The Commercial Case Law Index is a collection of judgments from African countries on topics relating to commercial legal practice. The collection aims to provide a snapshot of commercial legal practice in a country, rather than present solely traditionally "reportable" cases. The index currently covers 400 judgments from Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa.
Get started on finding judgments that are relevant to you by browsing the topic list on the left of the screen. Click the arrows next to the topic names to reveal a detailed list of sub-topics. Most judgments are accompanied by a short summary written by subject-matter expert postgraduate students from the University of Cape Town.
Two parties both claimed ownership to land, both believing they were first to cultivate the land. The court considered an appeal from a judgment that held neither the appellants or respondents were entitled to land in dispute. When the matter was appealed, it was remitted back to the trial court. There was a dispute over the lower court’s decision to remit the case to the trial court to consider the evidence.
The court held that the court has no power to grant a party relief that was not pleaded. However, an appellate court has the inherent power to order a retrial or remittance of a case for whatever purposes, even if this was not pleaded. In this case however, the court held that the previous appellate court was wrong to remit the case back because the trial court had already evaluated the evidence.
The court emphasised that the court must not absolve itself of its duty to carefully evaluate evidence and determine a matter on its merits. The burden of proof lies on the person who alleges, and he must lead credible and cogent evidence to support his claim.
The court held that the applicant had not proven their claim to the land and the respondent, who led credible and cogent evidence about the ownership of the land, was entitled to the property in question.
In this case two parties claimed a right to land and had evidence to prove their ownership. The court considered a cross-appeal from a judgment that held neither were entitled to land. The court below relied on a traditional oath and made concurrent findings of fact.
A traditional oath is a statement of fact that is made in writing and sworn to be the truth which are used in customary and Islamic law. The court held that the trial court could not rely on the traditional oath as this was not the only basis upon which the title to land could be determined. Because the court was not exercising jurisdiction over Islamic law, they could not rely on the oath as the basis for determining who owned the land when neither party proves their case.
An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the trial court unless it is shown that that finding was not supported by evidence or reached by the wrong consideration of evidence or incorrect application of legal principles.
Further, appellate courts should not readily set aside the concurrent findings of the courts unless it is clear that such finding, was made on an erroneous or perverse basis. Where there are concurrent findings of facts sufficient evidence on record in support, the court cannot set aside the findings unless the findings are found to be perverse or are not supported by evidence or were reached as a result of wrong application of a principle of law or of procedure.
The court also dismissed the findings of the trial court relating to the concurrent findings.
The appellant was charged and found guilty of obtaining money under false pretenses; he then brought an appeal against the ruling of the High Court before the appellate court.
The court was faced with two issues, the first being whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant on allegations of misrepresentation not covered in the charge. The second issue was whether the high court was correct to convict the appellant for misrepresentation and seize his property.
The court held that the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant and that the allegations of misrepresentation were covered in the charge. The court further held that the High Court made no error in seizing the appellant’s property following the conviction.
By evaluating witness testimonies and the evidence led in the High Court, the court stated that the appellant had indeed misrepresented himself to the witnesses so they could part with monies and invests with the appellant. The court was of the view that sufficient evidence was led in the High Court which justified the conviction of the appellant. Regarding the seizure of property, the court stated that the High Court exercised its inherent powers to make an order of forfeiture since the appellant bought and used the property to carry out his illegal operations for which he was convicted.
The appeal was unsuccessful and the judgement of the High Court (conviction and sentence) was upheld.
The case concerned an appeal of the High Court’s judgment regarding ownership of a house and the relevance of legislation relating to public officers in so far as the case was concerned.
The court considered whether the case before the High Court was a land matter and whether legislation relating to public officers was applicable to the case.
The court held that the case was indeed a land matter and that legislation relating to public officers that bars claims against public officers was not applicable to the case.
The court examined legislation and previous judgments and concluded that the legislation relating to public officers that barred claims against public officers due to prescription was not applicable to the case in the High Court because it was a land matter. The court stated that issues relating to land recovery, breach of contract and claims for work done were some of the exceptions to the application of the statute that barred claims against public officers. The court stated that since the subject matter of the case before the High Court concerned a house, it meant that the matter related to the recovery or retention of land or property.
Consequently, the appeal succeeded, the ruling of the High Court set aside, and the matter was remitted to the High Court to be heard afresh.
The case concerned an appeal against the ruling of the High Court relating to land ownership.
Based on the evidence adduced in the High Court, the court had to consider whether the appellant and the respondent proved their respective cases and whether the land in question was clearly described during the trial.
The court held that only the appellant was able to prove his case and that the land in question was clearly identified by the appellant.
The court went on to state that the appellant was able to prove title to the land in question through his grandfather and that the respondents did not dispute the claim. Furthermore, the respondents asserted in their pleadings that the land in question was acquired by the state but failed to discharge the burden that rested on them in proving so. The court ruled in favour of the appellant in so far as him being able to clearly identify and describe the land in question.
The appeal succeeded, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. The court confirmed that the title of the land vested in the appellant and granted a perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from trespassing on the land.
The court considered whether the evidence led in the court below was properly evaluated. This case concerned whether the court below erred in assessing the weight of evidence accordingly and considered the personal opinion of the judicial officer when adjudicating the matter.
The court found that the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of a trial court, who has the opportunity of seeing, hearing and assessing the witnesses and their respective evidence. Once determining that, the court will evaluate the evidence and justifiably assess the facts.
The court found that the evidence that was led was properly before the court below and that their findings were based purely on the evidence. Thus, the issue of substitution of opinion into evidence was clarified where the appeal court found that the court below applied the law to the proved facts and that cannot be considered to amount to a substitution of opinion.
The court considered whether the court below properly evaluated the evidence, and were they correct in expunging the evidence. Furthermore, it looked at whether the doctrine of waiver had been correctly applied.
This case looked at whether the revocation of the property as well as the sale of the property was null and void.
The court considered s 83(1)(b), 2(a) and (5) of the Evidence Act and found that a wrongly admitted piece of evidence is not a sacrosanct, it is still subject to scrutiny by the appellate court.
The court found that inadmissible evidence ought not to be admitted, even by mistake, and if it is, the appeal court ought to consider the case on the legally admissible evidence and preclude that which is inadmissible.
It is trite that the evaluation of evidence is essentially the function of the trial judge, where the trial judge has unquestionably evaluated the evidence before him and ascribed probative value to it, it is not the business of the appeal court to disturb such findings of fact, unless the findings are perverse.
In considering the doctrine of waiver, it was found that waiver means that the person in whose favour a benefit or right exists, is aware of those rights or benefits, but chooses to freely not take advantage of those rights or benefits. Thus, the doctrine of waiver could not be applied.
This case concerns a vast tract of land which belongs to the Oloto Royal Family of Lagos, of whom the appellant is traditional monarch and head of family. The appellant sought to set aside a conveyance on the grounds that the deeds of conveyance were fraudulently executed. The court considered whether reliance on the presumptions raised in ss 123 and 150(1) Evidence Act (the act) was justifiable where the purported vendors did not sign the deeds. The court also considered whether the lower court was correct to have sustained the plea of laches and acquiescence against the appellant.
The court held the claimant bears the burden of proof for ownership of land. Further, in terms of s 150(1) of the act, when any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that there was compliance with the formal requisites. The court held that in considering the doctrine of laches the plaintiffs must also consider acquiescence on the plaintiffs' part and any change of the position that has occurred on the defendant's part.
The court found that the respondents failed to tender the original copy of the conveyance containing the actual signatures of the vendors; therefore, reliance on s 123 and s 150(1) of the act is not justifiable. The court also found that the court of equity would come to the aid of the respondent and hold it unconscionable to uproot the respondent from the land.
Accordingly, the appeal succeeded in part, the court set aside the decision by the lower court that the conveyance documents are valid as per the Evidence Act.
The appellant sought to enforce a retainer agreement which was dismissed in the trial court because it lacked jurisdiction and the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal considered whether the case was an abuse of court process.
The court held that an appeal is a continuation of a matter and there must be a complete cause of action. Further, the concept of abuse of court process is fluid and imprecise. Improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interferewith due process of administration of justice.
The court found the action of the appellant, in this case, was not properly instituted and premature therefore an abuse of court process. Further, if the court were to determine the claims of the appellant while the eventual decision of the Supreme Court of appeal is pending, such a decision would have overreached the eventual outcome of the SupremeCourt.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the action.
The appellant challenged the decision of lower court where the respondent as judgement creditor was granted an order for revalidation of the judgement and an order for compliance judgment. On the appeal, the issue was whether the application was time-barred and grounds to grant the appeal.
The court held that money judgments automatically expire after ten years, therefore, the judgment creditor must file revalidation before the expiration of the ten years. Also held that judgements of courts remain valid until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The court found that the application is not statute barred and that the application had merit. The court ordered that the judgment on 12 March 2001 remained valid and that the respondents to comply with the orders in the judgments.
On the cross-appeal, the issue was whether the judgment of 12 March 2001 is barred by Limitation Law of Bauchi State ss 16(1) and 16(2).
The court held that a judgment of a competent court is valid from the date of delivery until set aside by the court either on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or court of appeal. Moreso, rules of practice and procedure do not confer jurisdiction to extend the time for enforcement beyond ten years as stipulated in ss 16(1) and (2).
The court found that the lower court did not have statutory authority to extend the time for enforcement after the expiry of ten years.
The court dismissed the appeal.
The appellant, a federal government agency, claimed that the first respondent, in the lower court, sought relief while the matter was still pending in the high court and the jurisdiction was exclusive to the federal high court according to the constitution. The court considered whether the lower court had the jurisdiction for the withdrawal of a building plan that was an executive decision by the appellant.
The court held that s 230(1) of Decree 107 of 1993 (‘the decree’, now s 251 of the constitution) automatically ousted the jurisdiction of the Lagos State High Court. This provision gave the federal high court exclusive jurisdiction in administrative or executive decision by the federal government or its agencies. The court also held that any decision or proceedings emanating from such a court are a nullity.
The court found that the lower court did not have jurisdiction according to s 230(1) of the decree.
Accordingly, the court upheld the appeal.
The appellant claimed that a letter in dispute was not a contract but a proposal which outlined the services the respondent intended to render and the billing details. The court considered whether the statement of claim by the respondent disclosed a reasonable cause of action based on a binding contract. The other issue was whether the costs granted in the lower court were justifiable.
The court held that there must be a cause of action cognizable in law. In that light, an action founded on a contract must disclose the cause of action and court must restrict itself to the averments in the statement of claim. The court also held that costs follow the events and are compensatory in the court's discretion.
The court did not determine the existence of the contract because a valid and enforceable contract is a substantive issue that should be determined at trial. The court also found that since the requisite factual elements were present in the statement of claim, a cause of action existed despite weaknesses and unlikelihood of success of the case. The court also found that the trial court awarded the costs reasonably and by the law.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal.
The court considered whether the court below was correct in finding that the re-allocation of land was valid in law. Furthermore, it considered whether the below court was correct in finding that ownership could not be established, irrespective of a subsisting agreement and whether the court was correct in admitting inadmissible evidence.
The appellants alleged that they were staff of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (‘NITEL’) purchased flats from NITEL and occupied them with supporting letters to confirm their purchase. They subsequently discovered that a portion of their land had been re-allocated and used as a car park without their consent.
The court found that a party for a declaration of title of land must show the court clearly the area of land to which the claim relates. The court found that the appellants did not prove their title by failing to prove acts of ownership or long possession.
On the issue of ownership, the court considered the five requirements for a contract to be valid, namely, 1) offer, 2) acceptance, 3) consideration, 4) intention to create a legal relationship and 5) capacity to contract. These must co-exist for a contract to be formed in law. It was found that a valid sale agreement had been established, therefore denoting ownership.
The court found that the admission of evidence which was made during the pendency of the suit was inadmissible and should not have been relied upon by the court below.
The court considered whether the second respondent was a public officer as defined under s 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 (the act) and whether the revocation of the certificate of occupancy can be said to be for an overriding public interest as defined in s 28 of the Land Use Act.
This case concerned an appeal of the judgment of the court below, declining jurisdiction, whereby the appellant claimed ownership of the land.
It was argued that a minister does not fall within the confines of the definition of ‘public officer’ as contended in the act.
The court found that the act applies not only to public officers but also to public officials who hold their respective offices for, or in trust of the public, thus, the minister is a public officer as contemplated in the act. Therefore, a public officer is a member of the public service.
On the second point, the court held that s 28 of the Land Use Act gives the minister the power to revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest. Overriding public interest means the requirement of the land by the government of the state or by local government in the state, for public purpose within the state.
The court found that the revocation of the right of occupancy was valid and for overriding public interest.
The subject-matter of this appeal concerned the enforceability of an English court order on the parties’ dispute. The first and second respondents argued in the court below that the appellant and third respondent were in breach of the order of a lower court, and so they sought an order restraining its enforcement. The trial judge admitted a copy of the English court’s ruling but made further other orders affirming the subsistence of the lower court ruling which led the appellant to lodge an appeal on multiple grounds.
Regarding the main appeal, the court endorsed the first and second respondents’ argument that the third respondent ought to be compelled to observe the subsisting order of the lower court. It affirmed the inherent power of the court to act where an existing court judgment is flouted to uphold the integrity of the judiciary. Such an issue may be raised by either party orally, by formal application, or raised by the court itself.
Although the appellant was not part of the suit and lacked the requisite legal standing without formal application, that it was a beneficiary of the English court’s order meant that the trial judge was justified to restrain it from enforcing the order. However, the appellant had been incorrectly found to be jointly liable with the third respondent for flouting the judgment of the court below, so it experienced some success on this count.
On the challenge of the trial court’s jurisdiction to make one of its pronouncements, the appellate court found that the judge had unlawfully addressed the substance of a forthcoming application. This violated the well-established principle that a court must make its findings and orders on the same grounds of argument it has received from the parties. This issue was therefore resolved in the appellant’s favour.
Overall, the appeal was meritorious and allowed in part.
The case before the appellate court concerned an appeal against the ruling of the High Court where the appellant’s case was dismissed. In the High Court, the appellant sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the matter.
The court considered whether the non-inclusion of the word ‘council’ to the names of the respondents was a misnomer and whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the appellant’s preliminary objection.
The court held that the non-inclusion of the word ‘council’ was indeed a misnomer which stood to be amended with the court’s discretion. Once amended, it gave the High Court the right to dismiss the appellant’s preliminary objection.
The court relied on legislation establishing the respondents in order to identify their correct names and the court stated that no other names could have been intended than those put forward by the respondents. The court was of the view that the appellant was being unnecessarily technical which led to an incorrect legal view.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the ruling of the High Court was affirmed. Costs were ordered in favour of the respondents.
The appellant brought an appeal against the judgement of the High Court, where the lower court dismissed the appellant’s suit on grounds that the claim had prescribed.
The court considered whether the appellant’s right to a fair hearing could be determined despite having failed to initiate its case prior to it prescribing and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the appellant’s case due to prescription.
The court held that the appellant’s right to a fair hearing could not be determined under the circumstances. The court also held that the High Court incorrectly dismissed the appellant’s case without considering important aspects.
Regarding the right to a fair hearing; the court was of the view that since the appellant initiated their case by writ of summons for a declaration against the respondent, it was not an application for the enforcement of a fundamental right and it stood to be affected by the operation of a statute including any limitations the statute could have had. Furthermore, the court issued that the High Court ought to have made an inquiry as to the definition of a ‘public officer’ as used in the statute and if there were any exceptions to the statute that prescribes claims against public officers after three months. The omission by the High Court was held to be an error.
The appeal was successful, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. Court ordered the case to be heardafresh by the High Court. No costs were ordered.
The court determined the principles of granting a stay of execution and injunction pending appeal in a case that involves a state government.
The first respondent raised a preliminary objection on the jurisdiction of the court, since there was a stay of execution pending in the court below on the same issue and the first appellant had not appealed on the attachment of the appellant’s monies in banks (garnishee order). In determining its jurisdiction, the court applied Order 4 Rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011 (Rules of the Court) and held that it had discretionary powers to make injunctions pending appeal even when no application lied in the court below depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Additionally, the court held that there was an appeal predicated on the garnishee order thus the issues were properly before it.
The court set out the principles of granting a stay of execution and injunction pending appeal: to preserve the subject matter of the appeal from irreparable damage pending appeal. It also held that the principles are applied when a party has an arguable appeal and to enhance public interest.
The court observed that the appellant had admitted its indebtedness to part of the judgment debt and held it just and fair to refuse the application with respect to that amount. The court held that the trial court erred in granting garnishee orders on balance of the judgment debt. Accordingly, the application succeeded in part.
Administrative law – judicial review- determining whether and administrative body acted ultra vires
This was an appeal on a decision of the High Court determining the title of a land.
The court determined whether the judgment by the trial court was a nullity on grounds of being delivered after three months in contravention of s 294(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The court applied the rule that a judgment in such a case may only be nullified if the appellant can prove that the delay in the delivery caused a miscarriage of justice. The court observed that the trial court did not properly evaluate evidence of the witness and made a declaratory order where the identity of the land was unknown. Secondly, the court determined whether the trial court erred in relying on pleadings that were amended and the court found that the trial court caused a miscarriage of justice for doing so. Finally, the court determined whether the trial court erred by declaring the title of the disputed land in favour of the respondents and resolved the issue in favour of the appellant.
Accordingly, the appeal succeeded, the judgment of the High Court was set aside and an order as to costs was made against the respondents.
Civil procedure rules – appeal - challenge of record of proceedings
This is an appeal of the decision of the trial court that found the assignment of the respondent’s debt to the Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) as being illegal, unlawful and negligent in law.
The court determined the first issue: whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the AMCON Act in relation to assignment of the debt and finding that the assignment was illegal, unlawful and negligent in law. The court held that the provisions relied on in the AMCON Act were clear and its only duty was interpreting the provisions according to their literal meaning not varying them. It was held that the trial court erred in its determination thereof. With respect to the other issues, the court held that the resolution of the first issue disposed the appeal making the other issues irrelevant. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside with costs in favour of the appellant.
The issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear a petition for winding up and whether the respondent had required authorization to petition for winding up.
The appeal emanated from the dismissal of the appellant’s objection to a petition for winding up the appellant company. The appellant argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide on the matter. It pointed out that only the English courts had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on any dispute between the parties. Moreover, the appellant challenged the legal personality of the respondent arguing that they did not provide original certificates of incorporation and that the respondent did not receive authority of shareholders to petition for the winding up.
The respondent opposed the appeal on the grounds that the English courts had exclusive jurisdiction only on disputes and not on a petition for winding up. It further argued that it required a trail to verify the authenticity of the certificate of incorporation. Lastly the respondent pointed out that since they were duly incorporated, they were authorized to work on behalf of the shareholders.
The court in dismissed the first two points raised by appellant. The court held that the English court’s exclusive jurisdiction did not extend to petitions and that documents attached to an affidavit in an interlocutory application should not be used as an objection to the issue of admissibility. However the court ruled that the respondent required the approval of directors and shareholders to file a petition to wind up. Thus the appeal was upheld.
The dispute emanated from reversal of a bank deposit by the appellant bank from the respondent’s bank account. The respondent deposited US $51,700 in to his bank account which was reversed by appellant bank on the basis that the money deposited was counterfeit currency. The respondent successfully challenged the reversal and was awarded damages amounting to 1 million Naira.
The appellant appealed against the ruling on the basis that the trial judge erred. The bank maintained that the currency deposed with bank was counterfeit. It based its argument on the failure by the respondent to disclose the source of the money and the verification of the money at its head office which proved that the money was counterfeit.
The respondent opposed the appeal on the grounds that there were not present at the verification of the currency and that it was the appellant who bears the onus of proving that the currency was not authentic. He argued that the bank staff verified the authenticity of the currency when he made the deposit.
In deciding the case the court held that the was no evidence to show that deposit acceptance was subjected to authentication. It ruled that deposit of the US $51,700 created a rebuttable presumption that authentic dollars were deposited. It pointed to the teller stamp and initials as consituting prima facie proof of payment and after producing that the respondent need not to go further. The appeal was thus dismissed.
This is an appeal against a High Court decision granting a summary judgement. The dispute emanated from share trading facility offered to the appellant company by the respondent bank. However, the appellant failed to pay for the shares when payment fell due, prompting the respondent to approach the court where a summary judgement was awarded in favor of the respondent.
The appellant appealed the decision on the ground that it was not given a fair hearing. It pointed out that the determination through summary judgement ignored issues of merit. The appellant argued that sufficient issues had been raised to warrant a full trial of the case, and that it had a bona fide defense.
The respondent opposed the appeal on the basis that the summary judgement was employed to prevent a sham defense, and that an objection to summary judgement must address a specific claim not a general sweeping denial of the claim.
The court held that the case hinges on whether the appellant’s defense constitutes a triable issue. It found that the appellant failed to raise triable issues. It held that the trial court was correct in finding that the appellant defense was a sham. It ruled that the appellant was indebted to the respondent. The appeal was thus dismissed.
The appeal emanated from the advance of a loan by the first respondent to the appellant. The appellant deposited with appellant bank a certificate of occupation and a share certificate as security. The appellant then failed to repay the loan resulting in the sale of the appellant’s shares deposited as security. The appellant instituted legal proceedings against the respondent claiming that it was not indebted to the first respondent for any amount because the arrangement between the parties was a joint venture agreement and that the sale of the second appellants shares was done mala fide and without their consent.
The challenge was dismissed. The appellant appealed against the dismissal arguing that the trial court erred. It pointed out that the deed of mortgage was not properly executed and that the contract between the parties was invalid.
The respondent argued that the appellant was raising new issues not canvassed in the court below. It argued that there was a valid contract between the parties.
The court held that there was a loan agreement between the parties and the appellants did not complain of anomalies in the contract hence it waived any right it may have had. The court ruled that a party cannot raise new issues in an appeal and dismissed the appeal.
The court considered whether the failure to omit the court name in a notice of motion and error in arrangement of parties invalidated the application.
The court held that a notice of appeal is the foundation and any defect to it renders the whole appeal incompetent. In that regard, to validly invoke the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal, it must be shown that the decision appealed against arose from the courts listed in s 240 of the Constitution.
The court found that the particulars of the claim did not invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeal which is a material defect. Moreso, cannot be cured by an amendment. Therefore, the court was not able to grant the reliefs claimed.
The court accordingly dismissed the application.
The court considered whether the State High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a matter about mines and minerals.
The court held that according to s 251(1)(n) of the Constitution as amended, the Federal High Court had jurisdiction about mining operations.
The court found that the statement of claim showed that the cause of action accrued in 1996; therefore, the law that was in existence at that time is applicable. Further, the court found that the construction, operation and maintenance of an oil pipeline by a holder of oil prospecting license is an act of mining operations. The facts of the case therefore fell within s 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution. The trial court lacked jurisdiction.
The court accordingly upheld the appeal.
The court considered whether the respondent’s witness' statement on oath needed to be amended notwithstanding the amendment of the statement of defence. Further, whether the appellant was properly retired from the service of the second respondent.
The court held that the giving of a written statement on oath is a distinct process from the statement of defence which serves to support the statement of defence but is not part of it. Further, according to the public service rules the compulsory retirement age for all grades in the service shall be sixty years or thirty-five years of pensionable service whichever is earlier. A statement of policy cannot overrule public service rules, especially where such terms are not written in terms of the contract of employment.
The court found that when the respondents were given leave to amend their statement of defence, the amended statement of defence took effect from the date of the original statement of defence. Therefore, it was too late for the appellant to object to the effect that there was no written deposition to support the amended statement of defence. The court also found that the premature retirement was unlawful, null and void thus entitled to reinstatement.
The court accordingly upheld the appeal and awarded costs.
The court considered three issues. Firstly, how a court should exercise its discretion in regulating a motion meant to regularise the process and the other meant to terminate the process. Secondly, whether the respondents were necessary parties to the suit. Lastly, whether the trial court was correct in awarding costs.
The court held that the practice was to give priority to hearing a motion set to regularise a process if the motion succeeds the other motions seeking to terminate the proceedings will be withdrawn. The court also held that respondents are necessary to a suit if they would be directly or financially affected by the outcome of the judgement of the case. Also, the court held that courts have absolute discretion to either award or refuse costs.
The court found that the trial judge instead of taking the motion for joinder and amendment, preliminary objections of the first and second respondent based on jurisdiction were taken which were meant to terminate the points in limine. The court also found that the respondents were necessary parties because they are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings, but they constitute those who in their absence the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. The court found that the costs awarded were not exceptionally high or punitive to conclude that the court's discretion was not in the interest of justice.
The court accordingly upheld the appeal.