The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
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This was an appeal against a judgment of the High Court which ordered the appellants to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on 10 November 2006 and later became an order of court. The first appellant was an elected body established in terms of the Regional Councils Act 22 of 1992. The first respondent was a voluntary association representing 104 members out of 110 persons who were lessees of sites in a holiday resort and fishing village of Wlotzkasbaken under the jurisdiction of the first appellant.
The first appellant advertised plots for lease without distinguishing between those already leased to the respondents and other vacant sites, which aggrieved the respondents and was interpreted as a breach of their right of pre-emption. The issues for determination were: the meaning of clause 2 of the 2006 agreement in the context of previous agreements and whether the advertisement was signaling an intention to no longer be bound by the 2006 agreement.
The court deduced that the agreements showed that in each instance the parties agreed to certain rights which would ensure that those existing leaseholders would be able, if so advised, to convert their lease holding into property rights. In their agreement with the appellants, the respondents acquired the right to have all the plots sold once the township was proclaimed. Therefore, the intention to lease those plots was a breach of the right of the respondents. Accordingly, the appellants’ appeal was dismissed with costs.
The matter dealt with an alleged breach of contract that required the plaintiff to supply large amounts of water to the defendantís wine farm. The contract contained two main clauses namely, that the defendant would reimburse the plaintiff a maximum of N$300000 for obtaining tenders and would design and construct the bulk water supply scheme in the absence of an alternative agreement.
The plaintiff contended that the agreement was never entered into despite the work being carried out and as a result, they were entitled to reimbursement because the defendant breached the two main clauses of the contract. In response, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff was vicariously guilty of breach of contract as a result of which the defendant says it terminated contract.
The main question before the court was whether the plaintiff was vicariously guilty of breach of contract which resulted in the defendantís termination of the contract and in the alternative. The court also considered whether the respondent would be required to pay for the work done as per the agreement.
The court found that no such breach existed and that had there been a breach, the defendant, would have been required to communicate termination of the contract which it failed to do. The court concluded that the reliance on an alleged oral agreement had not been proved by facts ëíin the clearest and most satisfactory manneríí. The court found in favour of the applicant.
This was a consolidated case where the court dealt with the issue of delay in instituting review of the decision of the minister of mines and energy to refuse the renewal of an Exclusive Prospecting Licence (EPL).
The court considered the issue of delay and not the merits of the refusal to renew licence. The court applied the rule in Disposable Medical Products v Tender Board of Namibia 1997 NR 129 HC where the court held that an inquiry to determine ‘reasonableness’ should be factual and the court can only exercise its discretion after making a conclusion that the delay was unreasonable. The court also considered the scope and object of the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act, No 33 of 1992 with regard to compliance with specific timelines.
The court held that the delays occasioned by the applicants were unreasonable and the explanations in both applications were unsatisfactory for the court to apply its discretion. Accordingly, both applications were dismissed with costs.
The plaintiff claimed that it was patentee and registered proprietor of an invention for the "method of, and apparatus for, underwater mining of mineral deposits known as a "pebble jetting system.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendants infringed on its patent by using integers of its invention in another invention, resulting in financial loss to the plaintiff. The defence argued that the Patents and Designs Proclamation, No. 17 of 1923 upon which the plaintiff relied for the registration of its patent had been repealed by the South African Patents Act, No 37 of 1952 and was therefore no longer in force in Namibia and that the union Act in s18 of the proclamation was to become main legislative piece for patents.
The court therefore had to decide whether the Patent proclamation was still in force and determine the legitimacy of the granting of the patent and the meaning of Union Act in the proclamation.
The court found that that the provisions of the proclamation under which the patent in issue had been granted, were not repealed or amended by the 1952 Act and were valid by virtue of Article 140(1) of the Constitution. Secondly, that the extent to which the Union Act had been applied to the law of patents in the Territory stemmed from s.5 of the Proclamation and, although it applied the Union Act to a wide range of specified matters, it did not apply to applications for the granting of patents. The matter was dismissed with costs.
This was an application to review the minister’s decision that differentiated the manner of issuing the sale of trophy hunting concessions as between the applicant and fourth respondent.
The applicant succeeded in obtaining an order to show cause (rule nisi) and an interim interdict of the reliefs in their application to prohibit the implementation of the concessions.
The applicant’s locus standi was challenged during the proceedings. The court applied the reasonable person test and held that the applicant was an ‘aggrieved person’ whose fundamental rights had been infringed or threatened to be infringed.
The court considered whether the minister violated the applicant’s right to equality and held that the minister acted fairly; since the decision was made to redress the injustice of the fourth respondent and did not violate the cabinet’s policy or the constitutional principle of equality.
The court also considered whether the decision violated the applicant’s right to administrative justice as per the concept of legitimate expectation of a hearing. The court applied the rule that the court should consider the existence of a duty to act fairly. The court held that the principles of a sale by private treaty did not require the minister to afford all professional hunters an opportunity to be heard. Having found that the concession was legally granted, the court did not deal further with the issue on violation of the freedom of economic activity.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for interdictory relief and made an order as to costs.
The plaintiff in this case claimed restitution for a breach of contract. The court determined whether the defendant was in breach of contract for failing to install a working borehole in a geohydrological environment where the plaintiff's farm was located.
The defendant raised a counterclaim that the plaintiff had accepted that work was completed but failed to pay the balance of the agreed amount. The court applied the rule in Du Plessis v Ndjavera that the plaintiff is under no obligation to perform before defendant has completed his performance.
The court held that the defendant was at fault for failing to assess the soil formation in the area and ended up using the incorrect drilling method. The court observed that the defendant admitted to using the riskier direct flush air percussion instead of the mud rotary method to save on expenses and thus failed to complete performance.
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was in breach of contract and the plaintiff was entitled to cancel the
agreement and claim restitution. The counterclaim was also dismissed with costs.
The matter dealt with an appeal against the decision of the High Court to issue an interdict restraining the appellant, from utilising a coal boiler at its factory and the removal of the boiler within 30 days. The respondent had claimed in the lower court that the appellant had erected a coal fired boiler on the property in contravention of regulation 3 of its Smoke Control regulations under s 18 of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965.
The court considered whether the decision of the High Court to restrain the appellant from using the boiler and the subsequent order for its removal was lawful. The court found that the appellant had installed the boiler without submitting plans or specifications to the respondent as required by the regulations. However, the court established that upon giving the appellant the opportunity to submit its plans, the respondent rejected the appellant’s application on account of the type of boiler that the appellant sought to erect and not smoke emissions as envisaged by s 15(1) of the act. The Court applied the rule in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) and stated that the facts of this case did not fall within the scope of that decision.
The court held that the respondent did not stay within the boundaries of the act and constraints of the Constitution and this was unlawful. Accordingly, the court upheld the appeal with costs.
This case concerned a dispute over the applicant’s land which became the subject of a mining permit held by the respondent. The applicants sought an interdict from the High Court to suspend all of the respondent’s mining activities. They contended that these activities would cause environmental harm and have negative effects on their business. The respondents argued that by failing to seek suspension of the permit timeously, the applicants exacerbated difficulties for both parties.
The court considered whether the matter was one of urgency and whether the applicants were entitled to the interdict sought. Although the court agreed with the respondent’s observations regarding the failings of the applicants, it held that both parties had an interest in certainty and therefore, took a liberal approach to consider the matter as urgent, noting that this would not prejudice either party.
The court did not find sufficient merit in the grounds for an interdict. The court held that the applicants needed to establish not only a prima facie right, but to show that they would suffer irreparable harm if the relief was not granted. The applicant, however, failed to demonstrate that irreparable harm would ensue if the interdict was not granted.
Consequently, the court did not grant the temporary interdict.
The court also refused to review the administrative decision to grant the respondent a mining permit. It held that the applicant needed to first exhaust all other possible remedies, which it did not do. Accordingly, the court refused the application for review.
This application sought a review of regulations requiring a 24-month period for lions to be fending for themselves in an extensive wildlife system before the lion would be hunted (self-sustaining provisions).
The court accepted a request by both parties to determine the validity of the regulations as if they were applicable to lions regardless of the omission of lions in the 2008 amendment.
It was also found that the applicantÕs argument that the predator breederÕs industry should be represented on the scientific authority was not a ground for review.
The court considered whether the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act of 2000 (PAJA) was applicable to the making of regulations and held that regulations are administrative actions according to PAJA.
Secondly, the court considered whether sufficient opportunity was provided for the applicant to make representations to the panel. The court considered s3(5) and s4(1)(d) of PAJA that allows a procedure that is fair but different from PAJA provisions. The court accepted that in some instances procedural fairness requires provision of a further opportunity to make representations. The court found that the respondent acted fairly and had no way of knowing the applicantÕs attitude on the self-sustaining provision since they considered the applicantÕs letter of 2006 and the applicantÕs opposing letter of 2007 was received after announcement of the regulations.
Thirdly, the court considered whether there was a rational basis for the self-sustaining provisions. The court appreciated the fact that the hunting of lions bred in captivity has damaged the reputation of the country and the principle of fair chase. It was held that the provisions were rational since they would prevent the hunting of lions that are completely dependent on humans. Consequently, the court also held that the provisions were reasonable.
Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
This was an appeal to the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court to uphold the unlawfulness of the water meters under operation “Gcin’amanzi”, a project addressing water losses and non-payment of water services in Soweto. This was done by installing pre-paid meters to charge consumers for use of water in excess of the free 6 kilolitre per household monthly water allowance. With access to water being a constitutionally guaranteed right, the Supreme Court ordered that the applicants supply residents with at least 60litres of water, hence quantifying what “sufficient water” as given in the Constitution.
The court in this matter had to deliberate on what the meaning of “sufficient water” was as required by the Constitution and the lawfulness of the pre-paid water meters.
The Constitutional Court found that it was not appropriate for a court to give a quantified content to what constitutes “sufficient water” because this would be best addressed by the government which pegged it. Further, given that, 80 percent of the households in the City would receive adequate water under the present policy, the Court concluded that it would not have been unreasonable for the City not to have supplied more.
With regard to the pre-paid water meters, the Court held that the national legislation and the City’s own by-laws authorised the local authority to introduce pre-paid water meters as part of Operation Gcin’amanzi. Accordingly, it held that the installation of the meters was neither unfair nor discriminatory.
In this case, the High Court had to consider an application for summary judgement. The plaintiff sought judgement to be ordered in the sum of E130373.77 for professional services it rendered to the defendant, plus mora interest and cost of suit. By means of this procedure for summary judgement, a defence of no substance can be disposed of without putting the plaintiff to the expense of a trial.
The plaintiff argued that it was faced with a defence of no substance and that a summary judgement should accordingly be granted.
The court held that in order to determine whether a summary judgement could be granted, it was necessary to evaluate whether the defendant had raised a triable issue. Relying on the judgement in Mater Delarosa High School v RMJ Stationary (Pty) Ltd unreported Appeal Case No. 3/2005, the court held that they would refuse to grant a summary judgement if there was a reasonable possibility that this would cause an injustice.
The court found that a number of issues needed to be decided in the course of a trial and not ignored by granting a summary judgement. Most crucially, a trial was necessary to decide when payment of the plaintiff was due. Given these circumstances, the court found that it would be premature to dismiss the defence and that doing so, by granting a summary judgement, would possibly cause an injustice.
Accordingly, the application for summary judgement was dismissed by the court and costs were ordered in the cause.