The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The main issue faced by the court in this matter was whether an appeal could be allowed to proceed when the notice of appeal is incompetent.
On the assertion that the notice was defective for failure to reflect names and addresses of the parties, the court was quick to dismiss the objection as baseless as the error was a mere irregularity which could not affect the hearing of the appeal on merits. It reasoned that a liberal interpretation must be followed thus non-compliance per se could not be a ground for nullifying a proceeding unless it could amount to a denial of justice. Since the requirement of endorsement of names and addresses was a measure of convenience and not mandatory, it could not render the notice invalid.
On the contention that the notice did not relate to any suit, the court acknowledged the presence of incongruities between record of appeal and the notice to an extent that there was no nexus between the two. Further, it observed the incompleteness of the record, defects which amounted to a failure in invoking the court’s jurisdiction. The court decried the applicant’s failure to remedy the above defects by way of motion on notice to the lower court, a defect it held to be fundamental and stems to the very root of the appeal process. The court thus held the appeal was effectively incompetent and therefore there was no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The court considered whether the failure to omit the court name in a notice of motion and error in arrangement of parties invalidated the application.
The court held that a notice of appeal is the foundation and any defect to it renders the whole appeal incompetent. In that regard, to validly invoke the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal, it must be shown that the decision appealed against arose from the courts listed in s 240 of the Constitution.
The court found that the particulars of the claim did not invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeal which is a material defect. Moreso, cannot be cured by an amendment. Therefore, the court was not able to grant the reliefs claimed.
The court accordingly dismissed the application.
The matter dealt with a special leave to appeal application against the Court of Appeal’s decision that an appeal from the General Legal Council without lodging a Notice of Appeal to the Council was invalid.
In responding to the above question, the court relied on Article 131(2) of the Constitution and the Dolphyne case (Dolphyne (No.2) V Speedline Steveddoring Co. Ltd [1996-97] SCGLR) to find that special leave applications are discretionary and are not fettered by rules of practice nor legislation. The exercise of this discretion depended on whether, given the particular case and validity of the reasons given, leave should be granted in favor of applicant to further the interests of justice and or the public good. The court, in exercising its discretion, established that the General Council was not a lower court. Thus the court concluded that the requirement for lodging a notice was not applicable. Moreover, it reasoned that it would be in the public interest if a Supreme Court was given an opportunity to pronounce on appeals from the General Council. It thus concluded that the court below had erred in its decision resulting in the overriding of the applicant’s substantive right of appeal. The court thus granted the special leave application.
The matter dealt with an application for foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property as a result of failure to make loan repayments by defendant.
The main issue was whether the plaintiff could exercise its right to foreclose the property. The court cited s 8(1) of the Mortgage Act that allows one to redeem the property at any time of breach and or to get a court order effecting the redemption. Reference to How v Vigures was also made regarding the triggers for foreclosure proceedings as being when due payment has not been made on date for redemption (default) or when there is a breach of any terms of the mortgage.
The court established that as the defendant had not complied with the terms of the credit facility agreement by not paying the agreed monthly instalments for a period of two years despite repeated demands, the exercise of the right to foreclosure was held to be fit and proper.
The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff could exercise the right to foreclose and accordingly allowed the application.
The applicant and respondent contested in a parliamentary election, the
respondent was aggrieved by the outcome of the election petitioned court
which dismissed the petition hence the appeal from which the application
arises. The applicant sought the notice of appeal struck out of court for being
filed out of time without leave of court.
The appellant applied to the supreme court seeking an enlargement time within which he should have filed his notice of appeal against the decision of the court of appeal.
The issues were whether leave to appeal could be granted to the applicant and serve the notice of appeal out of time and whether the applicant had ‘sufficient cause’ for not having been able to bring the appeal within time.
The court noted that it had the discretion to extend and validate pleadings even where there were limits created by statute. The court held that ‘sufficient reason’ must relate to the ability or failure to take particular step in time. It observed that the rule envisaged scenarios in which extension of time for doing an act so authorised or required would be granted namely: before the expiration of a limited time, after the expiration of a limited time, before an act is done and after an act is done.
The court also noted that the appellant was not to be prejudiced since the machinery which formed the core subject of the dispute between the two parties was still in possession. In the result, the court was satisfied that the appellant had established sufficient reasons for having failed to apply on time.
The appeal succeeded.
The appellant claimed that he was a partner in a business with the respondent. When the partnership dissolved and the proceeds were shared; the appellant was allegedly not given anything. He then sued the respondent for a declaration that he was a partner and was entitled to the proceeds. The High Court dismissed these claims.
The appellant appealed the judgment of the High Court five months after the judgment had been handed down. He further lodged an application for extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The court below dismissed this application because of inordinate delay.
The appellant appealed to this court. The appellant’s complaint was that the application was dismissed on the basis of technicalities and not substantive justice and this is in contravention of the Constitution. In response, the respondent submitted that the appeal lacks merit.
This court found that the continuation of the proceedings in question would greatly prejudice the respondent. This is because the respondent was holding a decree from the High Court since 1995 which decree the appellant has stubbornly refused to satisfy to date. Accordingly, this application was dismissed.