The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
Read also JIFA's Environmental Country Reports for SADC
The court considered an appeal against the judgment of the lower the court in in that the lower court erred in law by handing down the judgment in favour of the respondents.
The appellants argued that 1) the court had failed to acknowledge estoppel as part of the law of Lesotho. 2) that the learned judge erred in not finding that the respondent was precluded from seeking the relief by virtue of estoppel and 3) that the court had no power to make the order of costs.
On the question of whether the court was empowered to make a costs order, since it was not legislatively empowered to do so, the court held that despite the express powers in statute, the court had the capacity to make such order for reasons to do with justice.
On the withdrawal of the appeal, the court held that any party which wishes to withdraw an appeal must do so unequivocally. A litigant cannot unilaterally impose conditions on a case withdrawal to which an opponent and the court are enjoined.
The appeal was struck off the roll with costs.
This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court on ground that the Trail Judge erred in law when he held that the relatives of an intestate take priority over the Administrator General.
The appellant argued that he had unfettered discretion in the choice of estates to administer where there was no will left.
In consideration of the relevant laws, it was found that a widow or widower can apply for and obtain Letters of Administration of his or her deceased spouses’ estate without reference to the Administrator General. But other persons not authorized in law must seek for consent.
Thus, the consent that was sought was in respect of the second respondent.
This was an appeal against the decision of the trail judge on grounds that, the Learned Principal Judge had not considered the case according to the issue that had been framed by the counsel, rather on issues that were unilaterally put forward by counsel for the respondents, and that he failed to find that the appellant had procured the two policy covers and was therefore entitled to the full brokerage commission at 20% and not 7.7%
The respondents argued that the appellant was not contracted and that they had not done full brokerage, thus, they were not entitled to full commission.
It was however noted that to be an efficient broker, it was not necessary to complete all negotiations.
This was an appeal against judgment of the trail judge where it was found that the suit property belonged to the respondent. The appellant contended that, the trail judge erred when he declared that the respondent’s title was affected by the Expropriated Properties Act of 1982 which vested it in the Government of Uganda.
From the facts of the case, the respondent was among the departed Asians, who owned a shell that was half way complete before he departed from Uganda. Later the appellant was issued with a Certificate of title for a full term lease of the suit property which he fully constructed. The respondent later was granted a certificate of repossession and attempted to acquire the building from the appellant, hence the trail judge’s findings in favor of the respondent.
This was an appeal against the decision of the trail judge were the suit against the respondent was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay his outstanding loan account with the respondent within 30 days, failure of which, the respondent was entitled to sell his motor vehicle that had been pledged to it.
The grounds of the appeal were that, the trial judge erred in fact when she found that the document was signed voluntarily by the appellant. The appellant contended that he signed the document under duress to avoid arrest and to save his job.
This was an appeal against the order of the High Court requiring the appellant to furnish security for costs in a suit in which the appellant had sued the respondent for recovery of immovable property, allegedly obtained fraudulently.
The grounds of the appeal were that, the trail judge erred in failing to consider the merits of the appellant’s case, whether the decision was made with made, and whether the trail court erred on the mode and quantum of the security it ordered.
This was an appeal in which the appellant sought for an award of special and general damages, orders that the decree of the High Court be set aside with costs to the appellant, alternatively, that a retrial be ordered.
The grounds of the appeal were that, the learned judge erred in law in holding that the interlocutory judgment was of no consequence, that he erred in holding that no special damages were proved, and that he erred in holding that there was no breach of contract by the respondent.
This was an application in which the applicant sought for an order striking out the Notice of Appeal alleged to have been filed out of time.
It was argued for the applicant that the Notice of Appeal was filed 53 days out of time. The submitted that the Notice of Appeal had been filed within the prescribed time, that an application for a copy of the proceedings had been made to the Registrar within time, and that a copy of the letter had been sent to the applicant.
This was an appeal against judgment and decision of the High Court where the trail judge dismissed the case for the appellant. the appellant was indebted to the respondent and on failure to pay the debt, the respondent sold property of the appellant so as to recover the money, which the sale was contended by the appellant to have been null and void because the property was not available as security for the appellant’s indebtedness.
This was an appeal brought against the Order of the High Court Judge refusing to hear the suit de novo, and against the Order of another judge refusing the appellant’s application that the learned judge should step down from hearing his appeal for leave to appeal. The appellant sought for a retrial of the suit by another judge.
This was an appeal against the decree of the High Court where the appellant was ordered to perform his part of the contract by surrendering vacant possession of his to the respondent.
The grounds of appeal were that, the trail judge erred in law and fact in holding that the parties intended that the respondent would be entitled to vacant possession irrespective of whether he had or had not paid the full purchase money.
This was an application in which the applicant sought to strike out the Notice of Appeal on grounds that the respondent’s appeal had not been instituted within the prescribed time. The applicant argued that counsel for the respondent did not follow the prescribed procedure for lodging an appeal and that he was never served with a copy of the Notice of Appeal.
This was an appeal against the order of the high Court of dismissal of the suit due to failure to prosecute the case, and appeal against refusal of an adjournment.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the dismissal was unjustified considering the circumstances of the appeal. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that there was lack of interest by the appellant in the case, thus its dismissal.