The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The matter involved an application for extension of time of appeal against a lower court decision granted against the applicant.
The main issue was whether the applicant had shown cause to justify the granting of the extension. The court noted that the length of the duration of the delay in bringing an application for extension is immaterial provided there are good reasons to justify it. In its engagement with the law, the court emphasised the role of judicial discretion in assessing the efficacy of granting the extension. It stated that for this discretion to be exercised the applicant had to show good and substantial reasons for failure to initially make the appeal. These could be a rule, lack of means, mistake or accident. The other inseparable twin leg was for the applicant to show prima facie good cause why the appeal should be heard.
In assessing whether the contemplation of an out of court settlement as reason for delay was a substantial enough reason, the court cited the Supreme Court judgment of Ikenta Best Ltd v AG Rivers State (2008) 2 SCNJ 152 to establish that the reason would not meet muster. The court thus concluded that the application did not meet the first condition for granting an extension and therefore dismissed the application for lacking merit.
The matter involves an application for an extension of the period of appeal by applicant against a lower court decision.
The main issue was whether the applicant, after consideration of the interests of justice and fair hearing, is entitled to an extension of the period of appeal. Starting from the point that the execution of a judgment does not foreclose the aggrieved party’s right of appeal, the court stated that the applicant must show good and substantial reasons for the delay in appeal, which can be rooted in a rule, lack of means, mistake or accident and, prima facie good cause why the application should be heard. Whilst the first leg requires a satisfactory justification, the second leg only requires one to show that the grounds of appeal are arguable. It is upon satisfaction of both the above that the court will use its discretion to grant the application.
As the applicant’s sole reason was that the delay stemmed from a desire to explore an out of court settlement option, the court followed the Supreme Court decision in Ikenta Best (Nig.) Ltd v AG Rivers State (2008) 2 SCNJ 152 to arrive at the position that the applicant’s reason could not be regarded as a good and substantial reason for delay in filing an appeal. The court thus held the applicant had failed to justify why the extension should be granted and therefore dismissed the application.
The dispute emanated from an agreement between the appellant and the respondents to clear a debt owed to the appellant by the respondents. The agreement provided for reduction of the debt on the grounds that the respondents pay an initial payment of 500 million and the balance before the exit of Central Bank examiners who had who had come to inspect the appellant bank. After payment of all debt, the appellant required the respondents to pay R5.5 billion alleging that it did not pay the balance as agreed.
The respondents approached the court and an order that parties should maintain status quo until the matter was resolved was granted. The appellant then filed a petition to wind up the respondents which prompted the respondents to approach the court seeking a committal order arguing that the appellant was in contempt of court. This was opposed by a preliminary objection seeking to strike out the committal order. The court granted the objection while pointing out that it had no jurisdiction to decide on the matter.
The appellant appealed the decision to strike out citing lack of jurisdiction of the trial judge and that the judge did not consider all issues raised by appellants and that it should have dismissed not strike out the committal order.
The held that the trial judge correctly dealt with the issue and that since he had no jurisdiction, it was not necessary for him to consider issues regarding the merits of the case and dismissed the appeal.
The matter involve a ruling of contempt of court against the third and fourth respondents for their conduct in attacking the Chief Justice with an accusation of bias.
The court emphasised the importance of judicial independence as enshrined in the Constitution as a necessary element in maintaining judicial dignity and effectiveness, attributes that are crucial in upholding the democratic enterprise. Any attempt to disrespect the courts therefore amounts to an attack on the role of the courts and the community at large.
The court also emphasised the right to criticise the judiciary and its circumspection in exercising its power to charge citizens with contempt. However, should the conduct be of such gross a nature as to indicate a calculated attack, as in the present matter, the court would not refrain from the charge.
The court, however, acknowledged the harsh nature of the summary powers to charge for contempt, powers it accepted required circumspection. Nevertheless, the court considered the need to send a message to remind people to refrain from crossing the line between utilizing their freedom of expression and attacking the dignity of the court. It also invoked the principles of state policy which place duties to the citizenry to ensure the exercise of their freedoms upheld fundamental democratic principles. In the view of the court, the contemnors in question had dismally failed the above and therefore they were sentenced for contempt.