The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The subject matter in this case is a market stall at Igbudu Market, Warri. The second respondent permitted the appellant the use of a stall, ordinarily used by the appellant, during a temporary absence. However upon the second respondent’s return, the appellant refused repeated requests to vacate the stall.
In essence, this claim was for the possession of thr stall. The court was called upon to decide in whom the right to the stall resides.
It was the appellants claim that she was afforded lawful entry to the property. Additionally, that as a sub-tenant she was entitled to six months notice of eviction as per legislation. Such notice was not granted by the second respondent. The second respondent claimed damages for trespass to the stall. The judgment in the court below was in favour of the respondents.
On appeal, the appellant argued that the High Court did not properly evaluate certain evidence adduced. In any event, had it been properly evaluated, the judgment would have been favourable to the appellant. Thus, there was a miscarriage of justice.
This court held that the evidence that the appellant held on to possession of the stall could not on its own confer possession of the disputed stall. It found no merit whatsoever in this appeal and dismissed the appeal.
Appeal against the judgment in favour of the respondent for arrear rent with costs. The appeal was brought on two grounds: the lower court erred by ordering the rent payable in British Pounds (GBP); and the trial court erred in holding that the burden of proving non-payment of the rent in GBP rested on the appellant.
The first issue concerned the interpretation and applicability of the Decimal Currency Act (the act) on the mode of payment of the rent, which was fixed by the Deed of lease. Applying literal interpretation, the court concluded that section 1(2) of the Act related only to contracts entered into in Nigerian Pounds. It was not the legislature’s intention to constrict contractors from deciding the terms and manner of payment. Parties to a contract are bound by its terms and conditions, and a court will respect the contract.
Issue two as to who bore the onus of proving the currency of payment post-Decimal Currency Act, was decided in favour of the respondent. The burden of proof generally lies with the plaintiff to establish their case, however this burden is not static. The respondent adduced evidence of non-payment of rent, the burden shifted to the appellant to adduce evidence rebutting this, and in proof of the assertion that regular payments of rent were made. The appellant failed to produce evidence that payment was made, and that it was done in Naira and not GBP.
The appeal was dismissed.
The dispute emanated from a decision of the appeal court to overturn compensation award given to the appellant by the High Court.
The appellant was offered 6.19 acres of land by the respondent under a lease agreement. The respondent after 10 years was ordered to cede the land leased to the appellant back to its original owners. The respondent took 5 acres from the appellant leaving him with 1.6 acres of the land which was given to him for free. After 11 years the appellant successfully claimed compensation for the 5 acres taken, a decision which was later overturned by the appeal court.
The appellant was now appealing against the decision to overturn the compensation award. He argued that the trial court erred by concluding that the 1.6 acres given to him was compensation. He further contended that there was no evidence to show that as the respondent’s employee he manipulated the system to allocate himself land. The respondent maintained that there was evidence to show that the 1.6 acres allocated to the appellant was compensation and that he manipulated the system to allocate himself large pieces of land.
In deciding the matter, the court held that the appellant was the lessee and not the owner of the land in dispute. He was not entitled to any compensation. It ruled that the 1.6 acres that he received was more than enough compensation. It further ruled that the appeal court never said the appellant manipulated the system. The appeal was thus dismissed.
The appeal arose from judgement on a dispute of sale and ownership of property granted in favor of the respondent. The appellant alleged that the judgement of the trial court had been fraught with errors.
The first issue was whether the evidence before the court indicated a sale or was a receipt of rent. The court weighed the evidence and reasoned that as the appellant admitted to voluntarily signing the document in issue even when she was warned by the witness of the disjuncture between the discussed agreement and the written terms, the trial court was correct in finding that the evidence was a receipt for rent paid. The trial court’s finding of facts was thus upheld.
On the appellant’s second contention that the court had committed an error of law in attesting weight to an invalid agreement, the court responded that it was important for the appellant to point out the error that led to miscarriage of law. Since this had not been done, the court concluded that there was no evidence of miscarriage of justice.
Finally, the court also had to decide whether the granted mesne profits (i.e. recoverable profits gained by tenant during the period of unlawful possession of property) were too excessive. It stated that mesne profits are usually determined on the least rent payable rate during the period of dispute. The court thus reasoned that given the case’s circumstances, the trial court had not been justified to not use the least rent payable rate in its valuation. It thus varied the mesne profits award.
The court considered whether; the land occupied by the respondent was registered land, the grant of the lease was fraudulent, and estoppel is applicable.
The court held that s 31(1) of the Land Act gives security of tenure to a tenant on registered land. Moreso, the implications of the abolitions of statutory leases in terms of art 237 of the Constitution remains a grey area. The court also held that security of tenure protects a bona fide occupant 's interest. Also, under s 176 of the Registration of Titles Act, a registered proprietor is protected against ejectment except in certain cases including fraud. Further, to procure registration of title to defeat an unregistered interest amounts to fraud. The court also held that registration tainted with fraud does not give rise to the doctrine of estoppel.
The court found that respondent must continue occupation because they were in undisturbed possession and occupation before the 1995 Constitution. The abolition of statutory leases did not automatically extinguish such right. Also found that fraud was attributable to appellants because the grant and registration of suit land in the name of the second appellant was intended to defeat the unregistered interest of the respondent.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. Further ordered the first appellant to give due consideration to the respondent's application for a lease over the suit land including giving it a priority in the granting of the lease.
The Uganda Land Commission transferred a
parcel of land to the first respondent in 2005,
which leased the land to the second
respondent. In 2006, the appellant wrote to
the Ugandan Land Commission and received
a lease offer for the same land that had
already been transferred to the first
respondent. Both the respondents and the
appellant have been issued a certificate of
title for the same property. In first instance,
the trial judge ruled in favour of the
respondents. The appellant then filed an
In 1998 the appellant filed a suit against the respondent, to which the responded reacted with a counter-claim. The appellant’s claim was withdrawn in 2006 but the respondent’s counter-claim was not. The trial judge ruled in favour of the respondent. The appellants were dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal.
The Court of Appeal considered whether the burden of proof of fraud alleged in the counter-suit rested on the appellants. The court held that the burden of proof rests on the party who alleges that fraud was committed. In this case, the appellants had withdrawn their case against the respondent and only the respondent’s counter-claim remained. Consequently, the court upheld the appellant’s complaint and placed the burden to prove that fraud was committed on the respondent.
The court then considered whether the lease of the suit property to the first appellant was fraudulent and reviewed the lower court’s order in cancellation. The court held that fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved and cannot be left to be inferred from the facts. Neither party attempted to prove fraud against the other. Therefore, the courts held that the lease of the suit property to the first appellant was not fraudulent and that the trial judge should not have cancelled the first appellant’s certificate of title.
The court also considered whether the respondent’s lease agreement was breached because the first appellant denied the respondent possession of the suit land and reviewed the lower court’s order to extend the respondents lease. The court found that the respondent was in breach of contract and, therefore, had no right of possession and overturned the trial judge’s order to extend the respondent’s lease because the respondent had failed to request it in due course.
All grounds of the appeal succeeded.
The first appellant and the respondent are siblings whom were initially registered as tenants in common, on a land plot. In 2002, the proprietorship of this land was transferred from the names of the siblings to the 2nd to 8th appellants (who were at the time minor children of the first appellant).
The respondent was aggrieved by the transfer and registration of the appellant's descendants to the suit property. She contended that the first appellant had acted fraudulently in this transfer. She went to the High Court seeking reinstatement of her name on the suit title. The High Court granted the orders sought.
The appellants appeal the decision of the High Court. On the grounds that (1) the court erred in evaluating the evidence of the first appellant as a whole, nor recording of his evidence and (2) the respondent freely relinquished her interests in the property.
The respondent filed a cross appeal declaring that she is entitled to award of mesne profits and or general damages as well.
This court found that the transfer form did not amount to forgery or fraud. The appeal therefore succeeded in part. However, it was found that the respondent had not fulfilled the condition of transferring and subdividing part of lands into the names of the respondent - as they agreed.
The respondent was found to have carried out her part of the bargain and the first respondent must do his own as well.
This case concerned an action for breach of contract, and an objection to jurisdiction. The dispute emanated from a loan advanced to the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff deposited his share certificate as security for the loan. The plaintiff contended that the loan was fully repaid and the security discharged; notwithstanding this the defendant informed the Dar es Salaam stock exchange that the share certificates has not been discharged and that the defendant still held an interest in the share certificate. The plaintiff complained to the court that the defendant’s conduct was defamatory and had affected its operation.
The defendant raised an objection to the claim arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. It based its argument on the grounds that the claim was based on an amount below 100 million shillings. The plaintiff on the other hand argued that the claim was based on US $2.5 million, an mount which falls within the jurisdiction of the court if converted into shillings.
In deciding the case, the court dismissed the defendant objection and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter.