Commercial Law Index

In this case, the court considered whether a writ of summons issued for more than 12 months and not served within that period can be renewed. 
  
The court held that pursuant to order 5 rule 6 a writ has a life span of 12 months. It follows that an application for renewal must be made to the court before the expiration of the 12 months on the grounds that the defendant had not been served or for another good reason.

The court held that a writ is regarded as void where the expiration of the period of 12 months prescribed. An application for renewal of a writ can be made before the expiration of the 12 month period of issuance of a writ and after. Although order 5 rule 6 is a specific provision for renewal of a writ which is still in force, order 47 rule 3 provides for cases where the period of its effectiveness had expired and the two provisions must be read together.

In this case, the court had difficulty ascertaining reasons to jusitfy the exercise of discretion to renew the writ which had remained unserved after 12 months. The application of the appellant in the court below was found to be without merit.

The court dismissed the appeal. 
 

In this case, the appellant appealed the decision of the lower court to strike out the appeal against the trial court’s interlocutory decision for being incompetent. This case illustrates how final and interlocutory orders are distinguished.

The court considered whether the Court of Appeal was right to hold that the appeal from the High Court on the issue of jurisdiction was interlocutory for which an appeal must be lodged within 14 days.

The court was called upon to determine whether or not a court’s decision is final in the course of determining the appeal. The court held that a final order at law was one which brings to an end the rights of the parties in the action. On the other hand, an interlocutory order was only intermediate and did not finally determine the rights of the parties in the action. The court held that this case was an interlocutory motion and the order that had been granted by the trial court was a final order. Therefore, an appeal on the order of the trial court was a right under section 220(1) of the Constitution.

The court also referred to Alor v. Ngene (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt 1062) 163 which provided that where a decision of a court finally and completely determined the rights of the parties, it was final, but if did not then it was only interlocutory. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court’s decision was interlocutory and could not be said to be perverse.

The court dismissed the application with parties bearing their own costs. 
 

The appellant sought an order of the court nullifying the nomination of the first respondent as candidate of the second Respondent in the 2015 Governorship election in Yobe State. This case considered whether the lower court was right to have held that the appellant was not an aspirant in the second respondent for the purpose of invoking the provisions of s 87(9) of the Electoral Act (the act), and whether the lower court was right that the appellant had not established an allegation of forged documents.

The court held that two conditions must be present to confer the necessary locus standi to invoke the provisions of S 87(9) of the act, (1) there must be a complaint that the party’s guidelines or the provisions of the act were not observed in the nomination process and (2) the complainant must have participated in the primary election.  The court found that the appellant did not participate in the primary election and was thus unable to invoke the provisions of s 87(9) of the act. 

In determining whether a document has been forged, a party must prove; (1) the existence of a document in writing; (2) the document or writing is forged; (3) that the forgery was by the person being accused; (4) that the party who made it knew that the document was false; and (5) the party alleged intended the forged document to be acted upon as genuine. The court held that the court below was correct in holding that the appellant had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the document was forged. 

Appeal dismissed. 
 

In this case, monies held by the appellant belonging to the Nigeria Customs Service were traced. An order nisi was served on the appellant as the fifth garnishee. This case illustrates how the garnishee proceedings do not avail the garnishee to attack a judgment that the judgment creditor and debtor have accepted.

The court considered whether the appellant should be granted leave to raise fresh issues in additional grounds of appeal. The court explained that garnishee proceedings were not a process employed by the garnishee to fight a proxy war against the judgment creditor on behalf of the judgment debtor. The court held that a decision of a court of law not appealed against is to be accepted by the parties and it remains binding on them other parties, including garnishees.

The court held that the appellant had prayed for leave to raise issues that this court did not have the benefit of the views of the court below. The court considered order 2 rule 12 of the Rules of the Court which provide that the court may exercise its discretion to accept fresh evidence. The court held that there was a mischievous purpose attached to the appellant’s application and no power in law inheres in the garnishee to fight the cause of a judgment debtor.

The court concluded that the cause of action available to the garnishee was quite limited and therefore the application in this case was an abuse of the court process. 

The court dismissed the application with costs. 
 

The court determined that this was an application for special leave to appeal against the refusal of the Court of Appeal to discharge the order of the single judge of the Court of Appeal refusing to stay the execution of the preservation order made by the High Court.

The court determined whether the refusal to suspend the decision of the Court of Appeal could render the subsequent judgment nugatory. The court noted the difference between a stay and a suspension order. Further, the court stated that applications for the suspension of orders or decisions of lower courts where the conventional means of applying for stay of execution is not possible. The court held that the fact that the court granted the applicant leave to appeal against the ruling of the Court of Appeal was not an essential condition for the suspension of the ruling sought to be impeached. The court observed that the applicant raised the point that the failure of the application would render the subsequent judgment nugatory but failed to prove exceptional circumstances to merit the suspension of the order. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

This was an application praying for special leave to appeal against the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal refusing a repeat application for stay of execution pending appeal.

The court considered whether the Court of Appeal misconstrued its jurisdiction under art. 138(b) of the Constitution or s. 12 (b) of the Courts Act. The court was of the opinion that the applicant failed to prove the constitutional requirement for special leave to appeal in s. 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act by failing to prove that the interlocutory appeal was likely to succeed. The court held that the applicant failed to prove that the single judge misused or abused his discretionary power. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.

This was an appeal of a decision of the Court of Appeal that allowed a defective notice to commence suit for compensation against the respondent who was adversely affected by the execution of an approved development plan.

The court mainly dealt with the procedural grounds of appeal. The court determined whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the holding that the respondents had complied with the provisions of s 127 of the Local Government Act, 1993 in service of notice to commence suit and form of the notice on record. The court found that the notice was seriously defective and set aside the respondent’s action against the appellant. The court applied the rule that courts have no authority to grant immunity from consequences of breaching a statute unless the statute is incurably bad. The court also determined whether the Court of Appeal misdirected itself in holding that the application of provision under section 56 of the Local Government Act, 1993 is discretionary.  The court interpreted the word “may” in this section to have a mandatory effect even though not stated in mandatory terms. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded and the judgment of the High Court was restored.

The applicant sought an order setting aside the judgement of the trial court due to a procedural flaw.

The court had to consider whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction when it struck out the application for a stay in proceedings.

The court held that the trial court, in not carrying out the required procedure when it struck out the application, acted without jurisdiction.

The court stated that the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to make oral application and ought to have informed the respondent to file an application to relist the motion that was struck out. The court went on to say that it was settled practice that a formal application is required to restore motions that were previously struck out. As a result, the trial court, in deviating from settled practice acted without jurisdiction.

Consequently, the application for certiorari succeeds and the ruling of the trial court was quashed.

The court exercised its original jurisdiction to interpret constitutional provisions relating to the right of the General Legal Council to introduce examinations and interview as requirements for admission into the practical component of the law course.

The defendants raised a preliminary objection disputing the jurisdiction of the court claiming there was no issue of interpretation and also claimed that the plaintiff lacked locus standi (standing to bring the matter before the court). The court held that the matter was of public interest thus the plaintiff did not have to demonstrate personal interest. The court determined whether the imposition of the new admission requirements was unconstitutional. It was held that the council had the authority to do so but it was unconstitutional since the new requirements were implemented without legal backing (regulations). Secondly, the court determined whether the council’s failure to specify alternative places and modes of instruction for students who qualified to join the school of law was unconstitutional and held that the plaintiff was unable to prove the same. Accordingly, the matter succeeded in part and the court declared that the new admission requirements that led to exclusion of qualified persons were unconstitutional and that the Council’s policy on reviewing examination scripts and quota violated the constitution.

The appeal stemmed from the denial of the appellant's right to defend on merits due to the lower court’s grant of an Order 14 summary judgement in favor of the respondent, without properly engaging with the merits of the matter.

Substantively, the court held that in a summary judgement application the plaintiff must bring a prima facie case for the claim, which includes showing the basis of the claim, before the burden shifts to the defendant to defend. However, a complete defence is not required but rather the defendant only needs to show that he has a reasonable defence to the claim and his defence is not a sham or intended to delay payment.

Since the respondent’s claim had been based on an agreement and an alleged assignment, the court reasoned that on assessment of the evidence the argument of assignment lacked the element of intent and thus could not stand. Further, the argument that the respondent was a beneficiary of the agreement in question was unfounded. The trial court therefore erred in its decision to grant summary judgment as the very basis of the claim was reasonably challenged on the facts.

The court thus concluded that the appellant had been unjustifiably been shut out of trial. It thus allowed the appeal setting aside the summary judgement.

This was an appeal based on the decision of the trial court to try the question of res judicata as preliminary point of law. Res judicata dictates that once a matter is decided by a competent court it cannot be reopened in subsequent litigation.

The court held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of order 33 rule 5 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 by purporting to put an end to the full scale trial. The court held that in such circumstances, a plea of res judicata should only be sustained if it would result in a substantial disposal of the matter or render the determination of the other issues in the matter unnecessary. The court considered the uncertainty over the subject matter and the fact that a merit consideration of the action had already begun (at the trial court).

Accordingly, the appeal was upheld and an order made for the case to be remitted to the trial court for a re-trial.

In this appeal, the court considered whether the Court of Appeal had erred in upholding the respondent’s writ as per established rules. The court observed that the validity of the writ affected the jurisdiction of the trial court. The court held that the writ was competent since the court had to decide who had a better title to the property.

The court also considered whether there were legitimate grounds for the Court of Appeal to reverse the decision of the trial court on the disputed questions of fact. The court held that the Court of Appeal was right to intervene in order to make a judicial correction, based on the record of appeal, since the conduct of the 1st appellant was fraudulent. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, the decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed and the respondent’s right to injunctive reliefs succeeded.

One of the judges expounded on the whether the Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction by questioning an order of a public tribunal. The judge noted that the writ was made by appointees of the tribunal not the tribunal and could be questioned by the court.

The court was confronted with a question of liability for undelivered goods by the driver of a haulage company contracted by the plaintiff. The meat of the enquiry focused on the issue of the effect of a failure to sign the delivery note on bailment. Having assessed the understanding and intentions of the parties the court reasoned delivery occurred at the moment of loading by the supplier, upon which liability passed to the carrier. The issue of the signing of the note or lack of by the driver thus bore no significance on the question of liability. Only sufficient reasons for failure to adduce the signature and evidence of collusive fraud by defendant would commute the carrier’s responsibility. Consequently, a claim of contributory negligence could not stand once loading had been made by the supplier as they did not have an express duty of care to ensure signing of the notes. Moreover, the mere loading was in itself delivery thus the plaintiff failed to demonstrate negligence.  

Finally, the court dealt with the question of whether a contract actually existed between the parties as this had an effect on surcharges deducted by the defendant. The court found that given the nature of the contracts involved, the defendant had no contractual relationship with the plaintiff and therefore could not sue on the surcharge agreement as they were not party to the contract made for their benefit.

The court thus dismissed the appeal.

This case concerned the reversal of a judgment handed down in this court by a single judge in terms of article 134(b) of the 1992 Constitution. Furthermore, the order handed down was non-executable and that the court erred in ordering the suspension of a non-executable order. Article 134 (b) prescribes what a three-judge panel may do after hearing an application brought by a party who is aggrieved with the decision of a single judge. The court considered whether a three-judge panel should apply the conditions applicable by an appeal or a review or a combination of the two. It was found that an application of this nature couldn’t be treated as an appeal since the full record of appeal will not have been placed before the court. It was therefore found that it should be treated as a special review, considering all factors and merits of the case. Therefore, all rules on review should largely apply. The court found that where there is no executable order from the decision of the court below, this court cannot make an order to stay execution. The court found that the decision by the single judge did not disclose what factors were taken into consideration to enable him to conclude that it was fair to grant the application. Thus, the record did not disclose any special circumstances. Application granted.