The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
This was an appeal on a decision of the High Court determining the title of a land.
The court determined whether the judgment by the trial court was a nullity on grounds of being delivered after three months in contravention of s 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The court applied the rule that a judgment in such a case may only be nullified if the appellant can prove that the delay in the delivery caused a miscarriage of justice. The court observed that the trial court did not properly evaluate evidence of the witness and made a declaratory order where the identity of the land was unknown. Secondly, the court determined whether the trial court erred in relying on pleadings that were amended and the court found that the trial court caused a miscarriage of justice for doing so. Finally, the court determined whether the trial court erred by declaring the title of the disputed land in favour of the respondents and resolved the issue in favour of the appellant.
Accordingly, the appeal succeeded, the judgment of the High Court was set aside and an order as to costs was made against the respondents.
The matter involved a dispute concerning the nature and validity of the transaction between the defendant, a government-owned limited liability company, and Karpower. The matter revolved around the interpretation given to the phrase ‘international transaction’ in article 181 of the Constitution, a phrase whose effect is that the transaction required parliamentary approval.
The first question that faced the court concerned jurisdiction. The court relied on ample case law to arrive at the position that the Supreme Court is not a clearing house to assume jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to other lower courts. It noted that jurisdiction would only be exercised where it is manifestly clear and obvious that the cases are deserving.
Substantively, the court then had to consider the legal nature of the defendants in order to ascertain whether they were the alter ego of the government. After scrutinising the relevant transactions, the court reasoned that it was clear that the defendants, as juristic persons, had the capacity to enter into the transactions they entered into with the relevant institutions without seeking parliamentary approval as stipulated in article 181 (5) of the Constitution.
The court concluded that given the established interpretation of ‘international transaction’ and the legal nature of the defendants, the nature of transaction between the first defendants and Karpowership does not constitute an international business transaction with a government. It therefore did not require compliance with article 181 (5) of the Constitution.
The court dismissed the application.
The Fees and Charges Act (the act) calculated the plaintiff’s rent for five mining leases. The plaintiff challenged the Minister of Finance’s authority to amend the legislation.
Issue one: whether the Administrator of Stool Lands had any role to play in fixing annual ground rents. The court held that the Administrator did not fix the rates, but wrote to demand payment.
Issue two: whether the administrator was part of a review team that recommended the adjustments, amounting to prescribing annual ground rent. The administrator provided an advisory opinion with no legal force.
Issue three: whether the grant of power to the Minister of Finance was unconstitutional. A schedule forms part of an act. Subordinate legislation cannot amend an act; however, this rule is not invariable regarding schedules. Acts may empower another to revise the contents of a schedule, and this power must be expressly conferred by Parliament. It was found that it was.
Issue four: whether or not the Fees and Charges Instruments contravened the act and the Constitution. The Minister of Finance was empowered to amend the schedule in fixing fees and charges; however the inclusion of the administrator in the amended list was inconsistent with the Constitution, and void to the extent of this inclusion
Issue five: whether the power conferred on the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources was transferred to the Minister of Finance. The court held that no such transfer of power occurred.
Issue six: whether the failure by the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources to exercise the power conferred on him in the act violated the Constitution. The Minister of Mines was empowered in terms of the act; however the parties incorrectly cited the Minister of Lands.
The Minister of Mines was ordered to fix the fees and charges under the act.
The matter involves an application brought by judicial service staff’s union (plaintiff) over a dispute about their pension scheme and benefits.
First the court had to determine whether the phrase ‘all persons serving in the Judiciary’ applies in exclusion of non-bench judicial service staff and whether the plaintiff’s members were constitutionally subjected to the CAP 30 pension scheme or the SSNIT scheme. First, it established the consistent meaning of ‘judiciary’ in the constitution as that body that exercises judicial power and administers justice. The constitutional definition of judiciary therefore did not include non-bench judicial staff. The effect thus is that the plaintiff’s members were not placed under the CAP 30 pension scheme since they did not belong to the constitutionally-delineated class constituting the Judiciary. It should be noted, however, a dissenting opinion took on a more expansive approach that included the non-bench staff. Nevertheless, the court concluded the placing of the plaintiff’s members on the SSNIT scheme was not wrongful or in constitutional violation.
On the questions of discrimination, the court reasoned that as employment matters are purely contractual, the conduct of differential treatment in employment conditions did not amount to discrimination. It did, however, in holding for the plaintiff, decry the inconsistencies with best practices in remuneration management and constitutional procedures.
The court also held for the plaintiff by finding that the President could not delegate his function under arts 149 and 158(2) as this would be unconstitutional. Further, it also found ss 213(1)(a) and 220 of Act 766 to be unconstitutional to the extend it conflicts with constitutional provisions.