Commercial Law Index

This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal that held that retention of a vehicle with defects for 11 months is equated with acceptance, transfer of property and assumption of all risks terming the repudiation of the contract of sale void.

The court considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of the relevant sections of the Sale of Goods Act that were relevant in this case. The court applied the rule that if a man sells an article he thereby warrants that is fit for some purpose. The court was of the opinion that the plaintiff knew why they purchased the four wheel vehicle and had the responsibility and opportunity to inspect the vehicle before accepting the sale. The court held that the defects were not latent and could have been easily detected. The court also held that the plaintiffs waived their rights by their conduct in continuing to use the vehicle after becoming aware of the defects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal.

This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court to decline jurisdiction to determine an issue of wrongful termination and compensation thereof.

The court interpreted the provisions of the Labour Act to differentiate the jurisdiction of the Commission from that of the High Court. The court applied the provisions of art 140 of the Constitution to the effect that the High Court has jurisdiction to enforce every right created by statute unless it is ousted in the Constitution. It was held that the previous court had the power to make the relevant award on the strength of the applicable law, terms of employment and evidence adduced before it. The fact that its jurisdiction is excluded in respect of other reliefs does not entitle the court to decline jurisdiction altogether. The court may hear the whole case but decline to grant the reliefs it is not competent to grant when it delivers its final judgment in the matter. Accordingly, the application was granted, the order of the High Court was set aside and an order was made for the High Court to assume its jurisdiction and determine the matter.

The key issues in this appeal were due compliance with time set down by the rules of court, and the principle of the audi alteram partem rule (right to be heard).

The court considered whether the Court of Appeal erred in disregarding the fifth respondent’s non-compliance of time set down for filing statement of defence. The court noted that this was caused by the ambiguous order by the Court of Appeal and confusion in the registry. Therefore, this and other grounds relating to case management directions by the court of appeal were dismissed.

The court also considered whether the court of appeal’s finding that the fifth respondent’s right to be heard was breached, was erroneous. The court affirmed the decision by the court of appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed against a party who was not served or notified of a hearing date.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the court ordered the case be remitted to the High Court to be heard on its merits.

This appeal is based on a decision of the Court of Appeal that waived the respondent’s non-compliance with prerequisites to the issuance of a writ under Order 2 rule 4(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004.

The court determined whether the non-compliance was fatal to the proceedings. The court noted that the provisions of Order 2 rule 4(2) are obligatory, thus could not be waived as per Order 81 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2004. The court held that non-compliance with the rule rendered the writ void. The court applied the mandatory rule that a plaintiff should disclose the identity and addresses of all persons on whose behalf it is suing, and when the rule is not complied with the writ cannot be amended after its issue. Accordingly, the court upheld the appeal and the writ of summons issued on 4 March 2010 were declared a nullity. Consequently, all proceedings and judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal were set aside.

In this appeal, court determined whether the representations made by the respondents in their letter of 3rd October 2013 constituted promissory estoppels with regard to the auction that took place on 30th September 2013. The court noted that the principle of promissory estoppel relates to representations of future conduct and not past conduct and held that the principle was not applicable to the facts of the case. The court also determined whether the application was made out of time. The court applied the rule in Order 45 rule 10(1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004: that such an application should be made 21 days from the date of the sale. The appellant made the application on 8th November 2013 while the auction took place on the 30th September 2013. The court held that the application was incompetent since it was made out of time. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the judgment of the court of appeal was affirmed.

This appeal considered whether the respondent was barred from re-litigating a matter concerning a dispute on the ownership of property based on the concept of res judicata. Res judicata dictates that once a matter is decided by a competent court it cannot be reopened in subsequent litigation.

The court applied the rule that an appellate court must evaluate the evidence on record as if the case is being heard afresh.  The court noted that the plea of res judicata was not explicitly set out by the appellant in the High Court though it was raised as a ground of appeal to the court of appeal. The court observed that the previous courts failed to consider the plea. Base on the evidence on record, the court was satisfied that the properties described by the respondent n her writ  of summons had once been litigated and held that the respondent was estopped from re-litigating the issue.

Accordingly, the court set aside the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal and deemed it worthy to consider the other grounds of appeal.

The application was lodged as a response by the applicants (General Legal Council) to a decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside orders granted to them allowing for the suspension of the respondent from legal practice. The applicants sought leave to appeal against this decision.

In response, the court began its adjudication from the position that a special leave application is not concerned with substantive issues but rather with whether it satisfies the case law principles that there must either be (a) a prima facie error on the face of the record, or (b) a general legal principle arising for the first time, and or (c) that the Supreme Court decision on the appeal would be advantageous to the public.

The court assessed the grounds propounded by the applicants which in essence included allegations of fundamental errors that go to jurisdiction and which a determination by the Supreme Court would be advantageous to the public. The court reasoned that these issues were so important that a decision on them would have a public good. It therefore decided to allow the application.   

This case concerned whether the Supreme Court had the authority to quash a judgment handed down by the court below. The applicant contended that the court below lacked jurisdiction to interpret articles 127 (3) and 161 of the 1992 Constitution. The court considered the difference between interpreting a constitutional provision and applying a constitutional provision. It was found that all courts and adjudicating authorities are obliged to apply the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, it would be a denial of justice to parties if constitutional provisions are not considered by a court of law or any adjudicating authority. Furthermore, it is only when the issue of interpretation arises that a court must stay its proceedings and refer the matter to the Supreme Court. In this matter, the court below was not called upon to interpret any provisions of the Constitution but merely to ascertain where the Registrar was a holder of a judicial office and whether the holder of a judicial officer had judicial power. The court found that Article 161 of the Constitution did not define judicial power. Therefore, not all judicial officers exercise judicial power. The court found that the court below had not committed and error that destroyed its jurisdiction, thus there was nothing warranting the Supreme Court to be called upon to quash the judgment handed down by the court below. Application dismissed.

The plaintiff sought a writ (being a written order of the court to abstain from acting) against the defendants. The plaintiff asked the court to find that the court below did not have jurisdiction to determine matters involving the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution. The defendants in turn raised a preliminary objection to the plaintiff’s writ.

This case considered the preliminary objection raised in objection to the writ and whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs action calling for a writ against the defendants, thus did the plaintiff properly invoke the jurisdiction of the court and whether the proper parties were before the court. 

The court found that in determining whether its jurisdiction had been properly invoked, they were obliged to look at the preliminary objection of the writ before them.

The plaintiff argued that a single judge lacked the jurisdiction to determine matters involving the interpretation and or enforcement of the Constitution.

The court found that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked. On the second issue the court found that the Plaintiff had capacity to bring the application before this court. 

The court found that the first defendant was properly cited and was a party in this application, however the second defendant was not a party to the action as the plaintiff did not show any act or omission which would justify the plaintiff citing him.

The second defendant was therefore struck out.

Preliminary objection overruled.

The case concerned the parameters for determination when faced with a second appeal, as well as the elements to establish a plea of res judicata.

It was found that there are 4 instances when concurrent findings can be interfered with namely: 1) where the findings of the trial court are unsupported by evidence on record or where reasons in support of the finding are unsatisfactory, 2) where a principle of evidence has been improperly applied, 3) where the findings are based on a wrong proposition  of law, and 4) where the finding is inconsistent with crucial documentary evidence on record.

In the second appeal it was argued that the matter was res judicata. Thus, that the matter has already been determined between the same parties before a competent court. The essential elements to establish for a plea of res judicata are: 1) there has been an earlier decision on the issue, 2) there has been a final judgment on the merits and 3) the same parties in both suits. The court found that the matter was not res judicata as although premised on similar facts with the same parties, the merits of the action differ. Furthermore, the court found that the decision of the lower court was perverse and unsupported by the evidence.

Appeal succeeds.

The case concerned the extent of the National Media Commission’s (‘the Commission’) legal mandate under the National Media Commission Regulations (‘the Regulations’). It was argued that certain provisions amounted to censorship, and control and direction of mass media communication as it required an operator to seek authorization of content prior to publication on a media platform, and were thus unconstitutional.

The issues for determination were: whether the original jurisdiction of the court was properly invoked; whether the cumulative effect of the impugned provisions amounted to censorship; whether the cumulative effect amounted to control and direction over professional functions and operations; and whether the Standard Guidelines issued under the regulations were vague and unconstitutional.

The jurisdictional issue concerned whether the plaintiff sought a striking down of provisions without scrutiny to assist the court in its determination. This issue was to be determined on an examination of the relief sought and the pleadings. What was important was that both raised a case cognizable under the Constitution, which the plaintiff’s documents did.

On the second issue, the court held that some form of censorship was permissible under the Constitution; however where censorship laws are introduced they must be justifiable by being reasonably required in the national security interest, for public order, public morality, or the protection of the rights of another. What the second defendant wanted was akin to prior restraint. With reference to case law, the court held that prior restraint was not legally justifiable. Law must be precise and guide future conduct, which it was not in this case. The regulations were contrary to the Constitution.

On whether the Commission was empowered to impose criminal sanctions, it was held that Parliament could not delegate this function to the Commission.

As regards the third issue, the court had to define ‘direction or control’ in the context of the Constitution. Control or direction as used in the provision had the same meaning and effect as telling operators what they should or should not do in their publications. This function belongs to the media, not the Commission.

The plaintiff’s claim was upheld.