The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
The issue was whether it would be just and equitable to wind up the respondents in terms of s 81(1)(c)(ii) and s 81(d)(iii) read with s 157(1)(d) of the act on the grounds that executive directors of the first respondent unconsciously abused the corporate personality of the second respondent by acting unlawfully. The other issue was whether the minister had locus standi (the right or capacity to bring an action) to bring the application.
The court held that it was just and equitable to wind up a company if the company is conducting unlawful activities and where there is a deadlock between the parties. Further, that s 157 extends locus standi to a broad range of people.
The court found that there were just and equitable grounds to wind up the first respondent because there was a deadlock between the parties, unlawful misappropriation of public funds and non-disclosure. In that light, also wind up the second respondent because its existence depended on that of the first respondent. The court, also, found that the minister, as a member of the executive, had established the necessary locus standi to bring the application in the public interest in terms of s 157(1)(d).
Accordingly, the court granted the final liquidation and ordered that the costs of winding up include costs of the application.
The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the petition of the respondent to wind up the appellant company for being unable to pay its debts.
The court held that jurisdiction is a threshold issue and where there is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction, and then unless fulfilled, the court shall be devoid of the requisite jurisdiction to determine the matter. The dispute, if any must be within the parameters of disputing a debt; that is in good faith and on substantial grounds. The court stated that the appellant was supposed to put forward facts which would satisfy the court that there was something which was ought to have been looked into on the same matter.
Disputation of a debt can bar the court from allowing a petition for winding up a company which has failed to pay its debt. A real dispute must touch on the substance of the debt in its material particulars such as showing part of the debt had been settled. The court held that the appellant failed to make any payments to the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent satisfied the requirements of the act and the jurisdiction of the court was properly activated and the issue is resolved against the appellant.
The appeal was dismissed as it lacked substance.
This was an appeal against a decision of the court allowing an ex parte motion for the winding up of the appellant. The appeal was premised on the ground that the ex parte order was made against other parties who were not parties to the proceedings and were deprived of the right to be heard. The appellant further argued that the ex parte order was made without notice of the motion seeking the said orders being served on them which was regarded as contravening Order 4 of the Companies Winding-up Rules (the rules). The appellant also alleged abuse of court process by the respondent.
The respondent opposed the appeal by pointing out that issues raised by the appellant were substantial issues which cannot be dealt with in a preliminary objection. The respondent further disputed allegations of abuse of court process arguing that they at no point maintained two similar cases against the appellant.
The court held that where an order made by a court affects the interest of a non-party to a suit, the said party whose interest has been affected should complain. It ruled that it was out of place for the appellant to complain on behalf of the other parties. The court further pointed out that Order 4 of the rules does not allow freezing of assets and that the respondent breached Order 4 by filing an ex parte without serving a notice on the appellant. Thus the appeal was upheld.
The issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear a petition for winding up and whether the respondent had required authorization to petition for winding up.
The appeal emanated from the dismissal of the appellant’s objection to a petition for winding up the appellant company. The appellant argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide on the matter. It pointed out that only the English courts had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on any dispute between the parties. Moreover, the appellant challenged the legal personality of the respondent arguing that they did not provide original certificates of incorporation and that the respondent did not receive authority of shareholders to petition for the winding up.
The respondent opposed the appeal on the grounds that the English courts had exclusive jurisdiction only on disputes and not on a petition for winding up. It further argued that it required a trail to verify the authenticity of the certificate of incorporation. Lastly the respondent pointed out that since they were duly incorporated, they were authorized to work on behalf of the shareholders.
The court in dismissed the first two points raised by appellant. The court held that the English court’s exclusive jurisdiction did not extend to petitions and that documents attached to an affidavit in an interlocutory application should not be used as an objection to the issue of admissibility. However the court ruled that the respondent required the approval of directors and shareholders to file a petition to wind up. Thus the appeal was upheld.
The applicants applied to the High Court to stay the proceedings in the case and to release the properties attached to them in order that they would add them to other assets of the company to be sold for all depositors of the company to be paid. The High Court however dismissed the application and applicants being aggrieved by the orders made by the court filed an application to the Supreme Court praying for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the high court.
The main issue being the lawfulness of the grant of leave by the high court to applicants to proceed with their case after the winding up had commenced.
The court held that upon commencement of a winding up only secured creditors are allowed as of right to sue or continue with pending civil proceedings for the realization of their security. Any other person who has a cause of action against a company being wound up cannot sue as of right but may do so only with the prior leave of the high court. Similarly an unsecured creditor who has pending civil proceedings cannot continue with them without leave of the high court. So the applicants in this case who were not secured creditors were within their rights to apply for leave to continue with their case and the judge acted in accordance with law in granting same.
The court dismissed the application.