The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
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The matter concerned an application on whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear a claim for payment against a chartered ship in a contract for the carriage of fish by sea from Argentina to Nigeria. The facts were that the respondent brought an action in the Federal High Court due to a delay by the appellant to take delivery within the time agreed by the parties in the Bill of Lading. The contract however, stated that any dispute arising would be heard in the Courts of Argentina and the applicant challenged the court’s jurisdiction on this basis. The application was dismissed by the Federal Court and the decision upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal.
The Supreme Court considered whether the lower court had erred in upholding the decision of the Federal Court. It observed that, in the absence of evidence from the respondent on the appellant’s application, there was nothing to consider in favour of the respondent to support their actions contrary to the agreement between the parties, in holding the Federal Court as the proper venue for the hearing and determination of its case against the appellant. It held that in the absence of strong cause shown by the respondent for the trial court not to grant the appellant’s application for stay, the law required that the court exercise its discretion in favour of the appellant by granting the application. Accordingly, the appeal was upheld, and the judgment of the lower court was therefore set aside.
The matter concerned the importation of fish, whereby letters of credit were opened at the appellant bank, by the 1st defendant on behalf of the respondent for the importation, which the respondent had sought to cancel.
The court considered the relationships between the parties and found that the opening of the letters of credit created a relationship between the bank, and the respondent, and also imposed on the appellant an obligation to ensure the rights of the respondent were protected. The court found that the appellant failed to do so and resultantly could not escape liability.
The court held that where a duty exists, it must be faithfully observed, since breach thereof would result in damages. The duty owed to the respondent was established with the opening of the letters of credit. This created an obligation on the part of the appellant to keep to the clear terms, under which the letters of credit were to operate. Accordingly, the court found that it was the appellant’s duty to ensure that the terms thereunder were kept.
The court held that where, in a commercial transaction or a contractual relationship, a party signs a disclaimer, then that party by virtue of the disclaimer avoids liability for breach. The court found that the appellant bank, by implication, withdrew their earlier instructions, through their acceptance of the explanations given by the correspondent bank ,and that fact amounted in effect, to not giving any instructions at all.
The court considered an appeal against the judgment of the court below declaring the defendant a tenant, alternatively a licensee of the plaintiff, as well as determining the 2nd defendant’s misgivings concerning the costs awarded against him.
The defendant argued that the land devolved on the chief but was subject to use by both parties’ families. The second defendant was joined as a co-defendant, alleging that the land was founded by his ancestor and that he and his predecessors had been in undisputed possession.
The defendants argued that the judgment was granted erroneously as the trial judge failed to correctly define the boundaries between the parties’ land.
The court found that the trial court had adequately defined the boundaries between the parties’ land and that the first defendant’s ancestor and his people had lived on the land for over 300 years. Thus, although the plaintiffs are the land owners, the defendants are in possession and their possessionary rights should not be disturbed by an injunction.
The court found that in a case that has been on the list for 25 years, costs of ¢1,200,000.00 against 1st Defendant and ¢950,000.00 against 2nd Defendant awarded by the Court in my view is stretching judicial generosity to it limit. I am unable to review the costs mulcted against the Defendants. The appeal by the 2nd Defendant/appellant fails as well as that of the Plaintiff/appellant. In the circumstances the judgment of the lower Court is affirmed.
The court considered an appeal against the decision of the High Court, in which the trial judge accepted the appellant’s case that the conduct of the respondent in ordering the seizure of her fish, and subsequently dealing with it in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner, was unlawful and consequently made an award in her favour for damages, but directed that the appellant pays the appropriate custom duties on the fish.
The issues facing the trial court was whether or not the seizure was lawful, whether the quantum of damages awarded in favour of the appellant was correct and whether the trial court was right to order that the respondent-cross-appellant pay custom duties.
The court held that the appellant suffered damages equivalent not to the cost price but fair market value of the fish. Therefore, it was just for the said amount to attract interest at the prevailing exchange rate from the date of the wrong. Since the fish were wrongfully dealt with by the respondent, there was no merit in the cross appeal.
Finally, the court dismissed the appeal of the appellant as well as the cross appeal of the respondent and affirmed the decision of the court below, however, ordered a variation, in relation to the award of damages and the payment of interest on the custom duties by the respondent.
The court considered an appeal against an injunction to restrain the appellants from going onto the disputed land to demarcate, dig, construct etc. any tree on the land until the action had been finally determined. The court considered, 1) the weight of evidence and 2) the capacity of the respondent.
The respondent obtained a customary grant of land 22 years before the action. Later, he obtained a formal lease and was reallocated additional acres of land, which was used to cultivate cash and food crops. Due to development in the area, the respondent’s land was whittled away. The respondent alleged that the appellants trespassed on his land and undertook various activities such as alienation of portions of his land, in the premise.
On the ground of capacity, it was found that once a party’s capacity had been challenged, it should be determined as a preliminary point and the suit can only be heard after this is determined. The court held that the appellants did not raise capacity as a preliminary issue and as such, the manner in which it was raised was a ploy to confuse the trial judge.
On ground of the weight of evidence, the court found that if the injunction had not been granted, the respondents land would have been pillaged and its nature entirely changed. Thus, an injunction was necessary to ensure that irreparable damage was not caused.
The court found that the trial judge exercised his discretion properly and thus the appeal was dismissed and remitted to the trial court for continuation.
This was an appeal to the Supreme Court on a judgment of the High Court which had dismissed an application for the review and setting aside of a decision by the respondent to refuse the importation of Mountain Reedbuck from South Africa into Namibia.
The appellant cited the respondent, pursuant to his duties, powers and functions as set out in the Nature Conservation Ordinance No. 4 of 1975. The appellant placed particular emphasis on his duty to consider and decide on the importation of live game from South Africa in accordance with Section 49(1) of the ordinance as amended by Section 12 of Act 5 of 1996. The evidence revealed that the decision to refuse the import of Mountain Reedbuck was made by a subordinate official who was not authorised to do so and based on a new policy which had not been communicated to the appellant.
The court found out that this issue hinged on the confusion surrounding the parties involved, the reasons for the refusal and the failure of the respondent to abide by Rule 53 of the Rules of the High Court and Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution linked to administrative justice and the doctrine of “reasonable expectation”. The court held that the subordinate official acting on behalf of the respondent did not have the authority to make the decision which was set aside. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded, and the court directed the respondent to issue the permits applied for and pay the appellant’s costs.
The court considered an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant, for the killing of an animal, possession of government trophy and failure to report being in possession of government trophy.
The appellant sought leniency and a lighter sentence on the ground that he had reformed. The respondent opposed the appeal and urged the court to uphold, both the conviction and sentence, and maintained that the evidence by the prosecution’s witnesses established the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The main issue for the court’s consideration was whether at the trial, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
The court found that although the evidence was circumstantial, there was no plausible explanation as to how the appellant came to be in possession of the tusks stolen from the dead elephant. Further that between the discovery of the carcass and arrest of the appellant, there were no intervening factors to weaken the inference of guilt.
The court observed that the appellant was sentenced under the earlier Wildlife Conservation Act, Chapter 376 which had since been repealed. The sentence was more lenient than those introduced by the amended act, thus the sentence was neither excessive, nor wrong. Accordingly, the court held that the appellant had been properly convicted and dismissed the appeal on both sentence and conviction.
The matter dealt with a delay by the respondents to issue a permit for the import into Namibia of elephants published in Government Gazette No. 4236, Notice 60, dated 1 April 2009.
The court considered whether the delay was ultra vires the provisions of the Nature Conservation Ordinance No. 4 of 1975. The respondents conceded that the moratorium was ultra vires the ordinance and accordingly, the court agreed with their concession.
The court considered further, whether it should make an order directing the second respondent to issue the required permit to the applicant. The principle to be applied in the circumstances was that the court had discretion once it set aside an administrative decision to take the decision itself and this discretion was to be exercised judicially. The court observed that the second respondent had not yet decided whether to grant or deny the application and that the second respondent was better positioned to decide because it was privy to factual material which the court was not. Accordingly, the court held that it could not order the second respondent to issue the permit to the applicant.
The court considered whether the applicant and second respondent entered into a valid agreement. The test to be applied was to inspect the intention of the parties. The court concluded that whilst the applicant and second respondent had discussed and agreed upon some conditions, those were not intended to be the only conditions. Accordingly, the court held that no valid agreement was concluded.
This case interpreted the requirements to qualify for exemptions in s. 47(1) of the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 that allow for the sale of game or game meat or the skins of game which is obviously under the age of one year.
The applicants sought to review a decision by the minister of environment and tourism that revoked and altered the terms of the gaming certificate issued for Erindi farm. The permit was altered to include that it did not apply to game kept in enclosures smaller than 1000 ha. The court found that in doing so, the minister equated the phrase ‘piece of land’ in s. 47(1) (ii) with the phrase ‘enclosure’. This consequently subjected ‘a farm’ to the same requirement governing ‘a piece of land’.
The court noted that not every piece of land in Namibia was a farm. It was held that the respondents’ interpretation of s. 47(1) exemptions was far-fetched. The court held that farms were required to be enclosed with a game-proof fence to qualify for the exemption while a piece of land required the land to be 1000 hectares and be enclosed with a game-proof fence. The court observed that Erindi farm was enclosed with a game-proof fence and should not be subjected to other requirements.
It was also held that the first respondent acted unlawfully for failing to give the applicants an opportunity to be heard.
Accordingly, the respondents were interdicted from enforcing the alterations in the certificate.
This application sought a review of regulations requiring a 24-month period for lions to be fending for themselves in an extensive wildlife system before the lion would be hunted (self-sustaining provisions).
The court accepted a request by both parties to determine the validity of the regulations as if they were applicable to lions regardless of the omission of lions in the 2008 amendment.
It was also found that the applicantÕs argument that the predator breederÕs industry should be represented on the scientific authority was not a ground for review.
The court considered whether the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000 (PAJA) was applicable to the making of regulations and held that regulations are administrative actions according to PAJA.
Secondly, the court considered whether sufficient opportunity was provided for the applicant to make representations to the panel. The court considered s3(5) and s4(1)(d) of PAJA that allows a procedure that is fair but different from PAJA provisions. The court accepted that in some instances procedural fairness requires provision of a further opportunity to make representations. The court found that the respondent acted fairly and had no way of knowing the applicantÕs attitude on the self-sustaining provision since they considered the applicantÕs letter of 2006 and the applicantÕs opposing letter of 2007 was received after announcement of the regulations.
Thirdly, the court considered whether there was a rational basis for the self-sustaining provisions. The court appreciated the fact that the hunting of lions bred in captivity has damaged the reputation of the country and the principle of fair chase. It was held that the provisions were rational since they would prevent the hunting of lions that are completely dependent on humans. Consequently, the court also held that the provisions were reasonable.
Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
The case concerned a dispute between the applicant, a non-profit company involved in the promotion of a wildlife conservancy and the first respondent, a mining business within the area of jurisdiction of the second respondent. The applicant invoked its entitlement in public interest to apply for an interdict restraining the first respondent from making any development on any portion of the concerned properties as defined in s 1 and s 38(3), of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act No. 6 of 2008 (KZNPD).
The applicant argued that the first respondent was required to apply for its proposed development but the applicant contended that it had not yet obtained such authorisation. The first respondent contended that it had been granted approval for mining authorisations in March 1998, in terms of the then applicable Minerals Act No. 50 of 199. The first respondent argued that mining authorisations approved and granted under the Minerals Act entailed that no further authorisations were required where a mining right subsisted.
The court pointed out that mining authorisations were subject only to the provisions of the Minerals Act and there was no provision similar to that in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002. The court found that the concerned properties were not inside a municipal area and were never the subject of any zoning controls when mining authorisation was granted. On the basis of this alone, no further authorisations were required under any other legislation. Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
This was a judicial review on the administrative decision of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“DAFF”) to refuse a permit for the removal of 10 protected trees (white Milkwood trees) to build a new residence.
The court considered whether it was proper for the applicant to seek an order to compel the DAFF to make a decision it had not taken during a review. The court applied the rule that requires the court to exercise its judicial discretion to set aside an administrative decision only when considering the consequences of a decision that was already taken.
The court also considered whether the decision was made by an authorised person. The court applied the provisions of s15 of the Natural Forest Act which prohibits the disturbance (removal) of protected trees without a license or exemption from the minister. It also considered s7 of the that allowed the minister to delegate exercise of his powers. The court found that the decision was made by a forester who was not authorised to make the decision. The court found that alone to be decisive of the matter and set aside the decision by the DAFF.
The court also made an order as to costs to be paid on a joint and several bases by the respondents.
This was a judicial review against a decision by the Minister of Environmental affairs approving a flawed strategic plan to show commitment for the establishment of a seabird and marine mammal rehabilitation centre. The applicant sought a declaratory order that the first and second respondents failed to adhere to the Revised Record of Decision (ROD).
The origin of the case was an administrative appeal by South African Marine Rehabilitation and Education Trust (Samrec) faulting a specific condition in the ROD for not placing any obligation on stakeholders whose operations were likely to affect the marine life of Algoa Bay. Samrec proposed amendments that were rejected.
The ROD was amended to require the stakeholders to submit a strategic plan indicating their commitment to facilitating the establishment of the rehabilitation centre. Samrec faulted this amendment, arguing that the obligation created was not sufficient.
The minister maintained that the first and second respondents were compliant and her department bore the responsibility for environmental protection and oil spillage damage, but considered it necessary to have her views placed before court.
The court applied the rule that it should be slow to substitute or vary an administrative decision since an administrative body is better equipped and has the expertise to make the right decisions than the court, unless court has to step in to ensure fairness. The court held that this was not such a case.
Accordingly, the application was dismissed and each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
The court considered a petition to have a decision handed down by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning quashed and declared unconstitutional.
The petitioners were Embobut Forest dwellers which shared a common border with five other clans. The petitioners alleged that they were genuine evictees and internally displaced persons who were aggrieved, ignored and not compensated when the respondents harmonized their registers.
The petitioners argued that their constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment had been infringed and that they had not been appropriately compensated. They alleged that they ought to have been compensated like any other squatters and that they had been discriminated against.
The court found that the arguments put forward by the petitioners were non-justiciable. Justiciability refers to the types of matters the court can adjudicate on. In this instance, the court found that the harmonization of the register of the petitioners was a political question, and not a legal one.
The court found that the purpose of compensating those who were in illegal occupation of the forest was to give effect to their right to property. However, the court found that the petitioners did not demonstrate that they were part of those who illegally occupied the land, and thus could not be compensated. Further, the court found that the petitioners did not demonstrate that any of the constitutional provisions had been violated, thus their petition was without substance.
The court considered an application for judicial review on the ground that the decision of a magistrate to grant an injunction was ultra vires (i.e beyond the powers). The applicant contended that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to make such an order and as such the order was a nullity. The respondent argued that the application was misconceived; that it had jurisdiction and that the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal which meant that the remedy of judicial review was not available to it.
The court considered whether the respondent had the jurisdiction to consider the matters before it. The court also considered whether the applicant exhausted other equally convenient, beneficial and effective alternative remedies which were available under the law.
The court found that although the application was brought in terms of the Forests Act, such dispute ought to have been brought before the National Environment Tribunal.
The court found that the learned magistrate acted without jurisdiction and in excess of statutory authority, contrary to Section 63(2) of the Forests Act to receive, entertain, hear and otherwise deal with the said case as the proper forum to hear and determine the interested party’s claim, would have been the National Environment Tribunal. On this basis, the decision issued was ultra vires and thus a nullity ab initio. Accordingly, the court set aside the decision of the magistrate.
This petition arose primarily out of a concern over the incidences of poaching of wildlife. The petitioners sought a clarification of whether the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) fell under the national security framework. The court had to decide whether uniformed officers of the KWS were officers of the National Police Service (NPS) and on the right of the petitioners to information, among others.
In dismissing the petition, the court held that the NPS and KWS were established under different legal regimes to discharge different functions and they operated under different chain of command structures. The court further noted that its mandate was limited to fill the legislative gaps and it could not supplant the intention of the legislative role. It observed that the petitioners in essence sought to change the law relating to the inclusion of KWS officers under the NPS. The court observed that the relief sought by the petitioners was better directed to the right forum namely, the legislature which held the legislative mandate. The court went on to hold that the applicant had to show that the information being sought had been denied in order te establish a violation of the petitioners’ access to information. It ound that as no request for such information had been made to the respondents, the enforcement of the right could not have crystallized.
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with costs.
The matter was an appeal from a conviction on the charge of being found in possession of wildlife trophies in contravention of s95 and 92 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act of 2013 (“Act”).
The appellant argued that the trial court overlooked the inconsistencies and contradictions in evidence and applied the doctrine constructive possession of the wildlife trophies erroneously.
The court established that evidence must be led to prove the fact of possession and the contradiction in witnesses’ testimonies put the question of possession in doubt. Court also found that the doctrine of recent possession was erroneously applied.
The court considered s92 and established that it does not create an offence in so far as offences in respect of endangered species or their trophies are concerned but only a punishment and as such the suspect could not be tried under it. Further, that the proper provision that created an offence in respect to wildlife trophies and trophies generally was s95 and that suspects should be charged under the same until the Act is amended.
The conviction was quashed and the appeal was allowed on account of failure of the prosecution to prove the case to the required standard.
This was an application for judicial review wherein the applicants sought orders to quash the respondents’ decision to place an advertisement in the newspapers calling for applications for concessions in state forests, prohibition orders to prevent the respondent from actualizing any matters concerning the advertisement. They also sought an order of mandamus to compel the respondent to comply with constitutional provisions on the protection of forests.
The respondent argued that they had taken the action in accordance with s 37(2) of the Forest Act.
The court determined whether the respondent had complied with the law in making the decision.
The court interpreted s 37(2) and established that before the board takes a decision to place an advertisement for concessions, it must be satisfied that the forests will be efficiently managed through such concession or license and for the board to be satisfied, factors such as public views and opinion, should be taken into account before the decision is made.
The court found that the respondent had not made provision for public participation, yet it was constitutionally bound to do so and thus failed to comply with the law.
Accordingly, the court granted the orders sought by the applicants.
This was an appeal against the decision of the respondents refusing to issue an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Licence for the appellants’ housing project. The appellants asked the tribunal to set aside the decision and award costs of the appeal.
The respondents argued that they had received strong objections from members of the local community since the project was in a wildlife migratory corridor and dispersal area.
The tribunal determined whether the respondents were justified in their decision, subject to the objections, without considering if the objectives of the project could be met in absence of the project. The tribunal noted that the objecting stakeholders also found the project to be worthwhile. The tribunal found that the respondents failed by ascertaining that the views of the objecting stakeholders expressed the views of a significant section of the local community. The tribunal also found that the respondents failed to demonstrate that the potential adverse impacts could not be mitigated.
Based on these findings, the tribunal unanimously set aside the respondents’ decision and issued an EIA licence for the appellants’ project but on several conditions
This was an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from cutting down trees, felling logs or dealing in whatever manner with the plaintiff’s land.
The plaintiff contended that the respondent had committed trespass and malicious damage to the property on his land. On the other hand, the defendant argued that it was not the registered owner of the land but had entered into an agreement with the government to harvest forest produce in government forests in exchange for royalties.
The court found that the plaintiff was the registered owner of the land and that the defendant lacked the capacity to question the validity of the plaintiff’s ownership.
It was further held that the plaintiff had established the requirements for an injunction. The plaintiff established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success against the defendant. Further, that if the relief was not granted the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss as all the trees on his land would be cut down.
Accordingly, the application succeeded with costs to the respondents. The court issued the injunction and directed the applicant to mark out the boundaries of his land so that the respondent would excluded from its operations.
This was an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from cutting down trees, felling logs and trees remaining into or dealing in whatever manner with the applicant’s parcel of land.
The matter before the court was whether the applicant had established a prima facie case with a probability of success to entitle him to an injunction.
The court held that the definition of land includes trees which may be growing on the land and the respondent did not have the capacity to question the manner in which the applicant acquired his title deed as the validity of the title deed was not in issue.
The court held that the applicant had established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success as against the respondent and agreed with the applicant that unless the orders sought were granted the applicant would suffer irreparable loss as all the tree on his land would be cut down and ferried away by the respondent. The applicant had therefore satisfied the tests for grant of temporary injunctions. The court also held that the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the applicant.
The court granted the orders sought by the applicant and directed him to mark out the boundaries of his land if the same were not clear so that the respondent may exclude it from its operations. The court also awarded costs of the application to the applicant.
This was a review against the respondent’s decisions to set apart land on Funzi Island and grant registration titles to Pati Limited. The applicant prayed for prohibition and certiorari orders since the respondent made the decisions in excess of its jurisdiction and power.
The applicant argued that the land in dispute was forest land, and that no allotment could have legally taken place on the land unless there was a declaration that it had ceased to be forest land. The court found that when the proceedings commenced, it was assumed that the land was trust land, and despite argument, the applicant failed to adduce enough evidence to prove that the land was forest land. The land was thus declared to be trust land.
Secondly on the applicant’s disputed locus standi, the court found that the applicant’s properties were separated by about 200 metres from the disputed property. Further, the court found that even if the land was forest land, only the authorities in the Ministry in charge of the forest lands had the capacity to defend it. Consequently, it was held that the applicants lacked the requisite locus standi.
Finally, the court found that the respondent complied with the requirements in the Trust Act and dismissed the orders prayed for.
Accordingly, the application was dismissed.
The matter dealt with a petition of appeal arising out of a dispute over the destruction of the respondent’s crops by wild animals that entered the respondent’s farm.
The court considered whether s3A(l) of the Wildlife Act, imposed liability on the appellant to compensate for loss or destruction of crop. The court held that s3A(l) imposed a duty on the appellant to protect the crops from destruction by wildlife and compensate for destruction.
The court considered whether there is a common law obligation under the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 and the rule in Ryland v Fletcher  LR 1Ex 265 on the appellant to compensate for damage or destruction caused by wildlife. The court found that neither were applicable to the present matter based on the facts of the case.
The court considered whether damage caused by migrating wildlife is an act of God. Consideration must be given to the question whether the event was reasonably foreseeable. Migration of wildlife is an annual occurrence thus, foreseeable and so not an act of God.
The court considered whether the government ought to be liable for destruction by wildlife. Factually, the appellant had the duty of control of the wildlife because of s3A of the Wildlife Act and so the court held that liability for the damage fell on the appellant.
Court of Appeal judgment upheld.
The matter dealt with an application to release the applicant’s motor vehicle which was being detained by the Kenya Forest Service pursuant to an order of forfeiture.
The court held that the right to forfeit private property must be subject to both the constitution and the enabling statute.
The court held that the key elements in an application by the state seeking forfeiture in a criminal proceeding are that:
(a) The state must establish the requisite nexus between the property and the offence;
(b) The courts determination may be based on evidence already on record including any plea and or adduced evidence accepted by the court as relevant;
(c) If the court seeks to forfeit a specific property, a notice of the order must be sent to any person who reasonably might appear to be a potential claimant with standing to contest the forfeiture;
(d) This is more so when in practical terms the seized property would be in the hand of an agent, employee, or servant of the person with proprietary interest or right;
(e) Furthermore, as a form of punishment the principle of proportionality ought to apply.
The court held that, a presumptive innocent person whose property is a subject of criminal proceedings should not lose the property without an opportunity to be heard. In the present case, the order on forfeiture was disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the offence and there was a failure to serve notice. Accordingly, the order on forfeiture was quashed.
The court considered a petition whereby the petitioner sought an order of certiorari to quash a Gazette Notice declaring his land to be forest land. The petitioner had entered into a sale agreement with the original owner of the land by which the parties agreed to a down payment upon successful application to the land control board. The Petitioner took immediate possession and contracted to pay the balance of the purchase price after the maize season. The application was made and rejected due to the Ministry of Natural Resource’s interest in the land. Subsequently, the land control board met and the petitioner’s application was granted, however, the land was transferred to the government and marked a forest.
The petitioner argued that during the dispute, its members were harassed and evicted from their farms, with their houses being torched.
The court found that there was no doubt that the petitioner had entered into a sale agreement. Further, the control board acted in a manner to deny the petitioner the land. The court found that based on a letter received from the Commissioner of Land, there was a clear acknowledgment of foul play in the manner in which the government came to buy the land. Further, the government had deprived the petitioner of its right to land and subjected its members to poverty. In conclusion, the court held that the land was to be placed in the name of the petitioner as it was the rightful and lawful owner.