The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The respondent bought a piece of property from a third party. After the respondent had taken possession of the property, he became aware of the fact that his predecessor-in-title had mortgaged the property to the appellant. The respondent paid off the outstanding debt and thereafter demanded the release of the title deeds to him. Instead, the appellant demanded some authorisation from his predecessor-in-title before the documents could be released to him. The respondent instituted a claim on this basis. The trial court judgment was in the respondent’s favour.
After the respondent attached the property the appellant filed an application praying for an order staying execution of the judgment, particularly the sale of the property and ordered release thereof; before hearing of the application. The trial court dismissed this application.
The appellant eventually appealed to this court asking for the same. The appellant urged this court to allow the appeal, set aside the ruling of the court below and grant an order directing the High Court to retain the amount deposited as per judgment.
This court held that the order sought to be stayed was made by the trial court and there was no appeal against that order to the Court of Appeal. That being the case, it was held that it would be a wasteful academic exercise to delve into the merit of the issue. Consequently the appeal was dismissed.
The court determined the principles of granting a stay of execution and injunction pending appeal in a case that involves a state government.
The first respondent raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction of the court, since there was a stay of execution pending in the court below on the same issue and the first appellant had not appealed on the attachment of the appellant’s monies in banks (garnishee order). In determining its jurisdiction, the court applied Order 4 Rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 (Rules of the Court) and held that it had discretionary powers to make injunctions pending appeal even when no application lied in the court below depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Additionally, the court held that there was an appeal predicated on the garnishee order thus the issues were properly before it.
The court set out the principles of granting a stay of execution and injunction pending appeal: to preserve the subject matter of the appeal from irreparable damage pending appeal. It also held that the principles are applied when a party has an arguable appeal and to enhance public interest.
The court observed that the appellant had admitted its indebtedness to part of the judgment debt and held it just and fair to refuse the application with respect to that amount. The court held that the trial court erred in granting garnishee orders on balance of the judgment debt. Accordingly, the application succeeded in part.
The appeal was against a garnishee order attaching a sum of approximately N97 million belonging to the appellant granted by the lower court. The appeal was based on the claim that the garnishee order was made without hearing the appellants’ earlier motion for a of stay execution. This, the appellants argued, was a violation of their right to a fair trial.
The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appellant had no standing because it was judgement debtor, not the garnishee. It further argued that the appellants had not obtained leave to appeal.
The appellants responded by pointing out that they were respondents to the garnishee application, and that the funds that were to be attached belonged to them. Thus, they had locus standi (the standing and right to file this appeal).
The court held that it is only the garnishee that can appeal an order made by the court. It ruled that garnishee proceedings are strictly between the creditor and the garnishee. It found that the appellant lacked locus standi to file the appeal and the appeal was dismissed.
This was an appeal against a garnishee order granted by the court. The appellant contended that the garnishee proceedings were null and void because the first respondent did not disclose that the second respondent fell within the jurisdiction of the lower court. Further, the appellant argued that there was abuse of court process because the garnishee order was made after the appellant was granted leave to appeal.
The respondent argued that the appellant was not a party to the garnishee proceeding and cannot challenge the procedure.
In deciding the matter, the court held that the question of the judgement creditor establishing that the garnishee was within jurisdiction was not for the judgement debtor to determine but the court. It found that the appellants were not parties to the garnishee proceedings and that an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution. The appeal was thus dismissed.
The court determined that this was an application for special leave to appeal against the refusal of the Court of Appeal to discharge the order of the single judge of the Court of Appeal refusing to stay the execution of the preservation order made by the High Court.
The court determined whether the refusal to suspend the decision of the Court of Appeal could render the subsequent judgment nugatory. The court noted the difference between a stay and a suspension order. Further, the court stated that applications for the suspension of orders or decisions of lower courts where the conventional means of applying for stay of execution is not possible. The court held that the fact that the court granted the applicant leave to appeal against the ruling of the Court of Appeal was not an essential condition for the suspension of the ruling sought to be impeached. The court observed that the applicant raised the point that the failure of the application would render the subsequent judgment nugatory but failed to prove exceptional circumstances to merit the suspension of the order. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.
Litigation was commenced to recover a debt from a company incorporated in Australia that was wholly owned by a Ghanaian company. The High Court granted judgment in favour of the appellant for the amount due. The judgment was appealed because the respondent proposed a scheme of arrangement to reorganise their debts with their creditors. but the appellant subsequently the appellant filed a petition to liquidate the company as it was unable to pay off its debts. The court granted to wind up the company. However, the Court of Appeal granted a stay of execution of the winding-up before the respondent appealed the original decision of the High court to pay the amount due.
The appellant did not succeed with the appeal because they did not prove that the Court of Appeal failed to take relevant matters into consideration, considered irrelevant matters of misapplied the law.
The applicant in this application sought for an order staying the execution of the
judgment of the court of appeal until the determination of the appeal to this court, and
that costs of the application be provided for.
The background to this application is that the applicant filed against the respondent seeking to recover US$75,000, as payment made in error under a guarantee, interest and costs. The respondent counter-claimed for US$31,767 being the balance owed by the applicant on the guarantee, general damages for breach of the contract of guarantee, interest and costs.
The issue in contention was whether the plaintiff having represented to the defendant that it was entitled to a payment and even made part payment was barred by estoppels from claiming a refund of monies paid to the defendant after the failure of the third-party to make good on its obligations to the plaintiff.
It was held that a court can only exercise the discretion to grant a stay of execution if there are special circumstances and good cause to justify a stay. The inability of the victorious party to be able to refund the decremental amount in the event of a successful appeal is one of such special circumstances if proved.
The court held that the applicant failed to adduce any evidence to show that the respondent will not be able to restore it to the status quo ante if its appeal succeeded. Also, the deponent should have gone a step further to lay the basis upon which the court could make a finding that the applicant would have suffered substantial loss as alleged. The applicant should have gone beyond the vague and generalised assertion of substantial loss in the event a stay order is not granted. It is against this background that the court dismissed the application.
This was an application seeking orders for an interim stay of execution and/or enforcement of the decree and judgment of a civil suit pending the hearing and determination of the application; on grounds that there was a prima facie case on appeal and its essentiality for safeguarding the applicant’s right to appeal.
The respondents raised a preliminary objection to the application on grounds that it was not properly before the court. The court observed that it was more ideal for the High Court to first determine such applications on their own merits and for the Court of Appeal to do so only when the application is substantive in content and form and in special and rare circumstances: if the High Court refuses to accept its jurisdiction, or refuses jurisdiction on wrong reasons, or there is great delay.
The court was satisfied that the applicant failed to demonstrate special or rare circumstances for not making this application in the High Court first since there was no evidence of a formal application for stay or a follow up letter on the application. Accordingly, the court allowed the preliminary objection by counsel for the respondent and dismissed the application with an order to costs.
The applicant filed to the court an application for the execution of the decree by attachment and sale of the judgment debtor’s property.
The issue was whether an appeal can prevent the execution of an order.
The court noted that in any civil proceedings, where the notice of appeal has been lodged in accordance with rule 83, an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of the decree or order appealed from except so far as the high court or tribunal may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason of an appeal having been preferred from the decree order but the court may upon good cause shown, order stay of execution of such decree or order. The court may, upon good cause shown order stay of execution of the decree or order. It is only where there is an order for order for stay of execution that a trial court is estopped from issuing an execution order.
The execution process has two stages. The first stage is the issuance of an executive order and the second stage is the enforcement of that order which is normally done in the registry or other designed officer in the registry.
The courts took into consideration the fact that there was no order or stay of execution and concluded that it could make an order for execution despite the pendency of an appeal suit.
Execution order was granted