissibility of a document that was alleged to be a privileged document. The petitioner sought to have this document admitted as evidence, while the respondent argued that it should be excluded as the security of the state would be impaired.
The petitioner argued that that if this document was excluded, his constitutional right to fair trial would be violated. He further claimed that if the security of the state would be impaired by such conduct. Section 23(2) of the Constitution allows the court to hear the matters that touch on the security of the state, away from the public.
The respondent relied on s 121 of the Evidence Act. He claimed that this document relates to affairs of state and was therefore inadmissible without the consent of the head of department.
This court stated that when an act of Congress conflicts with constitutionally enshrined provisions; the Constitution prevails because it holds the paramount commands. Furthermore, it was held that the court that has the power to determine whether a matter falls within the exceptions or not. In order to do this, the state must produce evidence upon which the court can act. The state never did so.
The court examined the document in dispute and found it to relate to state security. However, the court overruled the respondent’s objection. The document was admitted as evidence in closed court.
The case was an application seeking to revive a consent judgment set aside by the registrar of the court.
The dispute emanated from an application by the respondent seeking an order to nullify registration of property in the name of the defendants (who are now applicants). The order was granted under an ex parte application because the respondents failed to respond to the suit. The respondents tried without success to appeal the judgment.
The respondents then filed a notice of appeal to the Appeal Court seeking to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing the application. They also requested an interim order for stay of execution. The applicant (who is now the respondent) objected to the appeal arguing that it was late which was confirmed by the registrar. The respondents referred the matter to a single judge and pending the determination by the judge, the parties entered into a consent judgment which was endorsed by the registrar. The registrar later set aside the consent judgment which the applicants are now seeking to revive.
In deciding the case, the court held that there was no appeal before the single judge because the applicants filed the appeal late. The court ruled that the registrar has no jurisdiction to hear and dispose an appeal. It found that the registrar erred when he entered a consent judgment on a matter which was on appeal before a court. It further ruled that the consent judgment was null and void thus it cannot be revived.
The matter dealt with an application for foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property as a result of failure to make loan repayments by defendant.
The main issue was whether the plaintiff could exercise its right to foreclose the property. The court cited s 8(1) of the Mortgage Act that allows one to redeem the property at any time of breach and or to get a court order effecting the redemption. Reference to How v Vigures was also made regarding the triggers for foreclosure proceedings as being when due payment has not been made on date for redemption (default) or when there is a breach of any terms of the mortgage.
The court established that as the defendant had not complied with the terms of the credit facility agreement by not paying the agreed monthly instalments for a period of two years despite repeated demands, the exercise of the right to foreclosure was held to be fit and proper.
The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff could exercise the right to foreclose and accordingly allowed the application.
In this case the plaintiff had lost valuable equipment through acts of incendiarism and sought indemnity since this had happened over 100 days into the life of the insurance policy. This case illustrates how parties are bound to their own undertakings in a contract for insurance premiums.
The court considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity under the Contractor Plant and Machinery Policy. The court considered the parole evidence rule and held that the defendant had to meet its obligations under the insurance policy. The policy insurance was clear on what it covered and thus the defendant could not invoke the parole evidence to show what the insurance policy intentions were or not. The court held that it could only enforce the insurance policy as it was.
The court also considered whether the plaintiff’s claim was fraudulent. It held that the plaintiff’s claim under the insurance policy was legitimate, as it had been proven that it possessed a valid insurance policy issued by the defendant. Thus in the absence of proof of fraud by the defendant, obligations under the insurance policy had to be met.
The court concluded that there was no fraud and thus the plaintiff was to be indemnified. The court upheld the claim and awarded damages in favour of the plaintiff.
A dispute arose between the appellant and the respondent regarding the amount payable for extra costs incurred during the delivery of goods by sea. The case was first heard by the high court, then the magistrates court where it was dismissed based on jurisdiction.
The court had to consider whether Ugandan courts had jurisdiction to hear the matter and whether the magistrate erred in law and fact when he dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim before hearing it.
It was held that Ugandan courts had jurisdiction to try the matter and that the magistrate erred in law and fact when he dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim without hearing it.
With reliance on the bill of lading, legislation and past cases, the court was of the view that the parties had voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Ugandan courts. In addition, the court stated that the Ugandan courts were readily available to adjudicate on the matter and it was convenient to bring the matter before Ugandan courts. Furthermore, the court issued that the magistrate ought to have considered the Constitution and civil procedure rules prior to dismissing the appellant’s counterclaim without hearing the merits.
The court ordered a new trial in the magistrate’s court. The appeal was allowed, and costs were awarded in favour of the appellant.
The application was based on the fact that the applicant had been prevented by sufficient cause from filing a defence in a civil suit which according to the court had a meritorious defence that had a high chance of success.
The main issue was whether the default judgment issued by the lower court pursuant to failure to file a written statement of defence should be set aside.
The court reiterated that the burden is on the process server to indicate whether a principal officer or director or secretary of the corporation has been served or to indicate whether he or she was unable to establish who was being served. The serving officer, in this case, was simply quiet about who was served notwithstanding that there is a stamp of the applicant on the signature of the person served. Moreover, the provisions as to service support are a fundamental rule of justice which is that of fair trial. Fair trial includes due notice of the summons on the defendant or persons sought to be summoned to appear in court.
The court held that due to the fundamental requirements of service of process on the secretary, director or other principal officer of the company, the default decree and judgment was set aside. The court held that civil procedure rules makes it necessary to identify the person served in the corporation sufficiently to fulfill the requirements for service on a corporation.
The appellant was dissatisfied with the
decision and orders of the court of appeal
hence this appeal on the grounds of the right of
appeal from the orders under arbitration and
conciliation, reliance on the commission of
inquiry report, decision to set aside the
decision of the high court.
The background is that the appellant had a
contract to construct an annex to the existing
Mbale Resort. The construction wasn’t
complete and the matter was referred to
arbitration and several orders and awards were
made. The arbitral award was contested and at
appeal, an objection on a point of law was
raised that there was no right of appeal as the
award arose out of arbitration.
The defendants applied for credit facilities to obtain steel products from the plaintiff. The second and third defendants stood surety. The plaintiff contended that the defendants refused to pay for the steel products. The proceedings were for breach of contract, and special and general damages. The defendants denied concluding the contract, and argued the matter ought to be heard in South Africa.
The issues for determination were whether the court lacked jurisdiction; whether there was a contract between the parties; whether the defendants breached the contract; and whether second and third defendants were liable.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the court considered the agreement. It was clear that the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the High Court of South Africa, however the court held that the Constitution and Judicature Act provided it with unlimited original jurisdiction in all matters. Even when parties had an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the High Court of Uganda still had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it.
Regarding the existence of the contract, the law required the plaintiff to prove the documents were signed by the second and third defendants. The court found that the plaintiff proved it entered into a valid contract with the defendants.
Whether the defendants breached the contract, the court held that the first defendant breached the contract by failing to pay for the goods, and that the second and third defendants were liable as sureties.
Plaintiff was awarded special and general damages.
This is an application to annul the consent order that was executed between the respondents and the cancellation of the third respondent’s title. The appeal was issued by the registrar against the decision of a judge who dismissed an application by the first respondent against the second and third respondents. The appeal is premised on grounds that the registrar had no jurisdiction not issue the orders and the consent is illegal.
The appellant appealed against a taxing officer’s order awarding the second respondent costs of 1, 900, 739/= contending that the instruction fee awarded was based on an incorrect value of the suit. The respondents’ counsel raised preliminary objections inter alia that couldn’t be permitted to raise a new point of law that was not argued in the lower court.
The matter involved a claim by the applicant against the defendant’s conduct of unlawfully blocking and deducting monies from his salary account.
First, was whether the court, as a commercial division, had jurisdiction over the matter. The court reasoned that as it dealt with crediting and debiting of the applicant’s account, the matter therefore lay in the ambit of a banker customer relationship. The court was therefore had jurisdiction as it was a commercial matter.
Next, was whether the applicant’s account had been unlawfully deducted and consequently who was liable, considering that the defendant had assumed the obligations of Crane Bank, the applicant’s original employer. The court found there was evidence that the applicant’s account had been credited with less money than he was earning for some time.
On the issue of liability, the court reasoned that despite the contractual exemption of liability upon assumption of Crane’s obligations by the defendant, the Employment Act required the employment obligations to transfer to the defendant as a matter of law. The effect was that the defendant was liable for the unlawful deductions.
Finally, the court dealt with the question of damages. The court used its discretion to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been but for the wrong, as required by law. The court, using its discretion, also awarded interest to the applicant on the basis that applicant had been deprived from own monies. It however denied the claim for exemplary damages as it could not establish malice, outrage or impunity in the conduct of the defendant.