The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
Read also JIFA's Environmental Country Reports for SADC
The plaintiff instituted an action in the High Court for the eviction of the defendants from a piece of land. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were carrying on mining operations at the site without holding a mining lease or a mining licence issued in terms of the Mining Rights Act 43 of 1967, hence acting illegally.
It was common cause that the defendants had not been granted a mining lease or a mining licence by the Mining Board. The defendants argued that the plaintiff did not have locus standi to bring an action of eviction because it did not own the land and that there was a likelihood that granite stone was not a base mineral that fell within the definition in the act.
The judge’s view was that granite stone fell within the definition of a base mineral and the defendants were therefore undertaking a mining operation requiring a lease or licence under the act. The court further held that the defendants held a bogus land grant from the chief. It also found that under s 2 of the Mineral Rights Act the right to minerals in any land were vested in the "Basotho Nation". The judge concluded that the case was not one between landlord and tenant but between landlord (or landowner) and squatter in a situation governed by a unique and unusual land law. Accordingly, a summary judgment was entered for the plaintiff as prayed.
In this case, chieftainship rights over a particular area were contested. The applicant sought an order calling upon the first respondent to show cause why he should not be restrained from holding himself out as chief of the area known as Ha Mochekoane. The applicant argued that he was a gazetted chief, but the respondent denied this and argued that he had been confirmed chief following the death of his father and that it was not necessary to be gazetted as chief. He further argued that the onus of proof was on the applicant to show that the disputed area was under his jurisdiction. The applicant’s failure to clearly describe his boundaries in the proceedings, the respondent argued, was fatal.
The court considered whether respondent held the office of chief and whether he was legally authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a chief. After reviewing all the evidence, the court found no indication that the contested area was that of the respondent. The court also found that the respondent did not exercise any chiefly functions and lacked locus standi. Finally, the court held that the Chieftainship Act No. 22 of 1968 stated that one could not hold the office of chief without having been gazetted.
Regarding the question of boundaries, the court reviewed historical evidence and held that it was impossible for the respondent to be chief of that area. Accordingly, the application was allowed with costs.
The appellants in this case appealed against the decision of the High Court to uphold a counter-application by the respondents. The High Court upheld the respondent’s counter application on the basis that certain peremptory conditions had not been fulfilled and by its judgment set aside the appellants’ mining lease and awarded costs in favour of the respondent.
The applicants argued that the requirements that they failed to fulfill were not peremptory and that these requirements were only peremptory prior to the 1970 and 1986 coups. They contended further that the lease agreement having been concluded thereafter, it should not have been declared null and void. The argued further that the court below erred in awarding costs on the attorney and own client scale.
The Court of Appeal held that, while the coups suspended the 1966 Constitution, they did not set at nought all other legislative provisions. It held that the provisions of the Mining Rights Act, relating to the conclusion of mining leases, were still in place. The court further held that the conditions that the appellants failed to fulfill were grounded in long tradition and custom.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed save on the issue of costs. The court held that the High Court was justified in making a special order as to costs on the issue of conspiracy but that the punitive costs were more appropriate in the circumstances and accordingly adjusted the costs order against the appellants whose conduct was deemed vexatious.
This was an appeal in the Court of Appeal against a judgment of the High Court which had dismissed an appeal to it against a judgment of the Judicial Commissioner’s Court, the effect of which was to uphold a decision of a local court. The issue concerned the removal of wood from a plantation by the appellant, which the respondent contended belonged to the community of which he was a headman. The appellant’s reasoning that the plantation was situated in his grandfather’s field was rejected by the court which ordered the appellant to desist from using the plantation and never to use it. The appellant was not satisfied with the ruling, so he appealed unsuccessfully, first to the Central Court, then to the Judicial Commissioner’s Court and finally to the High Court.
The issue for the court’s consideration was whether the local court had the jurisdiction to hear the matter.
The court observed that the matter concerned provisions of the Chieftainship Act 22 of 1968 pursuant to which the judge held that the finding by the Office of the Chief did not preclude the appellant from seeking recourse in the Local Court. The court upheld the High Court judge’s view that the dispute between the parties was not a dispute involving claims to; title, exemption from title, or overriding title. Therefore, the submission that the dispute must be dealt with in the Land Court or the District Land Court was not upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court considered a petition whereby the petitioners averred that they were land owners on which a wind farm was to be developed. The respondents bought the project rights from the initial owners whose application for the construction of the farm had been successful and sought to expand the farm. They obtained permission from the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) by renewing the initial project application.
The petitioners alleged that this was against the provisions of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act and the Constitution as the expansion was not implemented in accordance with the law and would violate their constitutional rights to a clean and healthy environment and their rights to own property. The expansion entailed the farm would encroaching onto their surrounding properties.
The issue faced by the court was whether the expansion was legal and whether the rights of the petitioners had been violated or not.
The court held that the expansion could not be logically carried out at the site captured in the original Environmental Impact Assessment and the EIA study report initially filed with NEMA. It could therefore, not be renewed. They had to file a new application and therefore the renewal of the application was contrary to law.
This failure to adhere to the EIA regulations potentially threatened the petitioners’ right to a clean and healthy environment but not their right to own property as the farm did not make use of their land nor did it threaten to use it up.
The court considered a petition stop the development of flats within a residential area. The property was initially planned as a single dwelling unit but the developer applied for change of user to multiple dwelling units which was approved. The petitioners claimed that the change of user was irregularly granted and claimed that approval from the National Environmental Management Agency was improper because the county government approved the change of user despite multiple objections from the public.
The petitioners sought an order declaring that the decision of the first respondent to change the user was unconstitutional and null and void. Further, that the approval of the re-development amounted to a dereliction of duties.
The court considered 1) whether a proper Environmental Impact Assessment was conducted, 2) whether the process of planning approval was lawfully adhered to and, 3) whether there was a violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.
It held that the NEMA processes were casually done as objections to the project, were not given a hearing and were not considered before the decision to allow the project was made.
Further, it held that there was no consultation with interested parties as was required by the law. This meant that no proper EIA was carried out and therefore the process of planning approval was legally flawed.
As a result of this, the court held that claims for violations of the right to a clean and healthy environment were breached or at the very least, under threat.
The plaintiff was claiming outstanding water use charges together with interest from the defendant.
The court determined if sea water can be owned or managed, and if so by which statutory body. The court held that art 260 of the Constitution defined land to include marine waters in the territorial sea and thus disagreed with the defendant’s argument that sea water is not capable of ownership. It was further held that the National Land Commission was the only body empowered to administer and manage the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the sea bed on behalf of the people of Kenya.
The court noted that the Water Act and the Water Resources Management Rules lacked specific provisions that included sea water as a water resource for the purpose of levying charges for the use of sea water. It was therefore held that the plaintiff lacked the locus standi to levy charges for use of sea water.
Accordingly, the case was struck out with costs to the plaintiff.
The court considered a petition to have a decision handed down by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning quashed and declared unconstitutional.
The petitioners were Embobut Forest dwellers which shared a common border with five other clans. The petitioners alleged that they were genuine evictees and internally displaced persons who were aggrieved, ignored and not compensated when the respondents harmonized their registers.
The petitioners argued that their constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment had been infringed and that they had not been appropriately compensated. They alleged that they ought to have been compensated like any other squatters and that they had been discriminated against.
The court found that the arguments put forward by the petitioners were non-justiciable. Justiciability refers to the types of matters the court can adjudicate on. In this instance, the court found that the harmonization of the register of the petitioners was a political question, and not a legal one.
The court found that the purpose of compensating those who were in illegal occupation of the forest was to give effect to their right to property. However, the court found that the petitioners did not demonstrate that they were part of those who illegally occupied the land, and thus could not be compensated. Further, the court found that the petitioners did not demonstrate that any of the constitutional provisions had been violated, thus their petition was without substance.
This was an application for an injunction order by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from harvesting trees without consulting and involving the community. The court had to decide on the following: whether a community that was a beneficiary of a forest had capacity to commence proceedings against the illegal and irregular harvesting of timber and fuel wood materials from the forest; whether public participation was mandatory in the management of forests; and whether the Director of Kenya Forest Service (KFS), the first defendant, could be sued in their capacity as a director.
The court held that there were no provisions in law which barred any suit against the first defendant in that capacity. The court observed that the community had an interest in the preservation and sustainable use of the forest. As such, public participation was an important component of environmental management as enshrined in the constitution. However, the court pointed out that there was no public participation that was demonstrated by the respondents. On the lack of a management plan by the KFS, the court held that it was difficult to know when a tree was planted or harvested, thus creating difficulty to prove which trees were to be cut. The court held that the balance of convenience weighed in favour of the applicants because environmental interests far-outweighed private interests.
Accordingly, the court ordered the respondents to stop harvesting trees, pending the hearing of the suit.
The matter dealt with the issue of jurisdiction arising out of a dispute regarding the development of residential flats by the ex parte applicant.
The court considered whether the National Environment Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine Tribunal Appeal No. 74 of 2011. Under section 129(1) of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act, a person who did not participate in the Environmental Impact Assessment study process for the development, in the process of approval or complaint cannot be said to have been an aggrieved by the process which led to the issuance of the licence as no decision could be said to have been made against him. If the tribunal purports to entertain such an appeal under the aforesaid section, the tribunal would be acting ultra vires its authority, hence its decision would be liable to be quashed.
In this case, it was clear that the appeal in issue did not fall within section 129(1) since the second respondent was not a participant in the licensing process. It followed that the limitation period provided under section 129(1) did not apply to the second respondent since, in the court’s view, that limitation only applied to a person appealing pursuant to section 129(1).
There was no evidence that the second respondent was barred from appealing by any other provision in the act or regulations. Accordingly, the court found that the second respondent was entitled under section 129(2) to appeal against the decision of the authority.
The Notice of Motion was dismissed.
The appellants appealed against the decision of the High Court to dismiss an application for judicial review. The appellants sought orders of certiorari and prohibition against the County council to set apart a portion of land for the purposes of a boat landing base and the subsequent granting of a lease to the third respondents. The court had to consider several issues including: whether judicial review was the proper avenue for nullifying a title which was granted by law; whether a person other than the ministry in charge of forest could challenge an allocation of land; and what the correct status of the land in question was.
The court observed that the remedy of judicial review under Kenyan law was not wide enough to accommodate a party who was not just aggrieved by the process but sought to ventilate other issues. The court however concluded that there was no material dispute of fact, and the case could be decided on the papers. The court held that the Commissioner of lands had no power to grant more land than what the statute empowered him to do and that he had no power to set aside public land. On the locus standi of the appellants, the court held that the land which was allocated was a beach in front of the appellants’ pieces of land which tourists and local villagers used. There was therefore substantial interest by the appellants in the matter.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the order of the High court dismissing the appellants’ notice of motion was set aside.
This was an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from developing the land until it obtained a positive environmental impact assessment, causing excessive noise and dust pollution from his property.
The applicant contended that the defendant was interfering with its right to a clean, safe and secure environment and, that the plaintiff’s tenants were unable to occupy the plaintiff’s premises due to nuisance and pollution on the defendant’s property.
The court determined whether the plaintiff had the necessary locus standi.
The court noted that non-compliance of statutory provisions or conditions made there were of a public nature and could have been dealt with by reporting to the Nairobi City Council officials,and the Commissioner of Lands. It was further noted that the grievances on non-compliance with provisions relating to environmental impact assessments should have been dealt with by the National Environmental Management Authority. For these reasons, the court held that the plaintiff lacked locus standi to institute the suit. Consequently, the application was dismissed with costs.
This was a ruling on a preliminary objection that disputed the jurisdiction of the court. The respondents argued that its discretionary powers were not amenable to judicial review.
This objection was raised in the course of a review of a decision of the respondent to cancel the applicants’ licences that gave them a right to carry out sludge and waste disposal at the port of Mombasa. The applicants sought an order to quash the respondent’s decision and a further order to prohibit the respondent from implementing and enforcing the purported cancellation of the licenses.
Having considered the competing arguments for and against the preliminary objection, the court found that the objection was challenging the jurisdiction of the court. The respondents argued that its discretionary powers were not amenable to judicial review. The court held in the contrary that the decision was administrative and therefore could be the subject of a judicial review. It was further held that the applicants were not barred from coming to that court for assistance when they had grievances with administrative matters.
The court found that the preliminary objection had no merit and dismissed the application with costs to the applicant.
The court considered an application declaring that the applicants right to life had been contravened by forcible eviction, as well as their right to protection of the law.
The applicants averred that they had resided and carried on farming on the land from which they were evicted for 61 years. After the land had been degazetted for settlement by Gazette Notices, the applicants claimed that their subsequent eviction was an infringement of their constitutional rights.
The Applicants claimed to reside and possess the land in dispute but did not lay any credible foundation to that claim. The only document they placed before the court to support their claim was what was described as “The fact-finding Report of Mr Cheruiyot Kiplangat.” The said person was not known to this court and the court was not told what authority he had, nor his competence to make the report.
The court held that the report had no legal basis and was to be rejected. As the application was substantially based on the fact that the appellants had wrongly been evicted from the land, to which they purported to lay a stake, the court found that their reference had automatically failed, based on the finding that the fact-finding report they relied on had no legal authority.
This matter determined whether the principles of granting an injunction should be applied differently in environmental litigation.
The applicants sought an injunction to restrain the respondents from mining and excavation activities which were likely to trigger environmental and health problems. The respondents argued that they were not mining but prospecting and had a license to do so.
The court determined that the applicants had the necessary locus standi by virtue of being persons entitled to a clean and healthy environment as per s3(2) of the Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA).
The court determined whether the grounds for the grant of an injunction were satisfied by the application. The court noted that breaches of the environmental statute must be looked at without the trappings of the law on injunctions but rather in line with the principles under s3 of the EMCA.
The court established that anybody who intends to mine or conduct prospecting activities is required to submit a project report and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) as per s58 of the EMCA. It was further held that where the provision is not complied with, it is immaterial whether such person had a license. The court found that the respondent failed to comply with the provisions of the act and declared the respondent’s activities illegal.
The injunction was granted since the environmental factors were not taken into account before the project commenced.
In this case the appellants appealed against the first respondent’s decision to issue an environmental impact assessment (EIA) license to the second respondent for the proposed development of offices, staff quarters, and a conference hall. The applicants sought the following: a stop order; cancellation of the license; and an environmental restauration order.
The first respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection contending that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, as the appeal was filed more than 60 days after the issuance of the license and, therefore, out of time.
The appellants argued that they filed the appeal within 60 days of the time they became aware that the license had been issued and urged the court to admit the appeal.
The tribunal considered whether the appeal was one under s129(1) or s129(2) EMCA. It observed that any appeal that sought to challenge matters surrounding the grant or refusal to grant a licence fell within the ambit of s 129(1) whereas s129(2) covered appeals against acts or omissions of the Director General or the committee of the authority or its agents on matters outside the issue of licensing.
The tribunal found that the appeal fell under s129(1) which imposed a strict time limit, incapable of extension. Thus, the tribunal held that the date when the appellants became aware of the decision to issue the license was immaterial in determining whether the appeal was competent or not. Accordingly, the preliminary objection was allowed, and the appeal dismissed.
This was a petition brought by various parties challenging the implementation and design of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET Project). The court considered whether the implementation of the project violated the rights of the affected communities.
The court observed that the rights of citizens regarding information on environmental matters, public participation, and access to justice were indispensable to foster sustainable development. The court found that the various petitioners’ rights were violated or could potentially be violated by the project, including the rights to fishing and to a clean and healthy environment.
The court ordered the project designers to engage the community as a distinct group and to mitigate on how the project, would affect their rights to culture. Secondly, it ordered the respondents to design a measurable and actionable plan, in consultation with the affected community on how to protect the cultural identity during and after the construction of the project. Thirdly, it ordered the government to draw up a management plan to preserve the Lamu Island as a UNESCO World Heritage Site as directed through UNESCO declarations. Fourthly, it ordered the department responsible for issuing environmental impact assessments to ensure that the rights of the communities were implemented before reconsidering the licence. Accordingly, the petition was upheld.
The two applicants were seeking an order for joinder in a substantive appeal by the petitioner. The court considered whether the applicants ought to be joined to the appeal as interested parties. The appeal dealt with the lawfulness of charges levied against the appellant and the applicants for the use of sea water.
In deciding the case, the court relied on the case of Francis Kariuki Muruatetu and Another v. Republic and Four Others which set out guiding principles when seeking to be joined to proceedings as an interested party. The rule stated that the party seeking to be enjoined must move the court through a formal application and must place sufficient grounds before the court namely: the personal interests that the party has in the matter; the prejudice that the interested party will suffer; and the relevance of the submissions the party seeks to rely on in the case.
In dismissing the application for joinder, the court held that the applicants expressed no interest in the matter during the lower courts. Furthermore, the court held that the applicants could bring their own application since there was no order of stay of proceedings in place. Lastly, it held that the applicants did not stand to suffer or incur any prejudice in the matter. Accordingly, the court dismissed the applications with costs.
The court considered an appeal, concerning a dispute between two companies over the right to mine salt in the Northern Cape.
The high court initially dismissed the appellant’s counter-application in which it sought to review and set aside the Minster's approval of the 1st respondent’s application for a mining permit over the disputed property.
The question on appeal was whether the high court was entitled to refuse to review and set aside the Minister's approval of the 1st respondent’s application without considering whether the 1st respondent had consulted with the appellant, as an 'interested and affected party' as contemplated in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002.
The court found that the answer to the question was dependent on the legal basis that the appellant relied on for its occupancy of the property. As the appellant’s occupation of the property was premised on the validity of a permit, which the high court found to be a forgery and thus invalid, the question arose as to whether the appellant had a right to be consulted even though the permit was invalid.
The court, after careful consideration of the requirements set out in the Act, held that a person that relies on an illegally issued permit to occupy land has no right to be consulted by an applicant for a mining right as contemplated in the Act because they do not qualify as an 'interested and affected party'.
The case concerned a dispute between the applicant, a non-profit company involved in the promotion of a wildlife conservancy and the first respondent, a mining business within the area of jurisdiction of the second respondent. The applicant invoked its entitlement in public interest to apply for an interdict restraining the first respondent from making any development on any portion of the concerned properties as defined in s 1 and s 38(3), of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act No. 6 of 2008 (KZNPD).
The applicant argued that the first respondent was required to apply for its proposed development but the applicant contended that it had not yet obtained such authorisation. The first respondent contended that it had been granted approval for mining authorisations in March 1998, in terms of the then applicable Minerals Act No. 50 of 199. The first respondent argued that mining authorisations approved and granted under the Minerals Act entailed that no further authorisations were required where a mining right subsisted.
The court pointed out that mining authorisations were subject only to the provisions of the Minerals Act and there was no provision similar to that in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002. The court found that the concerned properties were not inside a municipal area and were never the subject of any zoning controls when mining authorisation was granted. On the basis of this alone, no further authorisations were required under any other legislation. Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
The matter concerned an allegation that the accused’s filling stations presented an environmental risk. Having been granted leave, the prosecutor, an environmental advocacy organisation instituted a private prosecution in the Gauteng Division of the High Court against the accused, a fuel supplies company.
The prosecutor claimed that it had complied with all the legislative requirements set out in s33 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 to enable it to initiate such a prosecution. Counts 1 to 21 of the indictment alleged that the accused had contravened ss 21(1), 22(1) and 29(4) of the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1986 (“ECA”) as read together with other supporting environmental legislation. The said s 22(2) provided that authorisation of activities like construction of a service station would only be issued after consideration of reports concerning their impact on the environment. The accused formally pleaded to the charges divided into two sections. The first was a plea under s 106(1)(h) denying the prosecutor’s entitlement to prosecute and the other was a plea of not guilty under s 106(1)(b).
The court held that the claim under s 106(1)(h) on defence of want of title to prosecute failed. The court concluded that the prosecutor's case was straightforward and that the accused breached a duty relating to the protection of the environment. It held that in terms of s22(1) of the ECA the undertaking of certain identified activities was prohibited without written authorisation. The accused was convicted on 17 counts and acquitted on four.
The court considered an appeal against the decision of the lower court, seeking among other things, a declaratory order, that a concession agreement signed, and registered in the Register of Deeds, Lands Registry entered by the second respondent on behalf of the native lands was irregular, and liable to be set aside.
At the core of the challenge was a lease agreement entered by the Ife District Native Authority over a forest, which was communal property. The lease was granted to a timber trading company for a 25-year term. The court had to decide several issues, including: (1) whether the appellants had locus standi (2) whether the Oni if Ife had the capacity to act as both grantor and grantee (3) and whether the deed of concession was made in pursuance of the power vested in the first defendant.
In considering the appellants locus standi in the matter, the court considered the use of the land which included farming, fishing and hunting. The court concluded that the appellants thus had substantial interest in the matter. The court found in favour of the appellants on the question of whether the Oni of Ife executed the deed in a dual capacity as he was both a grantor and a major shareholder of the grantee company. Through being the grantor and the beneficiary of the rights, the Oni of Ife acted in a dual capacity and his interests in the agreement conflicted with his fiduciary duty. The court held that the Oni of Ife and the council, ought to have exercised their rights in a manner consistent and not detrimental to the rights of the appellants.
The applicant sought various reliefs concerning a project to abstract and pump water from Lake Malawi by and under the watch of the respondents. The judge considered the main issue to be an application for leave to apply for judicial review. The second issue was whether the applicant and the Malawi Law Society (MLS), an interested party), had locus standi in the matter in light of s 26(1)(d) of the Legal Education and Legal Practitioners’ Act (LELPA).
The applicant contended that the matters that it raised were matters of public interest and were intended to protect the public on an issue that directly touched on the law, namely compliance with various legal processes relating to environmental protection before a project of the nature of the instant one is commenced. The judge held that prima facie, this was a matter of public interest and that the MLS had a legal duty to take measures intended at protecting the public, within the meaning of s 26(1)(d) of the LELPA. The judge was also satisfied by the applicant’s representations that there was no alternative remedy for the applicant in the circumstances to secure appropriate reliefs. The court was satisfied that the applicant had an arguable case and therefore granted the applicant leave to apply for judicial review. The court further ordered the first respondent to make available to the applicant the contract with the contractor and other relevant environmental information.