The Environmental Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from 10 African countries on topics relating to environmental law, both substantive and procedural. The collection focuses on cases where an environmental interest interacts with governmental or private interests.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-area expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
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This was an appeal against the validity of an order to the Land Valuation Board to assess the compensation payable in respect of buildings and farms belonging to inhabitants of an old village.
The facts of this case were that the appellant, a mining company, requested the respondents and other inhabitants of a village, which adjoined its mining area, to vacate the village and paid them compensation for their buildings, which were later demolished. Section 71 of the Minerals and Mining Act, 1986, provided for compensation for disturbances to owners and occupiers of lands affected by mineral operations. The appellant argued that this compensation was limited to areas within the mineral operations and that these areas were not land designated within its mining lease.
The Supreme Court considered the lawfulness of the board’s decision to award further compensation under s71 of the act. It found that since the mining operations of the appellant affected the owners or occupiers of land they were entitled to statutory compensation. The court stated that whereas compensation for the buildings of the respondents was settled by agreement with the appellants, as permitted under s71(3) of the act, compensation for the disturbance of their farming activities at the old village was mandatory under the act.
The court, however, stated that the lower courts came to the right conclusion but their reasons were not sound in law. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed but the reasons were substituted for the Supreme Court’s decision.
This was an appeal to the Supreme Court on a judgment of the High Court which had dismissed an application for the review and setting aside of a decision by the respondent to refuse the importation of Mountain Reedbuck from South Africa into Namibia.
The appellant cited the respondent, pursuant to his duties, powers and functions as set out in the Nature Conservation Ordinance No. 4 of 1975. The appellant placed particular emphasis on his duty to consider and decide on the importation of live game from South Africa in accordance with Section 49(1) of the ordinance as amended by Section 12 of Act 5 of 1996. The evidence revealed that the decision to refuse the import of Mountain Reedbuck was made by a subordinate official who was not authorised to do so and based on a new policy which had not been communicated to the appellant.
The court found out that this issue hinged on the confusion surrounding the parties involved, the reasons for the refusal and the failure of the respondent to abide by Rule 53 of the Rules of the High Court and Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution linked to administrative justice and the doctrine of “reasonable expectation”. The court held that the subordinate official acting on behalf of the respondent did not have the authority to make the decision which was set aside. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded, and the court directed the respondent to issue the permits applied for and pay the appellant’s costs.
This case was an appeal in the Supreme Court of Namibia against a judgment that dismissed the application brought by the appellants on an urgent basis and discharging a court order issued on 5 May 2000. This matter concerned provisions of the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act No. 33 of 1992. An Exclusive Prospecting Licence 2101 (EPL 2101) was transferred to the third respondent, involved in diamond mining, on 25 June 1997 but it was alleged that its renewal happened without any notice to the landowner, involved in growing and marketing grapes, and who is one of the appellants in the case. The third respondent intended to excavate four pits of which two were situated within the area demarcated for further grape cultivation.
The appeal focused on three main issues, namely the constitutionality of Part XV of the Minerals Act, the review application regarding the renewal of EPL 2101 in 1998 and the application based on the provisions of section 52 of the same act.
The court concluded that Part XV was enacted in the public interest and for a legitimate object and is a reasonable mechanism whereby similar contesting rights are balanced to ensure equal protection of those rights in terms of the Constitution. It was on this basis that it could not be said that the provisions of Part XV of the Minerals Act are unconstitutional. Accordingly, the appellants’ appeal was dismissed with costs including those for the postponement of the appeal and further argument.
In this High Court case, the applicant had an agreement with the respondent aimed at selling a herd of cattle to the applicant. Based on this agreement, the respondent proceeded to take the herd of cattle presented in the contract without paying for them. An attempt to charge the respondent for theft through the police did not work as the police hesitated to prosecute the respondent because they contended that they would have a weak case.
Then, the applicant decided to prosecute the case privately charging the respondent for spoliation. The applicant demanded that the court should declare that the herd of cattle that were taken by the respondent, in fact belonged to him.
Thus, the issue for determination by the court was to show cause why a declaration should not be made against the respondent to the effect that the herd of cattle be restored to the applicant.
On perusal of the given evidence, the High Court held that the respondent failed to show that the applicant allowed him to take the herd of cattle in dispute. Subsequently, the applicant was despoiled of the herd of cattle, that is, possession should be restored to the applicant. The respondent was also ordered to hand over to the applicant the progeny of the cattle forming the subject matter of the proceedings.
This was an appeal against a judgment of the High Court which ordered the appellants to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on 10 November 2006 and later became an order of court. The first appellant was an elected body established in terms of the Regional Councils Act 22 of 1992. The first respondent was a voluntary association representing 104 members out of 110 persons who were lessees of sites in a holiday resort and fishing village of Wlotzkasbaken under the jurisdiction of the first appellant.
The first appellant advertised plots for lease without distinguishing between those already leased to the respondents and other vacant sites, which aggrieved the respondents and was interpreted as a breach of their right of pre-emption. The issues for determination were: the meaning of clause 2 of the 2006 agreement in the context of previous agreements and whether the advertisement was signaling an intention to no longer be bound by the 2006 agreement.
The court deduced that the agreements showed that in each instance the parties agreed to certain rights which would ensure that those existing leaseholders would be able, if so advised, to convert their lease holding into property rights. In their agreement with the appellants, the respondents acquired the right to have all the plots sold once the township was proclaimed. Therefore, the intention to lease those plots was a breach of the right of the respondents. Accordingly, the appellants’ appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court considered an application for eviction of the respondents from certain homestead and fields allegedly owned by the applicant.
The applicant contended that he was the owner in terms of Swazi law and custom, and that the land on which the homestead was built was allocated to his father through a traditional method of land acquisition. He further argued that the respondents claim was based on the fact that their parents were asked to look after the homestead in the past by the applicant’s mother.
The respondents alleged that the property was allocated to their grandparents. They argue that the second respondent’s father gave the applicant three fields where he built his homestead, after the applicant had come to the land asking for a piece of it.
The court found that the dispute relating to the ownership of the land had been the subject of debate for years and had already been dealt with by the royal council, who had made a decision in favour of the second respondent.
The court held that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, because of the nature of the application and the fact that the council had previously ruled on the boundary between the two homesteads. It held that the applicant should have approached the council instead of the court to address its concerns.
The court considered an appeal against the judgment of the court below declaring the defendant a tenant, alternatively a licensee of the plaintiff, as well as determining the 2nd defendant’s misgivings concerning the costs awarded against him.
The defendant argued that the land devolved on the chief but was subject to use by both parties’ families. The second defendant was joined as a co-defendant, alleging that the land was founded by his ancestor and that he and his predecessors had been in undisputed possession.
The defendants argued that the judgment was granted erroneously as the trial judge failed to correctly define the boundaries between the parties’ land.
The court found that the trial court had adequately defined the boundaries between the parties’ land and that the first defendant’s ancestor and his people had lived on the land for over 300 years. Thus, although the plaintiffs are the land owners, the defendants are in possession and their possessionary rights should not be disturbed by an injunction.
The court found that in a case that has been on the list for 25 years, costs of ¢1,200,000.00 against 1st Defendant and ¢950,000.00 against 2nd Defendant awarded by the Court in my view is stretching judicial generosity to it limit. I am unable to review the costs mulcted against the Defendants. The appeal by the 2nd Defendant/appellant fails as well as that of the Plaintiff/appellant. In the circumstances the judgment of the lower Court is affirmed.
The court considered an appeal against the decision of the High Court, in which the trial judge accepted the appellant’s case that the conduct of the respondent in ordering the seizure of her fish, and subsequently dealing with it in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner, was unlawful and consequently made an award in her favour for damages, but directed that the appellant pays the appropriate custom duties on the fish.
The issues facing the trial court was whether or not the seizure was lawful, whether the quantum of damages awarded in favour of the appellant was correct and whether the trial court was right to order that the respondent-cross-appellant pay custom duties.
The court held that the appellant suffered damages equivalent not to the cost price but fair market value of the fish. Therefore, it was just for the said amount to attract interest at the prevailing exchange rate from the date of the wrong. Since the fish were wrongfully dealt with by the respondent, there was no merit in the cross appeal.
Finally, the court dismissed the appeal of the appellant as well as the cross appeal of the respondent and affirmed the decision of the court below, however, ordered a variation, in relation to the award of damages and the payment of interest on the custom duties by the respondent.
In this Supreme Court case, the first respondent applied for the permit to drill boreholes in the Khan River for uranium mining activities. Subsequently, the second respondent granted the rights to use the boreholes and the water to the first respondent allegedly in the exercise of its powers provided under the Water Act of 1954. The appellant’s case against the respondents was that the wildlife on its farm depended on the naturally occurring underground water to support natural habitats. Overusing the water from the rare sources in the area would, therefore, disturb the ecosystem.
At the High Court level, the issue was to determine whether under the act the second respondent had the powers to grant such rights. The High Court held that the powers to grant such rights were limited to subterranean waters. Moreover, the court held that since under the act sections 27, 28 and 30, the president proclaims the underground waters. The president had never declared the areas allocated to the first respondent as such the permits were a nullity. As a result, there was nothing to be determined by the court in favour of the appellant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the permit issued was a nullity. However, it held that the High Court ought to have decided the case in favour of the appellant since, in law, illegal acts can create reviewable actions. Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the appellant’s claim.
The applicants brought a review to set aside the decision of the first respondent to declare the Malkerns area a town, due to failing to consult with the applicant prior to making this decision.
The minister published three notices, one in 1995 and one in 2010, which were not challenged as the first one did not affect the applicants and the second one was welcomed. The applicants contended that the third notice in 2012 was flawed for two reasons: (1) there was no schedule attached to it and (2) there was no commission of enquiry set to receive presentations from affected individuals.
The court considered whether the minister was bound in law to invite the applicants to make representations or objections before publishing the 2012 notice, and if so, whether the minister did so.
The court found that the minister’s intention in terms of the 2012 notice was to declare the Malkerns a town. It became clear that the minister made her declaration in terms of the Building Act and not the Urban Government Act, and she did so without extending invitation for objection or input from the applicants who would have been prejudiced by her decision.
The court found that instead of making invitation, for objection or input, which the minister failed to do, she declared the area a controlled area, which was grossly irregular. The court held that the conduct of the minister was not within her powers as she made the declaration in terms of two separate pieces of legislation which she tried to use interchangeably. Thus, the decision by the minister was reviewable and set aside.
This was a Supreme Court case that revolved around an agreement between the parties which was suddenly terminated. The agreement demanded that the respondent to import oil resources on behalf of the Government of Namibia. The arrangement proved to be failure as the cost of importing petroleum was high against the market price. Consequently, the first appellant, acting in ministerial capacity decided to end the agreement. The first respondent felt aggrieved and filed a suit in the High Court, asking it to review the decision of the cabinet that terminated the said contract.
As such, the main issue, in this case, was whether the cabinet of the government of the Republic of Namibia acted lawfully when it revoked the mandate of the respondents to import petroleum products. The High Court in determining this issue held that the cabinet had no legally tenable reason(s) to end the contract in question.
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court held that under the Namibian Constitution in article 27(2), the executive power of the Republic of Namibia vests in the president and the cabinet. It further held that under the article, the cabinet has the role of supervising the activities of the government departments. Since the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth respondents are government parastatals the cabinet justifiably exercised its regulatory powers in the best interest of the Namibian people.
The Supreme Court thus overturned the decision of the High Court and accordingly upheld the appeal.
The court considered an interlocutory appeal against the ruling, which the appellant contended that the High Court erred on several grounds by allowing the second respondent to continue to fell and extract timber from the subject matter of the suit, whilst the suit remained undetermined.
The Minister for Lands and Forestry decided to review all Timber Utilization Contracts due to alleged irregularities in the allocation. The cabinet gave the approval and accordingly the contracts of 42 allotees, including the appellant, was cancelled or revoked. The concession, which was revoked from the appellant, was granted to the second respondent as a replacement.
The court had to determine whether the appellant was entitled to an order of injunction.
The court relied on Order 25 rule 1(1) of C.I. 47 which states that a party who applies for injunction must show that he has a right, legal or equitable, which must be protected.
The court found that that the appellant was not entitled to an order of injunction. The court found out that the appellant’s allocation having been cancelled, he appeared by his conduct to have accepted the cancellation, and waited until the concession had been allocated to the second respondent, so he was left with no other right in the concession, which this court or the trial court could protect in his favour.
Consequently, the court was satisfied that there was no merit in the appeal and accordingly dismissed it, and affirmed the decision of the court below.
In this Court of Appeal case, the court determined who breached the contract of oil supply between the appellant and the respondent. The contract ran into a deadlock after three deliveries of the product when the appellants refused to accept one of the respondents’ deliveries upon presentation. The reason given for the resultant stalemate was that the product was not of the specification ordered.
The court below had penalised the appellant for unnecessarily breaching a contract. The appellant felt aggrieved and appealed to seek an overturn of the trial court’s judgment entered in favour of the respondents.
The Court of Appeal thus determined if there was a variation in the contract, when did that occur and also what did the variation entail.
In response, the Court of Appeal held that there was nothing on record to persuade the court that the respondent product was not of the specification ordered. The court thus maintained the decision of the court below. However, the Court of Appeal noted that the cost granted in the court below was exorbitant. In the end, the court dismissed the appellant case, but the costs awarded in the court below was accordingly varied.
The matter concerned the importation of fish, whereby letters of credit were opened at the appellant bank, by the 1st defendant on behalf of the respondent for the importation, which the respondent had sought to cancel.
The court considered the relationships between the parties and found that the opening of the letters of credit created a relationship between the bank, and the respondent, and also imposed on the appellant an obligation to ensure the rights of the respondent were protected. The court found that the appellant failed to do so and resultantly could not escape liability.
The court held that where a duty exists, it must be faithfully observed, since breach thereof would result in damages. The duty owed to the respondent was established with the opening of the letters of credit. This created an obligation on the part of the appellant to keep to the clear terms, under which the letters of credit were to operate. Accordingly, the court found that it was the appellant’s duty to ensure that the terms thereunder were kept.
The court held that where, in a commercial transaction or a contractual relationship, a party signs a disclaimer, then that party by virtue of the disclaimer avoids liability for breach. The court found that the appellant bank, by implication, withdrew their earlier instructions, through their acceptance of the explanations given by the correspondent bank ,and that fact amounted in effect, to not giving any instructions at all.
This Supreme Court case concerned an appeal against the ruling of the High Court that found the appellant guilty primarily on counts of: (1) theft of unpolished diamonds in contravention of section 74 of Act 13 of 1999; alternatively, possession of unpolished diamonds in contravention of section 30(11) of Act 13 of 1999; (2) robbery; (3) malicious damage to property; and 4) escaping before being locked up in contravention of section 51(1) of Act 51 of 1977.
The appellant was primarily charged in the High Court for stealing unpolished diamonds and fleeing arrest. He was convicted on all the counts and sentenced to both a jail term and payment of fine
The appellant felt aggrieved and appealed to the Supreme Court mainly on the ground that the prosecution side failed to establish that the mining company was the lawful owner of the alleged stolen diamond.
The court held that the evidence obtained from the surveillance cameras clearly showed that the unpolished diamond that the appellant was trying to steal was discovered and recovered from him. The court held that he was caught right at the exit of the mining site. So generally, the mining company was the one licensed to exploit and trade the diamond in that area the court a quo was justified to take a judicial notice that the diamonds belonged to the complainant.
The court therefore refrained from disturbing both the conviction and the sentence of the High Court, so the appeal was dismissed.
This Supreme Court case revolved around exploration prospecting licenses (EPL) provided by the first appellant, to the second appellant and the respondent over different mining groups of nuclear resources but in the same land.
At the High Court, the respondent challenged the first appellant’s action (the responsible minister) for giving prospecting and mining rights to another company over an area that the respondent had an EPL agreement to operate in. The High Court had quashed the first appellant’s decision in favour of the second appellant, asserting that the first appellant in offering the EPL agreement to the second appellant did not consider the interest of the respondent as required per sections 68(h) and 69(2)(c)(i) of the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act of 1992. Aggrieved, the appellants appealed.
On appeal, the main issue for consideration was whether the first appellant was justified to issue EPL over an area that the respondent had pre-existing EPL. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court stating that the first appellant was duty-bound to take into consideration the provisions of ss 68(h) and 69(2)(c)(i) of the act which requires regard to be given on what impact will the additional activities have on the existing EPL holders. The Supreme Court held that natural justice requires that a hearing must be given to the person(s) already holding EPL over an area likely to be affected with subsequent EPLs. In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision and dismissed the appeal with costs.
The court considered an appeal against an injunction to restrain the appellants from going onto the disputed land to demarcate, dig, construct etc. any tree on the land until the action had been finally determined. The court considered, 1) the weight of evidence and 2) the capacity of the respondent.
The respondent obtained a customary grant of land 22 years before the action. Later, he obtained a formal lease and was reallocated additional acres of land, which was used to cultivate cash and food crops. Due to development in the area, the respondent’s land was whittled away. The respondent alleged that the appellants trespassed on his land and undertook various activities such as alienation of portions of his land, in the premise.
On the ground of capacity, it was found that once a party’s capacity had been challenged, it should be determined as a preliminary point and the suit can only be heard after this is determined. The court held that the appellants did not raise capacity as a preliminary issue and as such, the manner in which it was raised was a ploy to confuse the trial judge.
On ground of the weight of evidence, the court found that if the injunction had not been granted, the respondents land would have been pillaged and its nature entirely changed. Thus, an injunction was necessary to ensure that irreparable damage was not caused.
The court found that the trial judge exercised his discretion properly and thus the appeal was dismissed and remitted to the trial court for continuation.
This was an appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court. The case concerned a ministerial notice stating that nuclear energy prospecting licenses regarding certain areas will not be provided. The appellant was allegedly an aspiring applicant. He thus felt aggrieved with the notice.
In the High Court, it was held that the appellant lacked legal capacity to challenge the notice as the notice did not create any triable issue. Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Thus, the main issue for determination was whether the respondent's notice exempting certain areas from being prospected for nuclear resources was unconstitutional. The appellant’s argument was that the denial of the prospecting license violated his constitutional right to work.
In response, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court decision, but it disagreed with the High Court that the respondent lacked the legal capacity. According to the Supreme Court, the appellant would have been successful if the minister had no statutory powers to issue the notice or if the process was procedural. However, the minister had such powers under section 122(1) of the Mineral (Prospecting and Mining) Act of 1992. Consequently, the Court held that it cannot order the minister to issue the license if the notice is still in existence. Also, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision on the right to work does not mean that people can conduct mining activities without being regulated given the environmental challenges.
Following this, the appellant's case was dismissed with costs.
The court considered an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, staying the proceedings of the High Court.
The origin of the appeal was an application for a mandatory injunction, against the respondent, for disturbing the “natural calm flow” of the Volta River, into the sea, while executing their contractual obligations (marine reclamation). The Respondent appealed 3 interlocutory applications in the High Court, which appeals were still pending.
The stay was granted to the respondents following an application for judgment to be entered against them.
The appellant raised six grounds of appeal, however the court held that the determination of one main issue would dispose of the appeal. Thus, the court had to determine whether the Court of Appeal erred in granting the stay of proceedings.
The court noted that all the interlocutory orders were on appeal before the Court of Appeal. The court found that the court of appeal was right to halt the proceedings, since the determination of the interlocutory orders could have a serious effect on the case before the High Court.
It was further noted that an order staying proceedings is interlocutory, and discretionary and should not be interfered with unless it might result in serious injustice. The court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the discretion exercised would result to injustice.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Civil Procedure ̶ Action by Appellant claiming damages for negligence – Bus conductor throws bottle under bus from which the Appellant has just alighted – Bus stamples over the stump of crushed bottle – Part of the bottle springs up and hits eye of the Appellant resulting in injury – Respondent raises plea of absolution from the instance on ground that the injury was not foreseeable – court a quo upholds the plea on ground that the bus conductor was not negligent as the damage caused was neither reasonably foreseeable nor preventable – whether court a quo applied proper test for absolution from the first instance – On appeal, held that on the evidence adduced the conduct of the bus conductor was negligent and the damage caused to the Appellant was reasonably foreseeable and preventable – Appeal allowed with costs – Matter remitted back to the court a quo, to hear the Respondent’s case and determine the case on the merits.
The matter arose from a power purchase agreement entered into by the Government of Ghana and the first defendant for the rehabilitation of a power barge.
The court considered whether the agreement constituted an international business transaction, within the meaning of Article 181(5) of the Constitution.
The court held that a business transaction is “international” within the context of article 181(5) where the nature of the business which is the subject-matter of the transaction is international, in the sense of having a significant foreign element, or the parties to the transaction (other than the Government) have a foreign nationality or reside in different countries or, in the case of companies, the place of their central management and control is outside Ghana. Accordingly, the court held that the agreement constituted an international business transaction within the meaning of Article 181(5) of the Constitution.
The court considered whether or not the arbitration provisions of the agreement constituted an international business transaction within the meaning of article 181(5) of the Constitution. An international commercial arbitration is not by itself an autonomous transaction commercial in nature which pertains to or impacts on the wealth and resources of the country and is, therefore, difficult to conceive of as a transaction independent from the transaction that generated the dispute it is required to resolve.
Accordingly, the court found that the arbitration provisions did not constitute an international business transaction within the meaning of article 181(5) of the Constitution.
The case was remitted to the High Court to apply this court’s interpretation of article 181(5) in the proceedings before it.
This case concerned a long standing land dispute. The appellants herein appealed against the judgement by the Court of Appeal that reversed the judgement by the High Court was which went in favour of the appellants.
The appellants claim to the land was based on purchase from a third party. In support of their case, they presented a land certificate. The defendants contended that the land claimed by plaintiffs fell within their domain, so they counter claimed for a declaration of title.
The High Court found that the respondents failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that the land was rightfully theirs, as per the requirements of s11 of the Evidence Act of 1975. The appellants, however, proved their case.
The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court judgement, on the sole ground of a 1992 judgement that declared that the land belonged to the defendants.
The Supreme Court, therefore, had to reconsider the evidence and finally settle the dispute. The court found that a close reading of the 1992 judgement casts doubt on the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s position. It found that the 1992 judgement did not actually concern the land in question and that the Court of Appeal, therefore, erred in its finding. Further, upon review of the evidence, the court found that the balance of probabilities favored the appellants.
Accordingly, it restored the first judgement, with an adjustment to the amount of general damages.
Civil Procedure ̶ Application by Appellant for an order ejecting the Respondents from the land situate at Mhlaleni, directing the Respondents to demolish all structures they have constructed on the land and interdicting Respondent’s from carrying out any activities on the land – Dispute over the territorial jurisdiction over the area where land is situate – Plea of lis pendens raised by the Respondents - whether matter pending determination by the High Court or the traditional authorities – High Court upholds plea of lis pendens and orders status quo prevailing to be maintained pending determination by appropriate authority – Whether High Court erred in so holding – Whether High Court has jurisdiction to entertain matters relating to land pending before traditional authorities having regard to Section 151 (3) (b) of the Constitution - Held that High Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain matters in which a Swazi Court has jurisdiction, but High Court has only revisional and appellate juridiction as provided by Section 151 (3) of the Constitution - where a matter is pending or has been determined by the traditional authorities, the High Court must refer the matter back to those authorities for determination or enforcement – Decision of High Court upheld, and – Appeal dismissed with costs.
The court considered an urgent application for spoliation orders (common law remedy) against the first to eleventh respondents or alternatively, an eviction order against them.
The thirteenth respondent purchased three farms which were adjacent to land which was incorporated in a communal area falling under the jurisdiction of the first applicant, a traditional authority. These farms were intended to be incorporated into the communal land falling under the applicant’s jurisdiction. The Government of Namibia initiated the process of incorporating these farms into the communal area under the first applicant through a notice published in the Government Gazette pursuant to the provisions of the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002.
The issue facing the court was whether the first to eleventh respondents had the prerogative to occupy the farms with their cattle grazing on them, without authority to do so. The respondents argued that the applicant lacked locus standi (capacity) to bring the application since the land had not yet been incorporated into the communal area by way of notice in the Government Gazette, as required by the act, thus the applicant did not have jurisdiction over the land.
The application for spoliation was refused because the applicant could not show deprivation of possession by reason of the respondents’ occupation which predates its possession and control. Thus, the court found that the respondents could not establish any right to be on the farms.
The eviction order was granted with costs.
The matter focused on the lawfulness of the removal of fencing surrounding land for agricultural purposes in a communal area.
The respondent, Ohangwena Communal Board, established under s 2 of the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002 removed fencing erected by the applicant, around a tract of agricultural land in a communal area, which the applicant alleged had been duly allocated to him in 1986.
The applicant approached the High Court on an urgent basis for an interdict to restrain the board from removing the fencing surrounding the grazing farm and from disposing of the fencing material which had already been removed.
The applicant maintained that in terms of s 18(b) read with s 28(2)(b) and 28(3) of the act, he is entitled to retain the fences which he had erected on and around the farm. The court found that the applicant had erected the perimeter fence prior to the coming into force of the Act and his intention to apply for authorisation for the retention of the perimeter fence, meant that the removal of the fence by the respondent was unlawful and in conflict with the act.
Given the entitlement to retain a fence if the statutory requisites in s 28(80) are met, it would be unlawful for boards to remove such fencing where applicants intend to make such application prior to the expiration of the period set by the Minister pursuant to s 18.
The interdictory relief was granted.
This was an appeal against the decision of the High Court to reverse the issuance of a mining licence the second appellant without hearing the respondents. The first appellant was the regional director responsible for providing mineral licenses and the second appellant was the mining company that had obtained a mining licence. The respondents wished to oppose the grant of the mining licence but a notice to the public which would have afforded them the opportunity to raise objections was not issue. The appellants contended that article 9 of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 did not provide such a duty. The respondents contended that the right to be heard was a natural right and therefore a silent section could not be deemed to oust it.
The Supreme Court considered whether interested parties, wishing to oppose an application by the holder of mineral rights for a mining licence in terms of sec 9 of the act, were entitled to raise environmental objections and be heard by the first appellant, The court held that the right to be heard was such a critical right that it could not be easily ignored and the critical nature of environmental issues at the global level demanded that the first appellant involve the public on environmental assessment measures taken. The court stated further that there was an obligation on the first appellant to provide allow for a hearing on any objections before a license could be issued. Accordingly, the appellants’ case was dismissed.
This case concerned parties who had competing interests (one being a luxury tourist lodge and the other one was a copper mine) over the same piece of land. They were undergoing litigation, which included a pending action before another court, in which the first and second respondent were seeking the eviction of the applicant from the property which they sold to the applicant in 2002.
The court considered an application to review and set aside a decision to grant the second respondent an environmental clearance certificate, as well as an interdict restraining them from taking any further action from using the mining rights already granted.
The applicant had earlier stated that they would launch urgent proceedings once they become aware that first and second respondent intend commencing mining activities. However, subsequent communication showed that there were no imminent mining activities. On this basis, the court found that the matter was not inherently urgent, and the application was therefore struck from the roll.
The court considered an application for a mandamus by the applicant, as a result of the respondents having applied for the consolidation and rezoning of 2 plots of land. The respondents had their application conditionally approved upon submitting an engineer’s drawing for the erection of retaining walls as part of flood protection and to create 54 client accessible parking bays.
The court considered if there was a contravention of s 44(5) of the applicant’s town planning scheme in accordance with the Town Planning Ordinance No 18 of 1954 as amended. Without drawing plans being submitted to the applicant for approval, the respondents admitted that a temporary corrugated iron wall was erected on the riverbank which was next to the two properties. On their own admission, the respondents did not create the 54 accessible parking bays.
The court found that the respondents failed to adhere to the condition of their approved application, so they were ordered to remove the illegally constructed corrugated iron wall, to submit an engineer’s drawing for the erection of the retaining walls to be constructed on the properties, within three months of the order. They were also ordered to construct the retaining wall within six months from the date of the approval by the applicant of the engineering drawing, as well as to remove all building materials and rubble from one plot in order to create 54 accessible parking bays on one of the properties. Respondents were ordered to pay applicant’s costs.
The matter dealt with an exception raised in the High Court of Namibia by the defendant to the plaintiff’s claim for damages for breach of duty to perform professional work. The plaintiff’s claim was that on account of the defendant’s breach, large quantities of effluent leaked out of the reticulation system beneath its bottling plant and it sustained damage to its property.
The main issue was when the plaintiff’s cause of action arose and if the plaintiff was the owner of the property at the time of the alleged damage. Under this issue the court sought to determine whether the pipes in question were damaged “after or upon installation”.
The defendant had argued that the plaintiff’s claim was not appropriate in delict as the breach was not wrongful for purposes of Aquilian liability. The defendant further claimed that the plaintiff did not have a proprietary interest in the property at the time of the alleged breach.
The court held that the duty of care of a professional could be extended to a person who later becomes the owner of a property as the damage to the pipes remained latent until discovered when the plaintiff acquired the property. The court further held that the Aquilian action forms a basis for such a remedy and that there were considerations of policy and convenience which prima facie allowed for an extension in the circumstances
Accordingly, the defendant’s application was dismissed with costs to the plaintiff.