The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
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The court considered whether an interim interdict could be granted to stop short-term remedial measures which were put in place to treat acid mine drainage (AMD).
To determine whether to grant the interim interdict, the date on which the ECL would be reached was critical. The court found that pursuant to the date being determined, the court was to apply the precautionary principle, which requires authorities to insist on adequate measures to safeguard against the contamination of underground water.
The court found that the ECL could not be determined and based on the short-term project, the greater the danger and consequences of untreated AMD is averted.
The case concerned a dispute between the applicant, a non-profit company involved in the promotion of a wildlife conservancy and the first respondent, a mining business within the area of jurisdiction of the second respondent. The applicant invoked its entitlement in public interest to apply for an interdict restraining the first respondent from making any development on any portion of the concerned properties as defined in s 1 and s 38(3), of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act No. 6 of 2008 (KZNPD).
The applicant argued that the first respondent was required to apply for its proposed development but the applicant contended that it had not yet obtained such authorisation. The first respondent contended that it had been granted approval for mining authorisations in March 1998, in terms of the then applicable Minerals Act No. 50 of 199. The first respondent argued that mining authorisations approved and granted under the Minerals Act entailed that no further authorisations were required where a mining right subsisted.
The court pointed out that mining authorisations were subject only to the provisions of the Minerals Act and there was no provision similar to that in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002. The court found that the concerned properties were not inside a municipal area and were never the subject of any zoning controls when mining authorisation was granted. On the basis of this alone, no further authorisations were required under any other legislation. Accordingly, the application was dismissed with costs.
The first and second respondents, were parties to a contract in respect of a gold plant for three years with the option to renew. At the end of this period, the second respondent did not renew the contract but recommended the applicant to take over its operations. However, the second respondent continued to mine at the plant and refused to hand the plant over to the first respondent thereby prompting it to seek an interdict to stop the continued mining by the second respondent and applicant. This was granted by the High Court.
The appellant immediately, filed an urgent application to the High Court seeking a provisional order to stop the first and second respondents from disturbing its operations at the gold plant. The two matters went before the High Court for confirmation of the provisional orders. The first order, to stop the first respondent and associates mining, was confirmed. However, the second order, to stop the respondents’ disturbance in the mine, was discharged. This appeal was against the judgment.
The court found that the first order included all business associates of the second respondent and the applicant was a business associate of the second respondent, as evidenced by the joint venture agreement concluded between the two.
In conclusion, the court held that the appellant was mining in contravention of the contract when it approached the court for the second provisional order and as a result, the provisional order granted in that case was discharged. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
This was an application for an injunction order by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendants from harvesting trees without consulting and involving the community. The court had to decide on the following: whether a community that was a beneficiary of a forest had capacity to commence proceedings against the illegal and irregular harvesting of timber and fuel wood materials from the forest; whether public participation was mandatory in the management of forests; and whether the Director of Kenya Forest Service (KFS), the first defendant, could be sued in their capacity as a director.
The court held that there were no provisions in law which barred any suit against the first defendant in that capacity. The court observed that the community had an interest in the preservation and sustainable use of the forest. As such, public participation was an important component of environmental management as enshrined in the constitution. However, the court pointed out that there was no public participation that was demonstrated by the respondents. On the lack of a management plan by the KFS, the court held that it was difficult to know when a tree was planted or harvested, thus creating difficulty to prove which trees were to be cut. The court held that the balance of convenience weighed in favour of the applicants because environmental interests far-outweighed private interests.
Accordingly, the court ordered the respondents to stop harvesting trees, pending the hearing of the suit.
The matter dealt with the issue of jurisdiction arising out of a dispute regarding the development of residential flats by the ex parte applicant.
The court considered whether the National Environment Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine Tribunal Appeal No. 74 of 2011. Under section 129(1) of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act, a person who did not participate in the Environmental Impact Assessment study process for the development, in the process of approval or complaint cannot be said to have been an aggrieved by the process which led to the issuance of the licence as no decision could be said to have been made against him. If the tribunal purports to entertain such an appeal under the aforesaid section, the tribunal would be acting ultra vires its authority, hence its decision would be liable to be quashed.
In this case, it was clear that the appeal in issue did not fall within section 129(1) since the second respondent was not a participant in the licensing process. It followed that the limitation period provided under section 129(1) did not apply to the second respondent since, in the court’s view, that limitation only applied to a person appealing pursuant to section 129(1).
There was no evidence that the second respondent was barred from appealing by any other provision in the act or regulations. Accordingly, the court found that the second respondent was entitled under section 129(2) to appeal against the decision of the authority.
The Notice of Motion was dismissed.
This petition arose primarily out of a concern over the incidences of poaching of wildlife. The petitioners sought a clarification of whether the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) fell under the national security framework. The court had to decide whether uniformed officers of the KWS were officers of the National Police Service (NPS) and on the right of the petitioners to information, among others.
In dismissing the petition, the court held that the NPS and KWS were established under different legal regimes to discharge different functions and they operated under different chain of command structures. The court further noted that its mandate was limited to fill the legislative gaps and it could not supplant the intention of the legislative role. It observed that the petitioners in essence sought to change the law relating to the inclusion of KWS officers under the NPS. The court observed that the relief sought by the petitioners was better directed to the right forum namely, the legislature which held the legislative mandate. The court went on to hold that the applicant had to show that the information being sought had been denied in order te establish a violation of the petitioners’ access to information. It ound that as no request for such information had been made to the respondents, the enforcement of the right could not have crystallized.
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed with costs.
The matter dealt with an application seeking an order that the defendant be temporarily restrained from erecting, constructing and or use of the public toilet on the beach front near the plaintiff’s resort.
The court considered whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case with a probability of success to warrant the grant of a temporary injunction. The principle of public participation informs the requirement of submission of an Environmental Impact Assessment Report which gives individuals such as the applicant a voice in issues that may bear directly on their health and welfare and entitlement to a clean environment. In the absence of the report for the construction of the toilets approved by the National Environment Management Authority, the court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case with chances of success.
The court considered whether the construction of the public toilet next to the resort would cause adverse environmental effect thus devaluing the plaintiff's otherwise prime property. The court has the constitutional duty, at Article 70 (2) of the Constitution to prevent, stop or discontinue any act or omissions that is harmful to the environment. Accordingly, the court held that unless the order of injunction was granted as prayed, the plaintiff, and the users of the beach and the ocean were likely to suffer irreparable damage if the toilets were used before proper mechanisms were put in place to mitigate the environmental pollution that may have occurred.
The application was granted.
This was an application for judicial review wherein the applicants sought orders to quash the respondents’ decision to place an advertisement in the newspapers calling for applications for concessions in state forests, prohibition orders to prevent the respondent from actualizing any matters concerning the advertisement. They also sought an order of mandamus to compel the respondent to comply with constitutional provisions on the protection of forests.
The respondent argued that they had taken the action in accordance with s 37(2) of the Forest Act.
The court determined whether the respondent had complied with the law in making the decision.
The court interpreted s 37(2) and established that before the board takes a decision to place an advertisement for concessions, it must be satisfied that the forests will be efficiently managed through such concession or license and for the board to be satisfied, factors such as public views and opinion, should be taken into account before the decision is made.
The court found that the respondent had not made provision for public participation, yet it was constitutionally bound to do so and thus failed to comply with the law.
Accordingly, the court granted the orders sought by the applicants.
The matter dealt with an application for a temporary order of injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on the business of a student hostel and a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the student hostel.
The court considered whether the plaintiff met the requirements for the grant of a temporary injunction which entails firstly, establishing a prima facie case and secondly, determining whether there was irreparable damage likely to be caused to the plaintiff that cannot be compensated by way of damages, if an injunction is not granted.
Firstly, the exclusive use of the premises as a students’ hostel, from its previous use as a catering school was a material change of use. Approval was required before the commencement of any development or material change of use of land. Therefore, the defendant was in breach of the relevant planning and environmental laws.
Secondly, the injury to the plaintiff would be of a continuing nature and no amount of damages could ever adequately compensate for harm being caused to the physical and social environment, nor could it buy one’s peace of mind. The plaintiff thereby established a prima facie case to warrant the grant of an order of temporary injunction.
The court considered whether the plaintiff showed any special circumstances to entitle it to the mandatory injunction sought. The court held that the mandatory injunction sought would amount to determining the matter with finality before it proceeded to trial. Consequently, the said prayer was denied.
Consequently, the application partially succeeded.
The court considered an urgent application for spoliation orders (common law remedy) against the first to eleventh respondents or alternatively, an eviction order against them.
The thirteenth respondent purchased three farms which were adjacent to land which was incorporated in a communal area falling under the jurisdiction of the first applicant, a traditional authority. These farms were intended to be incorporated into the communal land falling under the applicant’s jurisdiction. The Government of Namibia initiated the process of incorporating these farms into the communal area under the first applicant through a notice published in the Government Gazette pursuant to the provisions of the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002.
The issue facing the court was whether the first to eleventh respondents had the prerogative to occupy the farms with their cattle grazing on them, without authority to do so. The respondents argued that the applicant lacked locus standi (capacity) to bring the application since the land had not yet been incorporated into the communal area by way of notice in the Government Gazette, as required by the act, thus the applicant did not have jurisdiction over the land.
The application for spoliation was refused because the applicant could not show deprivation of possession by reason of the respondents’ occupation which predates its possession and control. Thus, the court found that the respondents could not establish any right to be on the farms.
The eviction order was granted with costs.
The matter focused on the lawfulness of the removal of fencing surrounding land for agricultural purposes in a communal area.
The respondent, Ohangwena Communal Board, established under s 2 of the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002 removed fencing erected by the applicant, around a tract of agricultural land in a communal area, which the applicant alleged had been duly allocated to him in 1986.
The applicant approached the High Court on an urgent basis for an interdict to restrain the board from removing the fencing surrounding the grazing farm and from disposing of the fencing material which had already been removed.
The applicant maintained that in terms of s 18(b) read with s 28(2)(b) and 28(3) of the act, he is entitled to retain the fences which he had erected on and around the farm. The court found that the applicant had erected the perimeter fence prior to the coming into force of the Act and his intention to apply for authorisation for the retention of the perimeter fence, meant that the removal of the fence by the respondent was unlawful and in conflict with the act.
Given the entitlement to retain a fence if the statutory requisites in s 28(80) are met, it would be unlawful for boards to remove such fencing where applicants intend to make such application prior to the expiration of the period set by the Minister pursuant to s 18.
The interdictory relief was granted.