Commercial Law Index

In this case, the appellant protested the total absence of any service of the processes and claimed ignorance of the proceedings at the lower court. This case illustrates the essentiality of service of court process.

The court considered whether the appellant had been duly served with the notice of appeal, other processes filed by the respondent at the lower court and also the hearing notices. 

The court followed the principle provided in Ihedioha v Okorocha Appeal No. SC. 660/2015 (unreported, delivered on 29 October 2015) where it was held that service is an important aspect of judicial process. It was held that failure to serve a named party with court process offends section 36(1) of the Constitution. 

The court also took into account the provision of order 2 rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules, which stipulates that it is mandatory for the service of the notice of appeal on a respondent to be personal.

The court held that the validity of the originating processes in a proceeding before a court was fundamental because the competence of the proceeding is a condition sine qua non (an essential condition) to the legitimacy of any suit. The court held that there was a lack of certainty that the appellant was served with any process in accordance with practice and procedure of the rules of court.

The court upheld the appeal with no costs.
 

The matter involves an application for an extension of the period of appeal by applicant against a lower court decision. 

The main issue was whether the applicant, after consideration of the interests of justice and fair hearing, is entitled to an extension of the period of appeal. Starting from the point that the execution of a judgment does not foreclose the aggrieved party’s right of appeal, the court stated that the applicant must show good and substantial reasons for the delay in appeal, which can be rooted in a rule, lack of means, mistake or accident and, prima facie good cause why the application should be heard. Whilst the first leg requires a satisfactory justification, the second leg only requires one to show that the grounds of appeal are arguable. It is upon satisfaction of both the above that the court will use its discretion to grant the application.

As the applicant’s sole reason was that the delay stemmed from a desire to explore an out of court settlement option, the court followed the Supreme Court decision in Ikenta Best (Nig.) Ltd v AG Rivers State (2008) 2 SCNJ 152 to arrive at the position that the applicant’s reason could not be regarded as a good and substantial reason for delay in filing an appeal. The court thus held the applicant had failed to justify why the extension should be granted and therefore dismissed the application.

The appellant brought an appeal against the judgement of the High Court, where the lower court dismissed the appellant’s suit on grounds that the claim had prescribed.

The court considered whether the appellant’s right to a fair hearing could be determined despite having failed to initiate its case prior to it prescribing and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the appellant’s case due to prescription. 

The court held that the appellant’s right to a fair hearing could not be determined under the circumstances. The court also held that the High Court incorrectly dismissed the appellant’s case without considering important aspects.

Regarding the right to a fair hearing; the court was of the view that since the appellant initiated their case by writ of summons for a declaration against the respondent, it was not an application for the enforcement of a fundamental right and it stood to be affected by the operation of a statute including any limitations the statute could have had. Furthermore, the court issued that the High Court ought to have made an inquiry as to the definition of a ‘public officer’ as used in the statute and if there were any exceptions to the statute that prescribes claims against public officers after three months. The omission by the High Court was held to be an error. 

The appeal was successful, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. Court ordered the case to be heardafresh by the High Court. No costs were ordered.

The court dealt with an application for an extension of time to appeal. The court reiterated the test that must be satisfied for an application for extension of time. The applicant must file an affidavit showing good and substantial reasons for the failure to appeal within time; and propose grounds of appeal that good cause why the appeal should be heard. The court held that the applicant had shown both good and substantial reasons as to why he failed to file appeal with the correct framework and proposed adequate grounds for appeal.

The court considered whether the appellants were necessary parties in the suit, and what is the procedure to determine a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that a necessary party is one who is bound by the result of an action. Further held that cause of action is the facts which when proved entitle a plaintiff to a remedy against the defendant and the procedure thereof is showing that the statement of claim contained facts which if proved plaintiffs would succeed.

The court found that the appellants had made a premature application which supported the respondent’s contention that there is a reasonable cause of action, and that the second appellant is a necessary party to the proceedings. 

The court accordingly dismissed the appeal and costs were awarded to the respondent.
 

The appeal turned on whether the plaintiff’s action in the trial court was statute barred. The plaintiff claimed that he owned a plot of land that he later transferred to a company, which was erroneously confiscated by the government, and occupied by the fifth defendant. It was argued, however, that the plaintiff acquiesced to the unlawful occupation of the land.

The plaintiff argued that the land was never transferred to the state, and the plaintiff remained owner. This meant that the government could not transfer ownership in the land to another as it still belonged to the plaintiff, who had not acquiesced in the matter.

The court held that there was uncontroverted evidence that the plot was transferred from the company to Gold Coast Motors as early as 1991, of which the plaintiff was aware. There was nothing preventing the plaintiff challenging the presence of Gold Coast Motors or the fifth defendant. The court held that Gold Coast Motors was in adverse possession since 1991, and fifth defendants continued such when they purchased the plot. Adverse possession is open, visible and unchallenged, giving notice to an owner that someone is asserting a claim adverse to the owner’s right of ownership. Gold Coast Motors had exercised rights inconsistent with the plaintiff’s since 1991, and later sold the plot to the fifth defendant who continued the chain of adverse possession. Neither recognized the title of the plaintiff since 1991, of which the plaintiff was aware but failed to challenge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court was called upon to review a decision of the Court of Appeal that held that a lawyer without a valid licence to practice cannot practice law nor prepare any court process. The court below held that any process originated by a lawyer without a licence is null. The majority decision of the court held that where a lawyer endorses a writ and court process, but he did not have a licence at the time, he cannot be said to be functioning as a lawyer and not capable of endorsing the court process. A litigant who fails to verify the legal capacity of is lawyer cannot claim miscarriage of justice because the writ endorsed by an unlicensed practitioner is without legal effect.

The case was an application seeking to revive a consent judgment set aside by the registrar of the court. 

The dispute emanated from an application by the respondent seeking an order to nullify registration of property in the name of the defendants (who are now applicants). The order was granted under an ex parte application because the respondents failed to respond to the suit. The respondents tried without success to appeal the judgment.

The respondents then filed a notice of appeal to the Appeal Court seeking to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing the application. They also requested an interim order for stay of execution. The applicant (who is now the respondent) objected to the appeal arguing that it was late which was confirmed by the registrar. The respondents referred the matter to a single judge and pending the determination by the judge, the parties entered into a consent judgment which was endorsed by the registrar. The registrar later set aside the consent judgment which the applicants are now seeking to revive.

In deciding the case, the court held that there was no appeal before the single judge because the applicants filed the appeal late. The court ruled that the registrar has no jurisdiction to hear and dispose an appeal. It found that the registrar erred when he entered a consent judgment on a matter which was on appeal before a court. It further ruled that the consent judgment was null and void thus it cannot be revived.

The matter involved an application for the setting aside of an order for default judgment and the order of execution of the default decree. It also involved an application for unconditional leave to defend the underlying suit that gave rise to the default judgment.

Substantively, the first issue was whether the applicant had been aware of the summons to defend the suit for the amount claimed. It was established that there was a serious flaw in the service by respondents particularly in the absence of a return of service summons. There was therefore no evidence of summons or a court order being served to the applicant on the court record and the application for leave to defend outside the stipulated timeframe could not be said to be in breach of a court order. Further, it was also held that the absence of effective summons justified the setting aside of the default decree.

Secondly, there was a question of the legality of the suit brought against the appellant for default as it was argued that the basis was an illegal instrument. As there was an argument that the cheque and acknowledgement the suit was based on were forged, the court reasoned that there was no difference between the signature on the cheque and on the acknowledgment. However, as there was no forensic evidence supporting this, the court offered the applicant conditional leave to defend the underlying suit against him. The court therefore concluded under a conditional pretext of the suit’s illegality and thus allowed the application for conditional leave to defend.

The application was based on the fact that the applicant had been prevented by sufficient cause from filing a defence in a civil suit which according to the court had a meritorious defence that had a high chance of success.

The main issue was whether the default judgment issued by the lower court pursuant to failure to file a written statement of defence should be set aside.

The court reiterated that the burden is on the process server to indicate whether a principal officer or director or secretary of the corporation has been served or to indicate whether he or she was unable to establish who was being served. The serving officer, in this case, was simply quiet about who was served notwithstanding that there is a stamp of the applicant on the signature of the person served. Moreover, the provisions as to service support are a fundamental rule of justice which is that of fair trial. Fair trial includes due notice of the summons on the defendant or persons sought to be summoned to appear in court. 

The court held that due to the fundamental requirements of service of process on the secretary, director or other principal officer of the company, the default decree and judgment was set aside. The court held that civil procedure rules makes it necessary to identify the person served in the corporation sufficiently to fulfill the requirements for service on a corporation.

In this case the appellant sought an order of Supreme Court extending the time within which to serve a notice of appeal. Counsel for the applicant lodged a notice of appeal well within the time prescribed by the law but the respondent’s counsel was served three days out of time. The applicant apportioned the blame for this delay on the staff of the Court of Appeal which, according to the applicant, failed to make available a signed notice of appeal on time.

The court considered the application for extension of the prescribed time in light of Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. According to this rule, the court may grant such an extension if it finds sufficient reason to do so. The court found that the fact that the applicant promptly filed the notice of appeal demonstrated zeal on the applicant’s part. However, counsel for the applicant failed to demonstrate that the court staff caused the delay and did not explain why it took nearly four months to file the application for extension before the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the court found that refusing the application would amount to denying the applicant’s right to present and prosecute his appeal and would have disproportionately negative consequences on the applicant. The court, therefore, used its discretionary powers to grant the extension sought, thereby validating the notice of appeal and the appeal itself.

The issue before the court was an application for extension of time to file an appeal.

The applicant was seeking condonation from the court after he failed to file an appeal within the time prescribed by court rules. He based his appeal on the grounds that he was not aware of the judgment and blamed his lawyer for not informing him of the judgment. He argued that it was just and equitable for the court to extend the time to file the appeal and that there was likelihood of success. 

The respondent on the other hand opposed the application arguing that the applicant failed to produce evidence to support its application.

In deciding the case, the court held that court rules empower the court to extend time limits if there are sufficient reasons. It ruled that negligence on the part of the applicant’s counsel amounts to sufficient reason for extension of time limits. The court found that refusal to extend the time limits will cause injustice to the applicant. 

The application for extension of time was granted.

The appellant applied to the supreme court seeking an enlargement time within which he should have filed his notice of appeal against the decision of the court of appeal.

The issues were whether leave to appeal could be granted to the applicant and serve the notice of appeal out of time and whether the applicant had ‘sufficient cause’ for not having been able to bring the appeal within time.
 
The court noted that it had the discretion to extend and validate pleadings even where there were limits created by statute. The court held that ‘sufficient reason’ must relate to the ability or failure to take particular step in time. It observed that the rule envisaged scenarios in which extension of time for doing an act so authorised or required would be granted namely: before the expiration of a limited time, after the expiration of a limited time, before an act is done and after an act is done.

The court also noted that the appellant was not to be prejudiced since the machinery which formed the core subject of the dispute between the two parties was still in possession. In the result, the court was satisfied that the appellant had established sufficient reasons for having failed to apply on time.

The appeal succeeded.